SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S FEBRUARY 25

C O N F I D E N T I A L SUVA 000065

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR GENERAL ABIZAID FROM AMBASSADOR DINGER
CANBERRA AND WELLINGTON PLEASE PASS TO CENTCOM POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2016
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV FJ US
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR GENERAL ABIZAID'S FEBRUARY 25
VISIT TO FIJI

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Dinger; Sec. 1.5 (D) and (E)


1. (C) We look forward to your short visit to Fiji. It
comes in the run-up to national elections, which could take
place as early as late April. It is also a time of very
difficult civil-military relations. Tensions between the
government and military have been at a near-boiling point for
months with Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander
(Navy Commodore) Frank Bainimarama (bai ni ma RAH ma) making
numerous veiled threats to replace the government of Prime
Minister Laisenia Qarase (ng ah RAH say) over acts and
policies Bainimarama says are corrupt, racist, or intended to
forgive past acts of treason. The government and military
have also sparred over the military's involvement in the
United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, with the
government giving the green light last fall for an additional
deployment only after protracted internal negotiations and
additional funding from Australia. In your meetings (we hope
with Vice President Ratu Joni Madraiwiwi (Man DRY we we),
Qarase, and Bainimarama),you will have the opportunity to
explore the possibility of having Fiji join the Coalition of
the Willing in Iraq. With Bainimarama you should also
emphasize the proper role of the military in a democratic
society.

The Political Background
--------------


2. (C) The current tension between the government and
military is in the context of a "coup culture" in Fiji. The
RFMF executed two coups in 1987. In May 2000, a group of
nationalist Fijian civilians removed the democratically
elected government headed by Indo-Fijian Mahendra Chaudhry,
with help from some dissident elements of the RFMF. The
RFMF, under Bainimarama, eventually resolved the situation,
with Chaudhry still deposed, and installed Qarase as interim
PM. In November 2000, dissident RFMF elements made an
attempt on Bainimarama's life during a failed mutiny. In
general elections in 2001, Qarase was elected PM. He and
Bainimarama have been at loggerheads much of the time since.
In late 2003, Qarase attempted to deny Bainimarama a second
term as Commander RFMF; but President Iloilo declined to
follow the PM's advice. According to Fiji's Constitution,
only the President can remove the military commander.


3. (C) In 2005, Qarase introduced a controversial
"Reconciliation, Truth, and Unity Bill" (aka "the Bill") to
ostensibly heal old wounds and bring the country together.
The Bill has had just the opposite effect, highlighting the
schisms that continue to exist between Fiji's indigenous and
Indo-Fijian communities and bringing civil-military strains
out into the open. The USG and many others criticized the
Bill's amnesty provisions and impositions on judicial roles.
Bainimarama is the Bill's biggest critic, arguing that its
amnesty provisions could lead to the release or exoneration
of participants in the coup and mutiny, and as such would
"reward treason." A Parliamentary committee suggested
changes that address some, but not all, of the Bill's faults.
Qarase has put the Bill on hold, and it may not arise again
until after the elections. Nevertheless, Bainimarama remains
highly critical of the Bill and openly skeptical of the
Qarase government's intentions. In recent weeks, Bainimarama
has reiterated his oft-stated threat that the military will
take (unspecified) actions to ensure the Bill is not made
into law and implemented.

Government and Military at an Impasse
--------------


4. (C) In mid-January, then-Land Force Commander
Baledrokadroka asked Bainimarama to step down, alleging that
the Commodore had gone beyond the bounds in his threats
toward the Government. Bainimarama, in turn, accused
Baledrokadroka of conspiring with the Government to oust him
from the military leadership. The showdown ended with
Baledrokadroka's resignation. Soon after, Vice President
Madraiwiwi mediated a meeting between Bainimarama and the PM
(the first in many months) in which both sides agreed to tone
down the rhetoric and hold regular meetings. Bainimarama
agreed to share his views with the PM instead of going
straight to the media, while the PM agreed to include the
Commander in National Security Council meetings and deal with
him directly on matters of national security. Bainimarama's
titular superior, the Minister of Home Affairs, appears to
have been cut out of the loop.


5. (C) This arrangement has not lessened Bainimarama's
distaste for the current government. In a February 14 letter
to Vice President Madraiwiwi (not made public),the Commander
called for the delay of elections until after a census is
conducted. He said that, without a census (now about a year
overdue),"the upcoming elections will not be contested on a
fair and democratic basis and it will deprive the people of
Fiji a truly democratically elected government." (Note: a
number of independent observers we have talked to believe
conducting a census is impractical at this point and are
satisfied that the coming elections will be reasonably fair.
End note.) Perhaps recognizing a census could not be
completed before the constitutionally-mandated election
deadline, Bainimarama also reportedly asked the Vice
President to convince the President to dissolve Parliament
and put in place an interim government, actions that the
President reportedly does not believe he has the
constitutional authority to take. Additionally, the Embassy
has a copy of an unsigned, undated think piece, apparently
drafted by or for the RFMF, on possible extra-constitutional
options and justifications. The document refers to the
Pakistan/Musharraf "doctrine of necessity" model as precedent.


