Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TAIPEI3707
2006-10-31 10:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

TAIWAN OPTIMISTIC ON RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

Tags:  PREL TW JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 5853
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 8200
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8162
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RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003707 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2031
TAGS: PREL TW JA
SUBJECT: TAIWAN OPTIMISTIC ON RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

REF: A. 05 TAIPEI 4550


B. TAIPEI 2747

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003707

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2031
TAGS: PREL TW JA
SUBJECT: TAIWAN OPTIMISTIC ON RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

REF: A. 05 TAIPEI 4550


B. TAIPEI 2747

Classified By: AIT Director Stephen M. Young, Reason 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: Shinzo Abe's election as Japanese Prime
Minister in late September is widely viewed within Taiwan
academic and foreign policy circles as an opportunity for
Taipei to further improve its already strong working
relationship with Japan. While hoping to expand economic and
cultural ties, President Chen's administration would also
like to enhance political and security relations with Tokyo.
Japan remains, however, reluctant to change the existing
framework of its unofficial ties with Taiwan and is low-key
about the increasing level of exchanges in both directions.
End Summary.

Overview of Taiwan Japan-Relations
--------------


2. (C) Relations between Taiwan and Japan have improved
significantly in recent years, especially since President
Chen Shui-bian took office in 2000, according to James Liao
of the Foreign Ministry's Association of East Asian Relations
(AEAR),Taiwan's quasi-official body overseeing relations
with Japan. This is due in large part to growing concerns
within the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and in
Japan over the PRC's increasing regional clout. The
extensive Japan-related experience of several old-guard DPP
leaders and the largely pro-Japan view held by many ruling
party members have also converged with the rise of a new
generation of conservative Japanese politicians to create a
more cooperative atmosphere between Taipei and Tokyo.

Abe's Election, Taipei's Opportunity
--------------


3. (C) Within this context, Shinzo Abe's election as the new
Japanese prime minister in late September is widely viewed
within Taiwan academic and foreign policy circles as an
opportunity for Taipei to continue building on the already
strong working relationship with Japan, especially on
economic and cultural issues. Immediately after Abe's
selection as head of the LDP, Taiwan MOFA officials
underscored the "good interactions" between Taipei and Tokyo
over the past six years and expressed hope that relations
will further develop under Abe's administration. Foreign
Minister James Huang (Chih-fang) told AIT on October 12 that

Taiwan expects the new Abe government to be "very friendly,
and added that the Chen administration hopes to continue
enhancing the relationship in a "pragmatic and low-key
manner."

Limited Concern over Abe's Overtures to Beijing
-------------- --


4. (C) MOFA officials do not appear to be overly concerned
that Abe's efforts to improve ties with the PRC will have a
negative impact on Taipei's relationship with Tokyo. Foreign
Minister Huang, rather, praised Abe's recent trip to Beijing
and Seoul, saying that improved Sino-Japanese relations are a
key to preserving stability in the East Asia region. MOFA's
James Liao suggested that Taiwan is confident that a stable
relationship between Tokyo and Beijing will allow Taipei to
continue to improve the level and quality of Taipei's
interactions with Tokyo.

Diplomatic "Successes" and Growing Exchanges
--------------


5. (C) Taiwan has scored several notable achievements in
improving its informal working relationship with Japan. FM
Huang highlighted, for example, Japan's support for Taiwan
WHO observership and the visa-waiver program for tourists as
two recent "successes." NSC advisor on Japanese affairs Lin
Cheng-wei told AIT that Taiwan continues to work closely with
Tokyo on several other initiatives. In particular, Lin
pointed to efforts to promote exchanges on environmental
protection and environment-friendly technology issues. MOFA
Pacific Islands Section Chief Wang Chiang told AIT that

TAIPEI 00003707 002 OF 003


Japan's willingness to brief the Taipei representative in
Tokyo on the Japan-South Pacific summit earlier this year was
another example of stepped-up cooperation.


6. (C) Exchanges between Taiwan and Japan, both
government-to-government and people-to-people, are growing
more robust. According to MOFA's James Liao, approximately
200-300 Japanese delegations from parliament, provincial and
lower-level governments, and non-government organizations
visited Taiwan last year. Over 400 similar delegations from
Taiwan visited Japan. He noted the large volume of traffic
is stretching his office's resources. While Japanese
government official visitors to Taipei generally remain at
the deputy-director level and below, Taiwan officials up to
the ministerial level frequently travel to Japan. Liao
explained that the visit of Japanese Vice Minister of
Agriculture Miyakoshi Mitsuhiro to Taiwan in August was an
exception rather than a breakthrough.


7. (C) According to Liao, while Japan enjoys its strongest
governmental relationship with the U.S., its closest
people-to-people relationship is with nearby Taiwan. The
number of tourist and private travelers between Taiwan and
Japan has grown over the past few years to surpass 1 million
in both directions. Japan is the top destination for Taiwan
tourists, and Taiwan is the number two destination (after
ROK) for Japanese tourists. The SARS outbreak in 2003 and
anti-Japanese riots in 2005, explained Liao, prompted many
Japanese tourists to cancel trips to China and visit Taiwan
instead, enhancing Taiwan's image and boosting tourism
growth. The Japanese are more knowledgeable about Taiwan
than in the past because of expanded news coverage following
the establishment in recent years of several Japanese media
offices in Taipei.

