FRAUD SUMMARY - AIT TAIPEI, JANUARY 2006

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TAIPEI 000253

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR CA/FPP AND EAP/TC
DEPARTMENT ALSO PASS TO KCC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
HONG KONG PLEASE PASS TO DHS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC TW
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - AIT TAIPEI, JANUARY 2006

REFS: (A) 05 AIT TAIPEI 2416 (B) 05 AIT TAIPEI 3816
(C) 05 AIT TAIPEI 4631 (D) 05 AIT TAIPEI 4888

SUMMARY: While AIT Taipei experiences low rates of
documentary fraud in immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, and
American Citizen Services operations, the use of Taiwan
passports containing valid U.S. NIVs to smuggle nationals of
the People's Republic of China (PRC) into the United States
continues to be a major concern and the primary focus of
AIT's Fraud Prevention Unit. Post has excellent
relationships with Taiwan government authorities,
representative offices of other countries, and DHS/CBP and
DHS/ICE officers in the U.S. and abroad. This, plus
intensive investigation into individual alien smuggling
cases, as well as continual discussion of fraud trends among
adjudicating officers, has raised the bar for alien
smugglers, but a solution to this ever-evolving problem
remains elusive. END SUMMARY.


A. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Taiwan is a fully developed and
industrialized society. Long a powerhouse of manufacturing
in everything from light industry to high technology, Taiwan
has one of the highest standards of living in East Asia.
Politically, Taiwan has continually made steps towards more
transparency, rule of law, and democratic processes in a
peaceful fashion. While tensions exist between Taiwan and
the People's Republic of China (PRC),these tensions have
not had a major impact on migration patterns of Taiwan
passport holders.

The United States has long been a popular destination for
Taiwan travelers for tourism, education, business, and
family visits. Despite the high volume of Taiwan travelers
to the U.S. (in FY 2005, AIT adjudicated 200,000 non-
immigrant visa applications),the overstay rate among Taiwan
passport holders is low. AIT's nonimmigrant visa refusal
rate is commensurately low, thus minimizing the number of
applicants who might otherwise use false documents, fake
marriages, and other forms of fraud to overcome the
presumption of immigrant intent. Fraud prevention efforts in
Taiwan are targeted primarily at the sale and use of valid
Taiwan travel documents containing U.S. visas to illegal
aliens and their escorts which are used to smuggle
nationals of the People's Republic of China to the U.S.
illegally.

For both economic and cultural reasons, Taiwan is also a
magnet for ethnic Chinese from other areas in Asia,
particularly Burma and Vietnam, as well as PRC nationals who
migrate to Taiwan primarily from coastal Fujian Province.
After meeting certain conditions, these migrants can receive
a Taiwan national ID card and Taiwan passport.


B. NIV FRAUD: AIT has seen negligible amounts of fraud in
applications for all classes of non-immigrant visa,
including the L, E, and H1B categories. The majority of
Taiwan passport holders have strong ties to Taiwan that are
easily demonstrated. Obtaining genuine job certificates,
household records, police certificates, bank statements,
school registration certificates and other documents that
demonstrate an individual's bona fides is generally easy,
and the information contained in the documents is generally
reliable and accurate. Thus, there is little need and little
market for forged documentation.

Although a relatively small percentage of our total NIV
workload, AIT does receive a substantial number of
applications from citizens of Philippines, Burma, Vietnam,
Thailand, and Indonesia. Most of these applicants are visa
shoppers with few ties to their home countries and no ties
to Taiwan. Additionally, overseas Chinese temporarily
resident in Taiwan and PRC immigrants to Taiwan also
frequently apply for visas at AIT. AIT's 2005 validation
study (see Ref A) showed that all of these applicants had
low rates of return to Taiwan and they are adjudicated

TAIPEI 00000253 002 OF 005


accordingly.

The most significant NIV fraud trend in Taiwan is the
improper use of Taiwan passports with valid U.S. NIVs by
organizations smuggling PRC nationals into the U.S. Because
Taiwan passport holders are considered low risk travelers,
Taiwan passports containing valid U.S. visas are valuable
items in this lucrative trade. Criminal syndicates involved
in PRC alien smuggling are highly sophisticated and
organized, and their methods leave FPU limited options for
combating them.

A common fraud pattern involves Taiwan passport holders
applying for NIVs with genuine Taiwan passports, then
immediately selling the passports with valid U.S. visas
(normally B1/B2) to brokers or alien smuggling syndicates.
Generally, the passports are not altered, but rather the
passport is used by an imposter, usually a PRC citizen (see
Ref B). Additionally, valid Taiwan passports are often used
in boarding pass swaps, in which the passport and U.S. visa
are used to obtain boarding passes that are then given to
PRC nationals in airport transit lounges. These PRC
nationals use the boarding passes to board non-stop flights
to the United States, where they arrive as no-doc passengers
requesting asylum (see Ref C). Taiwan passport holders
frequently serve as escorts for groups of malafide PRC
travelers.

