Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06TAIPEI3388
2006-10-02 08:40:00
SECRET
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:
MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA
how-toVZCZCXRO6255 OO RUEHGH DE RUEHIN #3388/01 2750840 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 020840Z OCT 06 FM AIT TAIPEI TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2405 INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 5723 RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0141 RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 4325 RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0159 RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 8079 RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU PRIORITY 9586 RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 6935 RUEHOK/AMCONSUL OSAKA KOBE PRIORITY 0386 RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI PRIORITY 0407 RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY RHMFISS/HQ BICE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003388
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2026
TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA
REF: A. STATE 156220
B. STATE 161145
Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4
B/C
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003388
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2026
TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA
REF: A. STATE 156220
B. STATE 161145
Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4
B/C
1. (S) Summary: On September 28, AIT delivered to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Consular Affairs (CA)
Bureau Ref A talking points on outstanding export control
"gameplan" issues. CA and AIT agreed to implement before
mid-October a system to allow Washington agencies to
regularly review Taiwan visa data on North Korean and Iranian
nationals. Separately, AIT delivered Ref B export license
comments to the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) and BOFT
described recent progress in interagency cooperation. End
summary.
2. (S) On September 28, AIT/ECON officers met with MOFA to
deliver Ref A demarche on reviewing Taiwan information on
visa applicants from North Korea and Iran. Representatives
from the Taiwan side included MOFA CA Section Chief Chou
Chung-hsing, Second Division Director Jerry S. K. Yang, and
Department of North America Affairs First Section Chief
Vincent C. H. Yao. Section Chief Chou, who was introduced as
the person in charge of North Korea visa issues, was the
principal speaker for the Taiwan side.
MOFA Visa Procedures
--------------
3. (S) Section Chief Chou presented an overview of the visa
application process for MOFA's overseas consular offices.
Every visa applicant from "Category Five" "sensitive"
countries like Iran and North Korea must be vetted by Taipei
and is required to have a local Taiwan sponsor who vouches
for the legitimacy of the applicant's intentions. Visa
application information, including information on the Taiwan
sponsor, is collected at the foreign post and then faxed or
otherwise electronically sent back to Taiwan MOFA.
4. (S) After the information is received in Taipei, MOFA
compares it against various "black lists" and briefly
investigates the sponsor/local company (for business visas
the sponsor is a local company). Typically, MOFA will only
check the business license of a listed company sponsor. MOFA
can then approve or deny the visa application, and relays its
decision to the overseas consular office.
AIT Overcomes MOFA Sovereignty Concerns
--------------
5. (S) MOFA CA Second Division Director Yang and Section
Chief Chou discussed at great length with AIT Ref A talking
points on providing information on visa applicants from North
Korea and Iran. In response to the sovereignty concerns that
they raised, AIT assured CA that the data exchange program
would in no way infringe on Taiwan's authority to issue or
deny visas to any individual, and that the final decisions on
whether to issue or deny a visa would remain with Taiwan
authorities. AIT explained that U.S. agencies would merely
provide an additional background check to see if the
applicants had any association with weapons programs or
criminal activities. Taiwan could then use this information
along with information from its own sources in determining
whether or not a foreign national should be allowed to travel
to Taiwan.
Balance Ying and Yang to Achieve Harmony
--------------
6. (S) MOFA CA representatives also expressed concern about
the one-sided nature of the information flow and asked if AIT
could provide any lists of entities involved in weapons
proliferation in return for the data on visa applicants. AIT
said that Washington agencies would regularly reply with
information on whether the Iranian or North Korean nationals
applying for Taiwan visas had suspicious backgrounds. If
further information exchange was needed for the sake of
TAIPEI 00003388 002 OF 003
balance, AIT suggested that it could regularly provide lists
of entities involved in terrorist finance activities based on
public information from the U.S. Treasury Department. MOFA
CA indicated such an exchange arrangement would be more
palatable, and agreed the U.S. Treasury data could serve that
purpose.