Limited Defense Exchanges
--------------


8. (C) While hoping to continue expanding economic and
cultural ties, the Chen administration has expressed interest
in enhancing security and defense cooperation with Tokyo. In
numerous meetings with AIT officers and with official and
unofficial visitors from the U.S., Taiwan authorities have
raised the issue of enhancing trilateral cooperation among
Taiwan, Japan and the U.S., often referring to the October
2005 U.S.-Japan "Two-plus-Two" talks (ref A). In a
television interview on September 10, President Chen stressed
that Taiwan-Japan relations were the "best in three decades"
and reiterated his desire to forge a "military partnership"
with Japan to preserve peace across the Taiwan strait.
Ruling DPP officials on October 12 used the North Korean
nuclear test announcement as another opportunity to reiterate
Taipei's willingness to intensify cooperation with the
US-Japan Security Alliance. In an October 30 video
conference with Japanese lawmakers, scholars, and
journalists, President Chen called for a Japan-Taiwan
security dialogue and a U.S.-Japan-Taiwan trilateral
dialogue.


9. (C) According to the Japan Interchange Association's
(JIA) General Affairs Director Takagaki Ryoji, despite
enjoying good relations with Taiwan, Japan prefers to keep
bilateral defense ties on an informal basis. MOFA's Liao
told AIT that Taiwan has one active-duty military liaison
officer in Tokyo while Japan has one retired military officer
serving in Taipei. Although Taiwan would like to increase
the level of representation and mil-to-mil exchanges, he
acknowledged that, prospects currently remain slim because of
Japanese caution.

Taiwan's Long-term Interest in Enhancing Ties
--------------


10. (C) Characterizing the current "unofficialness" of
Japan-Taiwan relations as a couple living together out of
wedlock. MOFA's Liao told AIT that for many years Taiwan has
urged Japan to enact a law similar to the Taiwan Relations
Act (TRA). It also hopes Japan will eventually agree to
allow transit stops by Taiwan leaders as the U.S. does. At
present, he said, Taiwan will not push such issues because it

TAIPEI 00003707 003 OF 003


does not want to cause trouble for Abe. Nonetheless, in his
October 30 video conference with Japanese legislators,
scholars, and journalists, President Chen urged support for a
Japanese version TRA and also expressed hope for investment
guarantee and economic partnership agreements leading
eventually to an FTA between Taiwan and Japan.

Wrinkles in the Relationship
--------------


11. (C) Fishing disputes in the overlapping Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) claim between Taiwan and Japan are the
only real point of contention in Taiwan-Japan relations,
MOFA's Liao told AIT. Taiwan's proximity to the Ryukyu
(Okinawa) islands means that fishermen operating out of Ilan
County in northeast Taiwan find themselves in the
Japanese-claimed EEZ just a few kilometers off the Taiwan
coast. Ongoing talks on the maritime border, now in their
15th round, have failed to reach a compromise. The recent
visit of Vice Minister Miyakoshi was an attempt to break the
deadlock but produced no results, said Liao. The Chen
administration, continued Liao, feels it has been flexible
enough in the negotiations and has even risked alienating
Ilan voters, a traditionally strong base for the DPP, by
strictly policing Taiwan fishermen. In June 2005, local Ilan
opposition politicians were able to mobilize large
demonstrations of Ilan fisherman to protest Japanese
treatment of, and Taiwan lack of support for, Ilan fisherman
in the disputed area.


12. (C) Although Taipei and Tokyo's competing claims over
the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) islands--also claimed by Beijing--is
another area of contention, Liao said the Chen administration
has minimized friction by emphasizing the need to resolve the
issue calmly and peacefully. Those in Taiwan most interested
in Diaoyutai activism are Deep Blue local politicians, who
like to raise the issue to attract media attention especially
during election campaigns. No administration in Taipei, even
one as pro-Japan as the DPP, could afford to give up Taiwan's
claim to the Diaoyutai, asserted Liao.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) With Abe as Prime Minister, Taiwan foreign policy
circles expect Taiwan-Japan relations to continue moving on
the positive trajectory built up over the past six years.
Taiwan has worked to minimize friction in the relationship
and has not aggressively pushed claims to disputed
territories. While officials in Taipei will probably
persevere in efforts to enhance the level and formality of
its relationship with Tokyo, they do not seem to expect any
near-term breakthroughs. After the United States, Japan is
Taiwan's most important partner, and the DPP government will
continue to assiduously promote this relationship, in part as
a counterweight to its more difficult and complicated
relationship with the PRC. The opposition KMT's views toward
Japan are colored by China's WW II experience and its
interests in developing relations with the PRC. Japanese
officials have expressed uncertainty, even puzzlement, over
the less-than-friendly attitude of KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou
toward Japan, which Ma sought to defuse, with only mixed
success, by his March visit to Japan and meetings with
Japanese media. If the KMT returns to power in 2008, it
would likely end up continuing policies toward Japan
basically similar to those of the DPP government, though
without the same warmth, enthusiasm, and mutual trust.
YOUNG