FPU has conducted detailed investigations into, and
maintains complete files on, cases of alien smuggling
reported to AIT by local authorities, FPUs at other U.S.
posts in the region, and DHS/CBP officers at U.S. ports of
entry. Airport liaison has proved a particularly valuable
tool in combating identity fraud and has thwarted many
smuggling attempts at Taipei's Chiang Kai-shek International
Airport. In addition, FPU has worked closely with the NIV
unit in heightening awareness of potentially fraudulent
applicants, and enhanced training for line officers and
local staff.


C. IV FRAUD: AIT experiences very little IV fraud.
Occasionally there is a need to verify family relationships,
or there is some doubt about an applicant's qualifications
for an employment based visa, but few of these cases involve
outright fraud. Recently, we have seen a few employment
based applications with petition approval based on the
applicants' entrepreneurial experience gained while
operating corporations in Taiwan or elsewhere in the region.
However, the current condition of these corporations as
presented during the interviews does not seem to be the same
as presented to DHS when the petition is filed. Through
investigating the local companies we attempt to determine if
there has been a change in circumstances since the petition
was filed, or if there was fraud or exaggeration in the
petition application.


D. DV FRAUD: There is very little fraud in the Diversity
Visa program at AIT. Taiwanese registration in the DV
program has decreased over the last two years and interest
in the program is limited. The few fraudulent cases
encountered have involved overseas Chinese from Burma
(carrying either Taiwan or Burmese passports) submitting
fake school diplomas and transcripts.

Potential Taiwan DV applicants are frequently targeted by
non-U.S. government organizations offering to register
applicants in the DV program for a fee. Although these
services are not fraudulent per se, they imply that
registration is not possible without their services, or that
their services can increase the chances of "winning."
Often, their Web sites look deceptively similar to the
Department of State's web site. Another trend we have seen
are organizations, posing as USG entities, who send emails
"congratulating" Taiwan passport holders on having "won" the
Diversity Lottery, and asking for payment in order to

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"accept and process" a U.S. green card. In response, in
November 2005 AIT's Consular Section issued a press release
through the Public Affairs Section warning the public
against these DV scams.


E. ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD: AIT has had no cases of
citizenship or passport fraud in recent years. There is no
significant local market for stolen or fraudulent foreign
passports and Taiwan citizens are not seeking to
fraudulently obtain foreign citizenship. Taiwan
documentation used to support U.S. citizenship claims for
Consular Report of Birth Abroad (CRBA) cases, such as
hospital records, birth certificates, family registries, and
entry-exit histories, are reliable and verifiable. In the
few CRBA cases where there was not sufficient documentation
to confirm a claim of paternity by an American citizen, DNA
testing was done and in every case paternity was confirmed.


F. ADOPTION FRAUD: There have been no confirmed cases of
adoption fraud in Taiwan for immigration to the United
States. In the few instances where cases raised suspicions,
additional questioning of the adopting parents and, in one
instance, by an FPU field investigation and cooperation with
DHS resolved the case.

Most adoptions by American citizens of Taiwanese orphans are
conducted through orphanages/adoption agencies in Taiwan
with whom AIT has excellent working relationships. The IV
Unit also has regular communication with the adoption
agencies in the U.S. who refer their clients to Taiwan
orphanages and agencies. The majority of adoption cases are
prescreened by the Immigrant Visa unit for compatibility
with U.S. immigration law prior to a child being identified
to the prospective American parents and the initiation of
local adoption proceedings. Local documentation is reliable
and decisions by Taiwan courts are open and generally based
on rule of law.

Private adoptions of Taiwan orphans by American citizens,
who are often ethnic Chinese or dual US-Taiwan nationals,
are somewhat more problematic than those conducted through
the agencies and orphanages, although no fraudulent cases
have been identified. The origin of the children in these
cases is often more difficult to trace and there are
frequently family connections between the adopting parents
and the children. There have been a few cases of family-
based "targeted" adoptions where AIT has refused to process
the cases as IR-3's or IR-4's because they have not met the
standard for adoption of an orphan and the adopting parents
have been advised they must instead maintain legal and
physical custody of the child(ren) for two years for them to
qualify as IR-2's.


G. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFIT FRAUD: AIT has had no fraud
in this area. Reports of lost/stolen I-551 are frequent,
but checks through DHS have confirmed the status of all the
applicants. We issued 107 travel letters in FY 2005 to
replace lost I-551s, one Visas 91, and no Visas 92 and Visas
93 in FY 2005, with no cases in process.


H. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: Local law
enforcement takes seriously the abuse of Taiwan government-
issued documents, but rarely prosecutes cases involving
smuggling attempts to other countries, including the U.S.
Local authorities actively investigate and prosecute, where
possible, violation of laws concerning the issuance and use
of Taiwan passports and national ID cards, and they have
uncovered several alien smuggling rings in recent years.
Local authorities have a number of laws on their books to
use in bringing about arrests and prosecutions. The Taiwan
Passport Law imposes a maximum 5 year prison sentence and/or
NTD 500,000 (USD 15,000) fine for forging a passport or
national ID card that is used to apply for a passport. The
penalty is the same for "handing over" (e.g., selling) a
passport or national ID card, except that the fine is

TAIPEI 00000253 004 OF 005


NT$100,000 (USD 3,000). Taiwan's immigration law also
imposes a maximum 3 year sentence and/or NT$1 million (USD
30,000) fine on boarding pass swappers, although this crime
is rarely prosecuted. This punishment is heavier when
illegal PRC nationals are involved. Article 80 of the
"Statute Governing Relations Between People's of the Taiwan
Area and the Mainland Area" stipulate a maximum prison
sentence of 3 years and/or a fine of NT$1 million to NT$15
million (USD 30,000 to USD 455,000) for anyone who illegally
transports PRC nationals into Taiwan or countries other than
the PRC.

However, enforcement of these penalties does not seem to be
entirely consistent, often because local law enforcement
struggles with the question of jurisdiction. For example,
most boarding pass swaps occur in the transit lounge at CKS
Airport, and there seems to be a constantly shifting
consensus on whether or not transit lounges are considered
to be within law enforcement's legal jurisdiction. For the
most part, however, the Aviation Police Bureau has
cooperated closely with both AIT and DHS/CBP officers at the
ports of entry in intercepting swappers and their PRC
national clients at CKS International Airport, although
arrests are rarely made.

Overall, FPU's relations with host government authorities
have been positive and constructive. FPU enjoys excellent
relations with the Ministry of Justice's Investigation
Bureau, and the National Police Administration's Criminal
Investigation Bureau and Aviation Police Bureau,
particularly in the sharing of information regarding known
alien smugglers and their Taiwan recruits.

FPU has also enjoyed good relations with the Ministry of
Interior's Immigration Bureau, particularly in tracking the
movements of Taiwan passport holders in and out of Taiwan.
However, in 2004, the Taiwan government prohibited all
government agencies from releasing information on Taiwan
passport holders to foreign government entities, and written
requests for such information have gone unanswered. In
addition, the Immigration Bureau and the Aviation Police
have been reluctant to assist FPU in flagging and detaining
alien smugglers moving in and out of Taiwan unless they are
caught in an actual act of smuggling.

FPU's cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
been excellent, particularly with the passport division, who
routinely provide information regarding reports of lost and
stolen passports, as well as information regarding specific
passport applications.

AIT's Consular Section continues to promote training of
local airline and immigration personnel and urge greater
local prosecution of immigration fraud, and more secure
methods of obtaining local identity documents.


I. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: Interdiction of alien
smugglers is a difficult task for FPU because a significant
amount of this fraud occurs beyond our control. For
example, CKS International Airport, which has a relatively
high number of non-stop flights to the United States, is
often used for boarding pass swaps between non-Taiwan third-
country nationals and illegal PRC nationals transiting the
airport to the U.S. These swaps may or may not involve
Taiwan travel documents (see Ref D). In addition, Taiwan
documents are often used to smuggle illegal PRC nationals
into the U.S. through Central and South America, often
following circuitous routes from Asia through Africa and/or
Europe. Finally, data on Taiwan citizens found to have
misused or sold their U.S. NIV's shows that a broad range of
applicants is involved in this activity, making detection at
time of visa interview extremely difficult.

Since FPU often does not learn about smuggling activity
until after flights carrying smuggled individuals are en

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route to the U.S., close cooperation with DHS/CBP officers
at U.S. ports of entry is essential. FPU has worked with
DHS/CBP line officers at Agana (Guam),Los Angeles, and
Honolulu airports, which have resulted in numerous
interdictions of alien escorts and illegal PRC nationals,
and even some arrests and prosecutions. However, FPU could
benefit from closer, more formalized cooperation with
DHS/CBP. For example, TECS/IBIS and CLASS should expand
information-sharing, and a list of key contacts in various
DHS/CBP offices and ports of entry could facilitate more and
faster communication.

FPU has cooperated closely with the Canadian, Australian,
British, New Zealand, German, and Dutch representative
offices in Taipei. In May 2005, AIT hosted a Pan-American
fraud prevention meeting that brought together
representatives from the embassies of Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala, as well as the
Brazilian, Canadian, and Mexican trade offices in Taipei, to
discuss the problem of alien smuggling through Central and
South America.


J. STAFFING AND TRAINING: Post's Fraud Prevention Manager is
a part-time position, generally a second-tour Entry Level
Officer with collateral duties that rotate through the IV,
NIV, and ACS units. FPU also has three full-time Foreign
National (FN) fraud investigators. The incumbent FPM has
had no fraud prevention training other than the fraud
prevention unit of FSI's Basic consular training course.
One FN investigator received fraud prevention training in
Washington in 2002. The other two FN investigators have had
no formal fraud prevention training.

KEEGAN