MOFA Raises Logistical/Timing Concerns
--------------
7. (S) Section Chief Chou pointed out to AIT some of the
logistical and timing issues that needed attention before
data exchanges could take place. He said that Taiwan
consular offices in some countries do not have access to
reliable internet connections and transmit application
information to Taipei via fax. Further, the Taiwan visa
application form lacked data fields for date of birth and
name of employer, as requested in Ref A. Chou also expressed
concern about the length of time that would be required for
U.S. agencies to review the visa applications. He pointed
out that AIT and CA would need to agree on how the data would
be formatted, encrypted, transmitted, stored, and shared with
AIT.
AIT Focuses on a Practical Approach
--------------
8. (S) AIT agreed that there were a number of unresolved
logistical issues, but noted that Ref A talking points
suggested that progress towards the gameplan goals could be
achieved in stages. AIT suggested that AIT and CA
immediately begin a series of tests of the proposed data
exchange system to get a better idea of the numbers, timing,
and difficulties involved.
MOFA Agrees to Immediate Testing
--------------
9. (S) Chou agreed to immediately begin an initial testing
phase of the data exchange system. During this phase, MOFA
will supply AIT with data for visa applicants from North
Korea and Iran that have most recently received Taiwan visas.
CA and AIT briefly discussed whether to exchange data at
weekly or monthly intervals, but decided feasibility testing
was necessary to determine the appropriate interval. CA
agreed that the Taiwan information will be formatted
according to international standards for digital visa
information. The data will include the name, passport
number, date of birth, sex, visa type, number of entries,
issue place, issue date, enter-before date, duration of stay,
visa number, remarks (including name of employer for business
travelers),and a digital photograph.
Details of Testing Arrangement
--------------
10. (S) During the testing phase CA will inscribe its most
recent visa data for North Korean and Iranian nationals onto
a compact disk. In order to balance the flow of information,
AIT will prepare a disk with any U.S. responses on previous
visa applicants and the latest U.S. Treasury public
information on entities involved in terrorist finance
activities, and swap disks with CA. AIT will then transmit
the visa data to ISN/MTR via the State Department Intranet
system. Both CA and AIT will keep records of the number of
applicants, how long it takes Washington agencies to provide
comments on the applicants, the number of applicants scoring
"hits" indicating suspicious intentions, and follow-up
actions taken by Taiwan authorities.
Bad Guys Can Be Stopped at the Border
--------------
11. (S) Section Chief Chou explained that in most cases visa
applicants do not enter Taiwan immediately after the visa is
issued. He said that even several days after issuance there
would be a good chance that the person could be stopped at
the border prior to entry if Washington agencies can provide
TAIPEI 00003388 003 OF 003
prompt responses. He noted that even if the person could not
be stopped prior to entry, it might be possible to stop them
prior to exiting Taiwan, and it would certainly be possible
to add their names to Taiwan's own "blacklist" to prevent
future travel to Taiwan.
System Test and CWC Info Coming in Near Future
-------------- -
12. (S) AIT noted that the testing phase would provide
information essential for planning how to move closer to the
Ref A goal of allowing Washington agencies a chance to review
visa applications prior to adjudication. Section Chief Chou
agreed that after implementation of the testing phase there
could be more realistic discussions on how to move forward.
AIT and CA agreed that the first test of the new data
exchange system will take place before mid-October. Chou
also said that within the next few days MOFA will provide AIT
with updated materials on Taiwan's desire for some form of
participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
BOFT Praises Effectiveness of Gameplan
--------------
13. (S) In a separate meeting with BOFT Export Control Task
Force Head Wally Su, AIT delivered Ref B comments on specific
export license applications. Su took the opportunity to
relate that Taiwan Customs has recently forwarded a number of
cases of possible export control violations to BOFT, which,
in turn, has forwarded them to the Ministry of Justice
Investigation Bureau (MJIB). Su said he was impressed with
recent improvements in interagency cooperation, but was
concerned that the MJIB still had few agents who understood
export control issues. He added that Taiwan's National
Security Bureau has asked him to develop a training program
in export control for its agents.
