MTAG: TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL TECHNICAL ISSUES

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 001337

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/TC AND ISN/MTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/17/2026
TAGS: ECCT PARM MTCRE JP TW
SUBJECT: MTAG: TAIWAN EXPORT CONTROL TECHNICAL ISSUES

REF: A. STATE 5106


B. STATE 36441

C. STATE 30954

D. STATE 21176

E. AIT TAIPEI 00171

F. STATE 008195

G. AIT TAIPEI 00141

Classified By: AIT DEPUTY DIRECTOR DAVID KEEGAN, REASONS 1.4 B, C, D.


1. (S) Summary: On April 10 CSI Kaohsiung Head Probo Munoz
met with BOFT Export Control Taskforce Head Wally Su to
discuss changes that needed to be made to Taiwan's regulatory
system and the challenges of implementing the export control
"gameplan." Munoz acknowledged that some of the challenges
were complex and needed further research on solutions. AIT
also delivered ref A demarche. Action request para 10. End
summary.

AIT/T Calls for Technical Assistance
--------------


2. (S) In an April 2 meeting with Taiwan's Bureau of Foreign
Trade (BOFT),AIT Taipei delivered ref A demarche and
listened to BOFT discuss its frustration over trying to meet
some of the technical challenges of implementing the export
control gameplan. AIT Taipei relayed the general substance
of these frustrations to Container Security Initiative (CSI)
Kaohsiung Head Probo Munoz, and arranged for him to meet with
BOFT Export Control Taskforce Head Wally Su on April 10.


3. (SBU) Munoz is a veteran U.S. Customs officer now
stationed in Kaohsiung, Taiwan as an AIT/K CSI consultant. He
works closely with Taiwan Customs, the Port of Kaohsiung
Harbor Bureau, and the shipping lines using the Port of
Kaohsiung and is familiar with the atual practices at
Kaohsiung Harbor and at other harbors around the world. On
the morning of April 10, he noted to AIT that he had just
received instructions from his headquarters in Washington to
assist in helping Taiwan deal with its larger export control
issues.

Export Control Impossible with Current Practices
-------------- ---


4. (S) Munoz began the discussion with Su by pointing out
that Taiwan would never have effective export controls as
long as it allowed goods to be added to containers after the
manifest was completed, as, he said, was now commonly done in
Kaohsiung. He also noted that many transit or transshipment
cargoes still came into port manifested only as "general
cargo" or "personal effects." Until Taiwan started requiring
a complete manifest for all transit cargoes and prohibited
changes to a container's contents after the manifest is
completed, effective export control would be impossible, he
said. He asked Su to consider issuing administrative
regulations to change these two aspects of current
procedures.

CSI Could Improve Taiwan's Export Control
--------------


5. (S) When Su asked if CSI could help target ships with
cargoes to or from North Korea or Iran, Munoz said that while
CSI did not have data on transit cargoes manifested as going
to or coming from North Korea or Iran, it did have data on
companies that do business with these countries. He said
that one of the most powerful features of CSI was its
extensive database on trading companies, the commodities they
handled, and the customers they serviced. He said that he
would check with his headquarters in Washington about
providing this information to Taiwan export control
officials. Munoz said that all of the items that Taiwan was
asked to control in transit were also controlled when they
transited U.S. ports on the way to or from North Korea or
Iran. Munoz suggested that Taiwan's difficulty with

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licensing transit cargoes could be overcome if Taiwan
required the shipping line to provide a complete, detailed
manifest to Taiwan Customs officials 24-48 hours prior to the
arrival of ships in harbor.

No Easy Solution to Transit License
--------------


6. (S) Su responded by pointing out that even a detailed
advance manifest would not provide sufficient information to
determine whether or not a transit/transshipment license
should be issued for items on Taiwan's unique sensitive
commodities lists (SCL),as required by Taiwan's export
control "gameplan" commitments. Su noted that to determine
whether a license should be issued, BOFT needed to know
information not normally on the manifest, such as the name of
the manufacturer, ultimate consignee, intended use, end user,
agent, etc. Su illustrated his point with the example of a
good being shipped from Japan to Hong Kong to Kaohsiung to
Iran. The item might not be on any of the Strategic
High-Tech Commodities (SHTC) international control lists, and
so not require a formal export license from Japan. However,
the item might be on Taiwan's unique SCL (which contains many
items not on any other control list) and require a transit
license to pass through Kaohsiung.

Legal Consequences All Around
--------------


7. (S) Su explained that in this situation the exporter
would not necessarily know that the ship was routed through
Kaohsiung, and captain of the ship would have no way of
knowing the additional information needed for license
determination, and would not risk the penalties for bringing
his ship to Kaohsiung with goods that might be denied a
transit license. Not only would no licensing information
would be collected by Japanese authorities if no formal
export license was required for export, but, Su added, Taiwan
Customs had no direct channels of communication with Japan
Customs and these types of information were considered highly
sensitive in Japan and most places. Su noted that two Taiwan
Customs officials had been sent to jail recently for
revealing information on shipping manifests, and while TECRO
and AIT have exchanged letters on sharing customs
information, Japan has not agreed to share such information
with Taiwan.

Further Study Required
--------------


8. (S) Munoz said he did not have any ready answer for the
problem Su had described, but that he would research and
consult with his headquarters regarding a solution.


9. (S) Su said he would be holding meetings with industry
representatives in the near future to discuss Taiwan's new
SCL and license requirements. He said that Taiwan companies
had already expressed interest in learning how U.S. companies
deal with complex export control regulations and he wondered
if CSI or AIT might be able to help him locate U.S. companies
willing to discuss their procedures. AIT will discuss this
possibility with AmCham Taipei.

10 (S) Action request: AIT requests guidance from Washington
agencies on how to advise BOFT to deal with the technical
issue described in para 6-7.
YOUNG