Overview of Taiwan's Investment Climate

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TAGS: EINV EFIN PINR OPIC KTDB USTR TW
SUBJECT: Overview of Taiwan's Investment Climate


1. Summary: Septel transmits AIT's mandated annual report
with Taiwan's "Investment Climate Statement." Here we
attempt to answer a different question: Are local and
international investors, especially long-term investors,
satisfied with Taiwan's investment climate, looking at both
political and economic factors? Are they expanding their
presence or moving elsewhere? What does Taiwan need to do,
in the opinion of such investors to make itself more
attractive? End Summary.


2. The direct answer to these questions is that foreign and
Taiwan multinational corporations are not fully satisfied
with Taiwan's investment climate. Taiwan's investment
climate disadvantages are well-publicized by local media
that thrive on gloom. Corruption and incompetence of
government officials, unemployment, rising personal debt,
crime, decline in traditional virtues, and exodus of
manufacturing are standard fare in daily news reports.
Bitter partisan politics and the shadow of China's military
threat further lessen Taiwan's appeal to investors.
Restrictions on trade, investment, personnel, and capital
flows with China are a nuisance even though these
restrictions directly affect only a small percentage share
of products and industrial categories.


3. Many, if not most, of the complaints from the business
sector stem from the tense relations between Taiwan and
China. The multinational corporations complain that cross-
Strait shipping and air links must go through a third
territory (i.e., a place other than Taiwan and China).
Cross-Strait travel by air must stop in a third territory.
Indirect navigation costs extra time and money. Tedious
application procedures are required for sending mainland
Chinese-born employees (even those with non-PRC passports)
to Taiwan for work or training in their affiliated offices
on Taiwan.


4. The biggest formal hurdle is that Taiwan-registered
companies' investment in China may not exceed 40% of the net
worth. This means a foreign firm registered in Taiwan must
limit its activities in China to 40% of its Taiwan capital.
The effect for local and foreign firms is to limit growth
possibilities to the growth of the Taiwan market. With
China growing at close to double-digit rates and Taiwan
growth at around 4%, few companies favor tying their growth
strategies to the Taiwan market. For American firms that
seek to use Taiwan as a platform for the China market, the
threshold is just too high.


5. Taiwan authorities also forbid foreign companies with
mainland Chinese ownership from establishing offices in
Taiwan. Taiwan's resistance to absorption by China and its
insistence on a cross-Strait financial regulatory agreement
have prevented Taiwan banks from setting up branches and
subsidiaries on the mainland. Consequently, Taiwan firms in
China complain of inconvenience in getting loans and raising
capital, and have therefore turned to Chinese or third-
country banks for banking services and have listed on Hong
Kong and other stock exchanges rather than in Taiwan.

Rambunctious Democracy Cuts Both Ways
--------------


6. President Chen Shui-bian's 2006 New Year Message
prompted further complaints that his replacing "active
liberalization, with effective management" with "active
management, with effective liberalization" may foreshadow an
increase tensions across the Taiwan Strait, resulting in
setbacks in cross-Strait economic relations. The change
reportedly was an attempt to mollify pro-independence groups
in Taiwan. However, many local observers believe that
further restrictions on investment in China will lead to

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more Taiwan companies listing on overseas stock markets, and
diminishing ties to Taiwan. The President's New Year speech
re-enforced the widespread perception that the government is
less interested in the health of Taiwan's economy than in
partisan goals.


5. While divisive, overactive politics are sometimes cited
as a factor discouraging investment in Taiwan, its
successful transition to democracy is viewed as an advantage
over regional competitors. Taiwan's democratic society,
free press, and vigorous debate of current issues make it an
environment conducive to the sort of critical, creative
thinking most valued in an information-based economy. Local
businesspeople have cited to AIT the liberal environment as
a major quality-of-life advantage that Taipei has to offer
over some other cities in the region.

Good International Rankings
--------------


6. Well-known investment climate indexes continue to rate
Taiwan highly as an investment destination. The World
Economic Forum in its Global Competitive Report for 2005-
2006 ranked Taiwan the most competitive economy in Asia, and
fifth highest in the world out of 117 economies in its
growth competitiveness index. South Korea, the regional
economy most similar to Taiwan, ranked number 17 in
competitiveness. The Business Environment Risk Intelligence
2005 report gave Taiwan it highest rating, reserved for low-
risk economies worthy of investment. The annual World
Competitiveness Yearbook Competitiveness Scoreboard put
Taiwan in 11th place out of 60 economies, with Hong Kong as
number two and Singapore as number three. These ratings
tend to emphasize Taiwan's dynamic private sector
businesses, well-developed infrastructure, detailed
commercial laws, and relatively open markets.