WANG
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2026
TAGS: ETTC UNSCR TW NKWG
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN AGREES TO SEND IRAN/NORTH KOREA DATA
REF: A. STATE 156220
B. STATE 161145
Classified By: AIT Acting Deputy Director Daniel K. Moore, REASONS 1.4
B/C
1. (S) Summary: On September 28, AIT delivered to the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Consular Affairs (CA)
Bureau Ref A talking points on outstanding export control
"gameplan" issues. CA and AIT agreed to implement before
mid-October a system to allow Washington agencies to
regularly review Taiwan visa data on North Korean and Iranian
nationals. Separately, AIT delivered Ref B export license
comments to the Bureau of Foreign Trade (BOFT) and BOFT
described recent progress in interagency cooperation. End
summary.
2. (S) On September 28, AIT/ECON officers met with MOFA to
deliver Ref A demarche on reviewing Taiwan information on
visa applicants from North Korea and Iran. Representatives
from the Taiwan side included MOFA CA Section Chief Chou
Chung-hsing, Second Division Director Jerry S. K. Yang, and
Department of North America Affairs First Section Chief
Vincent C. H. Yao. Section Chief Chou, who was introduced as
the person in charge of North Korea visa issues, was the
principal speaker for the Taiwan side.
MOFA Visa Procedures
--------------
3. (S) Section Chief Chou presented an overview of the visa
application process for MOFA's overseas consular offices.
Every visa applicant from "Category Five" "sensitive"
countries like Iran and North Korea must be vetted by Taipei
and is required to have a local Taiwan sponsor who vouches
for the legitimacy of the applicant's intentions. Visa
application information, including information on the Taiwan
sponsor, is collected at the foreign post and then faxed or
otherwise electronically sent back to Taiwan MOFA.
4. (S) After the information is received in Taipei, MOFA
compares it against various "black lists" and briefly
investigates the sponsor/local company (for business visas
the sponsor is a local company). Typically, MOFA will only
check the business license of a listed company sponsor. MOFA
can then approve or deny the visa application, and relays its
decision to the overseas consular office.
AIT Overcomes MOFA Sovereignty Concerns
--------------
5. (S) MOFA CA Second Division Director Yang and Section
Chief Chou discussed at great length with AIT Ref A talking
points on providing information on visa applicants from North
Korea and Iran. In response to the sovereignty concerns that
they raised, AIT assured CA that the data exchange program
would in no way infringe on Taiwan's authority to issue or
deny visas to any individual, and that the final decisions on
whether to issue or deny a visa would remain with Taiwan
authorities. AIT explained that U.S. agencies would merely
provide an additional background check to see if the
applicants had any association with weapons programs or
criminal activities. Taiwan could then use this information
along with information from its own sources in determining
whether or not a foreign national should be allowed to travel
to Taiwan.
Balance Ying and Yang to Achieve Harmony
--------------
6. (S) MOFA CA representatives also expressed concern about
the one-sided nature of the information flow and asked if AIT
could provide any lists of entities involved in weapons
proliferation in return for the data on visa applicants. AIT
said that Washington agencies would regularly reply with
information on whether the Iranian or North Korean nationals
applying for Taiwan visas had suspicious backgrounds. If
further information exchange was needed for the sake of
TAIPEI 00003388 002 OF 003
balance, AIT suggested that it could regularly provide lists
of entities involved in terrorist finance activities based on
public information from the U.S. Treasury Department. MOFA
CA indicated such an exchange arrangement would be more
palatable, and agreed the U.S. Treasury data could serve that
purpose.
