FIJI POLICE IN THE LINE OF FIRE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000586

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016
TAGS: ASEC PREL CASC MARR FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI POLICE IN THE LINE OF FIRE

REF: SUVA 581 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: DCM Ted Mann, per 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary
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1. (C) The Fiji Police Force stood in the forefront of
opposition to the plans of RFMF Commander Frank Bainimarama
to overthrow the lawfully elected government of Fiji. Now
that the coup has taken place, remaining senior officers are
forced to work with the new military government and the
commissioner it appointed. The police face the challenge of
fighting a rising crime rate with reduced capacity, while
trying to avoid becoming a political tool of the military.
Early indications are that crime has not risen noticeably in
post-coup Fiji and that the police have been successful in
maintaining an appearance of independence. However, a
slowing economy, the military's decision to disarm the
police, and the possibility that more pre-coup senior
officers will be let go could make a bad situation worse.

The New Order
--------------

2. (C) The Fiji police have been led for the last three
years by Commissioner Andrew Hughes. Hughes is an active
duty senior Australian Federal Policeman who was seconded to
Fiji in 2003 to serve a five-year contract. Hughes has
worked hard and successfully to reform and modernize the
police. With the backing of his senior officers, Hughes
attempted to bring criminal charges against the military's
senior officers in the lead-up to the coup. Due to threats
by the military against he and his family, Hughes left Fiji a
week before the coup. His Deputy, Moses Driver, and
Assistant Commissioner for Crime Kevueli Bulamainaivalu were
sacked immediately after the coup. Driver had been very
vocal in his opposition to military actions and called the
military's post-coup claims that the police and military were
working together "lies." Bulamainaivalu led the police
investigation of sedition charges against the military's
senior officers.


3. (C) On December 6, Bainimarama appointed a retired
director of the Criminal Investigative Division, Jimmy Koroi,
to be the new Police Commissioner. Sada Nand, the currently
serving Assistant Commissioner for Crime, was moved up to be
the Deputy Commissioner of Police. Josia Rasiga, the current
Director of Operations for the Criminal Investigative
Division, was moved up to be the Assistant Commissioner for
Crime. Bainimarama appointed Bernard Daveta, former head of
the Special Branch Division, to a previously defunct position
entitled "Chief of Staff." This position fits between the
four Assistant Commissioners and the Deputy Commissioner
position. All other senior officers kept their current
positions.

Leadership in Transition
--------------

4. (C) Assistant Commissioner for Operations Samuela
Matakibau told RSO that Koroi has been out of the force for
over twenty years and does not understand the reforms and
force structures put in place by Hughes. Matakibau fears the
reforming spirit Hughes instilled in his officers may be lost
under Koroi. Koroi does not appear to be confident in his
abilities and tends to put off making substantive decisions,
said Matakibau. Perhaps reflecting the fact that Koroi is
not up to the task, the military has named a replacement
Commissioner, Romanu Tikotokoca. Tikotokoca has not yet
formally accepted the job. According to Matakibau,
Tikotokoca has been in touch with Hughes and Driver in
Australia. Both advised him to wait until the Great Council
of Chiefs named (or reaffirmed) the new president before
accepting the Commissioner's job, thereby avoiding the stigma
of having been appointed by the Commander. The police rank
and file appreciate the fact that Hughes and Driver seem to
support Tikotikoca's appointment, said Matakibau.


5. (C) Matakibau told RSO that a number of senior officers
are still in contact with Hughes and Driver in Australia.
Matakibau says that Driver advised him to stay in his current
position and not to accept any promotions or to appear to
benefit from the leadership shakeup. This could also help
Matakibau avoid possible visa sanctions from New Zealand,
Australia and the United States, Driver said. The Director
of Uniformed Operations is reportedly also in communication
with Driver and was able to confirm to the press that Driver
had been offered a job with the Australian Federal Police (he

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later denied the report).