Open Markets May Slow Foreign Investment
--------------


7. Taiwan's relatively open markets allow foreign companies
to export their products to Taiwan without the need to
establish a physical presence, in contrast to some economies
where local manufacturing is necessary to bypass market
barriers. The relative infrequency of merger and
acquisition cases in Taiwan limits what in other economies
is an effective means of attracting foreign direct
investment.


8. Another factor behind the slowing growth of foreign
direct investment in Taiwan is the prevalence of indirect
investment through foreign shareholding in major Taiwan
companies. According to market participants, expectations
of a weaker U.S. currency in 2006 have prompted portfolio
investors to move huge amounts of capital from the United
States to East Asia recently. AIT believes that higher
stock prices and a stronger NTD (against the USD) will
prevail throughout the first half of 2006, buoyed
additionally by the strong attraction of investing in
Taiwan's LCD/TFT (flat panel display) industries, which
anticipate a very good year.


9. Taiwan has largely dropped barriers to most types of
imports from China and most types of investment in China.
About 83% of all trade categories are open to imports from
China, basically only agriculture goods are restricted.
About 93% of all industrial categories are open for Taiwan
investment in China, basically only some high-tech and
infrastructure items are restricted. However, as noted in
para 4 above, there are stringent limits on the value of
investment in China.


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Investment in Taiwan Continues to Expand (Slowly)
-------------- ---


10. Industrial relocation to China has not prevented
continued, albeit slow, expansion of Taiwan's domestic
investment. Real growth in private investment slowed from
31% in 2004 to as low as 3% in 2005 due to excess inventory
stock, and is to reach only 3.6% growth in 2006. The stock
of foreign investment has continued to grow every year, up
7% to US$60.5 billion in 2004 and up another 5.2% to US$63.9
billion in the first 11 months of 2005.

Trade with China Huge and Growing Rapidly
--------------


11. Liberalization of cross-Strait restrictions has
contributed to a steady increase in Taiwan's trade with
China. In September 2005, Taiwan's imports from China for
the first time exceeded imports from the United States,
making China Taiwan's second largest source of imports.
Taiwan's imports have grown at a double-digit rate over the
past four years. In contrast, the island's imports from the
United States have shrunk on a y-o-y basis over the past six
months, and the rate of decline has accelerated. China for
the first time replaced the United States as Taiwan's major
export destination in 2002 when the island's exports to
China totaled US$29,465 million, more than US$26,764 million
from the United States. The percentage share of exports to
China steadily increased from 19.6% in 2001 to 28% in
September 2005. Meanwhile, the share of shipments to the
United States steadily fell from 22.5% to 14%.

Investment in Taiwan as a China Play
--------------


12. A growing number of companies, both local and foreign,
are taking advantage of Taiwan's high-quality human
resources to staff projects in China. They invest in Taiwan
or partner with Taiwan companies in order to gain technical
and management know-how, and language and culture advantages
that make investment projects in China much easier. The
extensive involvement of Taiwan companies in China attracts
foreign investors to Taiwan who want to share in the
benefits of China's rapid growth without the high risk
associated with direct investment there.

New Factor Discouraging Investment
--------------


13. Taiwan's new labor pension system and higher taxes that
will both take effect in 2006 greatly concern investors
because of the impact on operating costs here. Inbound
foreign direct investment approved in October and November
2005 reversed from a y-o-y growth of 53% in Q3 to fall 17%.
Meanwhile, outbound direct investment approved in October
and November 2005 grew 16.4% from a year ago.

Globalization Contributes to Huge Outbound DI
--------------


14. Like other developed economies, Taiwan has begun to see
outbound direct investment exceeding inbound direct
investment as manufacturing has moved offshore. Taiwan
business firms started to relocate their production bases to
Southeast Asia in the mid-1980s and subsequently mainly to
China. Meanwhile, foreign investors continue to flow into
the island to take advantage of Taiwan's high technologies,
relatively liberalized service sector, and as a China play.
An additional factor unique to Taiwan is that in spite of
its continuing competitiveness on paper (as measured by the
investment rating organizations) its appeal to investors has
been declining in direct proportion to China's growing

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economic importance and the falling barriers to trade and
investment there. The tension between Taiwan and China
forces investors to choose between the two to some extent,
and the growing favorite is China. While cross-Strait
tensions and trade and investment barriers will not
disappear overnight, presumably they will eventually. When
progress on this front is good, Taiwan looks like a good
place to invest. But when progress toward lowering cross-
Strait tensions does not keep pace with expectations, Taiwan
looks like a lousy place to invest.

PAAL