MOFA Raises Logistical/Timing Concerns
--------------
7. (S) Section Chief Chou pointed out to AIT some of the
logistical and timing issues that needed attention before
data exchanges could take place. He said that Taiwan
consular offices in some countries do not have access to
reliable internet connections and transmit application
information to Taipei via fax. Further, the Taiwan visa
application form lacked data fields for date of birth and
name of employer, as requested in Ref A. Chou also expressed
concern about the length of time that would be required for
U.S. agencies to review the visa applications. He pointed
out that AIT and CA would need to agree on how the data would
be formatted, encrypted, transmitted, stored, and shared with
AIT.
AIT Focuses on a Practical Approach
--------------
8. (S) AIT agreed that there were a number of unresolved
logistical issues, but noted that Ref A talking points
suggested that progress towards the gameplan goals could be
achieved in stages. AIT suggested that AIT and CA
immediately begin a series of tests of the proposed data
exchange system to get a better idea of the numbers, timing,
and difficulties involved.
MOFA Agrees to Immediate Testing
--------------
9. (S) Chou agreed to immediately begin an initial testing
phase of the data exchange system. During this phase, MOFA
will supply AIT with data for visa applicants from North
Korea and Iran that have most recently received Taiwan visas.
CA and AIT briefly discussed whether to exchange data at
weekly or monthly intervals, but decided feasibility testing
was necessary to determine the appropriate interval. CA
agreed that the Taiwan information will be formatted
according to international standards for digital visa
information. The data will include the name, passport
number, date of birth, sex, visa type, number of entries,
issue place, issue date, enter-before date, duration of stay,
visa number, remarks (including name of employer for business
travelers),and a digital photograph.
Details of Testing Arrangement
--------------
10. (S) During the testing phase CA will inscribe its most
recent visa data for North Korean and Iranian nationals onto
a compact disk. In order to balance the flow of information,
AIT will prepare a disk with any U.S. responses on previous
visa applicants and the latest U.S. Treasury public
information on entities involved in terrorist finance
activities, and swap disks with CA. AIT will then transmit
the visa data to ISN/MTR via the State Department Intranet
system. Both CA and AIT will keep records of the number of
applicants, how long it takes Washington agencies to provide
comments on the applicants, the number of applicants scoring
"hits" indicating suspicious intentions, and follow-up
actions taken by Taiwan authorities.
Bad Guys Can Be Stopped at the Border
--------------
11. (S) Section Chief Chou explained that in most cases visa
applicants do not enter Taiwan immediately after the visa is
issued. He said that even several days after issuance there
would be a good chance that the person could be stopped at
the border prior to entry if Washington agencies can provide
TAIPEI 00003388 003 OF 003
prompt responses. He noted that even if the person could not
be stopped prior to entry, it might be possible to stop them
prior to exiting Taiwan, and it would certainly be possible
to add their names to Taiwan's own "blacklist" to prevent
future travel to Taiwan.
System Test and CWC Info Coming in Near Future
-------------- -
12. (S) AIT noted that the testing phase would provide
information essential for planning how to move closer to the
Ref A goal of allowing Washington agencies a chance to review
visa applications prior to adjudication. Section Chief Chou
agreed that after implementation of the testing phase there
could be more realistic discussions on how to move forward.
AIT and CA agreed that the first test of the new data
exchange system will take place before mid-October. Chou
also said that within the next few days MOFA will provide AIT
with updated materials on Taiwan's desire for some form of
participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention.
BOFT Praises Effectiveness of Gameplan
--------------
13. (S) In a separate meeting with BOFT Export Control Task
Force Head Wally Su, AIT delivered Ref B comments on specific
export license applications. Su took the opportunity to
relate that Taiwan Customs has recently forwarded a number of
cases of possible export control violations to BOFT, which,
in turn, has forwarded them to the Ministry of Justice
Investigation Bureau (MJIB). Su said he was impressed with
recent improvements in interagency cooperation, but was
concerned that the MJIB still had few agents who understood
export control issues. He added that Taiwan's National
Security Bureau has asked him to develop a training program
in export control for its agents.
WANG