6. (C) In recent days, Bainimarama, via a spokesman, has
signaled that the RFMF could invoke the "doctrine of
necessity" to keep Fiji's Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) from
installing a person implicated in the 2000 coup as Fiji's
next President in March. Current President Iloilo has
indicated he is prepared to stay on for a second term;
however, Qarase is rumored to want someone different, someone
who will stand up to Bainimarama and remove him if the PM so
requests. One possible candidate is Ratu Jope Seniloli, a
high chief and former Vice President, who is currently in
jail on 2000-related charges.


7. (C) Bainimarama and Qarase may now both be in situations
of rolling the dice. For the PM, to continue on the course
toward an early election carries a risk of rapidly triggering
a Bainimarama reaction. To attempt to delay the election in
order to hold a census and appease Bainimarama, on the other
hand, may not be legal. It would also be a sign of glaring
political weakness. For the Commander, ordering his troops
to take illegal action against the government risks their
refusal to follow. If he were to succeed, the Commander
knows such an action would trigger international negative
reaction detrimental to Fiji's military reputation and its
tourism economy.

The RFMF in Iraq
--------------


8. (C) In the meantime, Fiji troops have acquitted
themselves very well in Iraq in support of UNAMI. They have
a long and laudatory PKO history, most notably in Lebanon and
the Sinai. In 2004, 200 Fiji troops were deployed in Iraq,
a 155-man guard unit and a 45-man personal security
detachment. In 2005, Fiji renewed its UNAMI commitment and
authorized adding 110 troops for positions in Erbil and
Basra. The additional RFMF troops have trained and are ready
to deploy. However, the UN has not yet given the mission a
green light.


9. (C) The RFMF is dissatisfied with current UNAMI
arrangements, which in the RFMF view, do not allow it to use
the peacekeeping skills it has developed over many years of
involvement in PKO missions. After Bainimarama visited Iraq
in December, he informed us he believes Fiji troops could
contribute more by participating in the Coalition, in
addition to meeting current UNAMI commitments. He has
proposed sending a platoon (starting small),but the
Government has not yet responded. Bainimarama believes
Coalition participation would provide unique training
opportunities and enhance the skills of his troops.

Themes For Your Visit
--------------


10. (C) From our perspective your visit should have two
main themes. First, Iraq:

Commodore Bainimarama has invited you to make the case to the
Government of Fiji for an RFMF deployment to the Coalition of
the Willing.
-- Please express to each interlocutor our deep thanks for
Fiji's exceptional contributions to peacekeeping operations
throughout the world, including via UNAMI in Iraq. Then
discuss the usefulness of Fiji deploying at least some troops
in Iraq as a Coalition partner.

-- Fiji's civilian leaders appreciate that RFMF and Fiji
Police contributions to peacekeeping operations burnish
Fiji's international reputation and contribute to a more
peaceful and prosperous world. This CENTCOM visit, in
itself, strongly accents the message that the U.S. values
Fiji's contributions.

-- The RFMF's budget has been a political issue. It will be
important to flag to the civilian leadership how the costs of
an RFMF deployment to the Coalition would be covered.


11. (C) Second theme: military-civilian relations in a
democracy:

Given the ongoing tensions in Fiji, we believe it essential
for senior U.S. military visitors to reiterate to Commodore
Bainimarama the USG view of civil-military relations.
Bainimarama is well aware that the U.S. believes the military
in a democracy must abide by civilian control. This is
nowhere more true than in a nation like Fiji with its "coup
culture" history. Bainimarama knows that illegally removing
a lawfully elected civilian government will trigger a cut off
of USG military-assistance programs, as has happened before
here. He knows, as well, that a coup would strongly affect
Fiji's tourism-based economy. While the themes have been
delivered before, we believe the timing of this visit, in the
context of the RFMF's very recent "doctrine of necessity"
comments, requires finding an opportunity to raise the
subject and deliver the clear message:

-- No matter the Commodore's strongly held dissatisfactions
with the Qarase Government and his deep worries about the
coming elections, he must work within the civilian-led
political system. If the civilians cannot, or are not
willing to, accommodate military concerns, the civilian view
still must win.

-- Any RFMF actions to disrupt the constitutional processes
in Fiji, no matter how sincere the motive, will do great harm
to Fiji's international relationships, including bilateral
U.S.- Fiji relations, and, under U.S. law, must result in a
suspension of military assistance.
DINGER