Military "Roughing Up" Dissidents
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6. (C) Since the appointment of the new Commissioner, the
police have resisted any notion that they are a tool of the
military. According to RSO police contacts, the military
has not interfered with the police's ability to act against
common crime. The problems have been when members of the
military commit crimes. Since the coup, several people who
opposed the military takeover have been taken against their
will to the military barracks for a "meeting" with senior
officers. These meetings can end with a simple verbal
warning or at the other extreme a threat with a pistol to the
head.


7. (C) Matakibau told RSO that in the Western District of
Fiji, there have been several incident of soldiers picking
up people who speak out against the coup and roughing them up
in cane fields. Apparently two people have been checked into
hospitals after these assaults. While the general public
understands that there is nothing the police can do about the
situation, he said, it is galling to the police to not be
able to stop these assaults.

Police Officers Intimidated Too
--------------

8. (C) Even currently serving senior police officers are not
immune from the military pickups. On Saturday night December
16, 2006, Matakibau was asleep in his home when his son woke
him to tell him that armed military officers were outside his
house. They put him in the back of a military truck and took
him to the military's strategic headquarters. At strategic
headquarters, two senior military officers accused Matakibau
of not cooperating with the military government and of
reducing street patrols. Matakibau responded that district
commanders are in charge of staffing levels and that he only
stepped in if he noticed gaps in coverage. Matakibau said he
told the officers that the public would soon become tired of
the military's abuses of power. They need to stop the
illegal detentions or the people would turn against them.
According to Matakibau, later that evening one of the
officers called to apologize for the detention.

No Post-Coup Crime Rest Yet
--------------

9. (SBU) In recent years, Fiji has experienced a major rise
in crime. Suva was already rated a high crime post before
2005 when overall crime in Fiji rose 15% over the 2004 level.
From January to June 2006 crime rose an additional 3% over
the same period in 2005. Home invasion-type burglaries are
becoming common with criminal groups ranging from two to ten
breaking though grills and solid core doors. Even before the
military takeover the police had severe manpower and
transportation shortages. The criminal element in Fiji knows
that the police are unable to respond in a timely manner to
crimes. Criminals know that the small police posts in the
residential areas usually have only one officer.
Home-invasion burglaries have occurred within a hundred yards
of small police posts.


10. (C) Since the coup took place, there has been a general
perception in the public that crime has decreased. Military
checkpoints may have impeded the movement of criminals
somewhat, and there have been fewer people out in the streets
at night, especially in groups. This drop in crime,
however, is likely to be a short-lived phenomenon. The
biggest contributor to crime in the medium- to long-term will
be the inevitable slow down of the economy caused by the
military takeover. Due to the coup-related tourism slowdown,
hotels and tour operators have been forced to cut staff and
reduce costs. Foreign sanctions imposed on Fiji because of
the coup will also have an effect.


11. (C) To counter the rise in crime over the past two
years, the police had been on a major hiring drive. With
the economy likely to shrink, it will be difficult to keep
the hiring at the level the police need to meet the criminal
threat. Transportation has always been a major problem for
the force. Last year Australia donated 23 police cars to
Fiji. It is doubtful that the police will receive any new
donated vehicles while the military government is in power.
The police will also be cut off from training opportunities
with developed countries and the ability to work with
regional police organizations. The Pacific Island Chiefs of
Police (PICP) has already suspended Fiji from taking part in

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any of its activities. This is the first time the PICP has
suspended a country in the 35 years of the organization.


12. (SBU) One of the biggest blows to the effectiveness of
the police was the disarming of the Police Tactical Response
Unit (PTR). The unit was formed by Hughes as an elite unit
that could respond to violent criminal incidents. The day
before the coup, the military went to the PTR barracks and
confiscated the unit's weapons. The police are now
completely unarmed and have lost much of their already
limited ability to deter crime.

Comment
--------------

13. (C) Due to the military take-over the police are in a
tough position. They feel a strong duty to the people of
Fiji to carry on with their law enforcement mission, but they
are under a military leadership that routinely breaks the
laws the police are charged with enforcing. There is every
indication that the police will continue to attempt to keep
as independent as possible from their military-appointed
leadership. This may work as long as the pre-coup senior
officers stay in the majority of the leadership positions.
If the military were to purge those officers, then the police
would be seen as merely an extension of the military.


DINGER