Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SUVA555
2006-12-11 23:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Suva
Cable title:  

THE FIJI COUP: WHAT EFFECTS? WHAT IMPLICATIONS?

Tags:  PREL MARR PHUM ASEC CASC FJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2402
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0555/01 3452351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 112351Z DEC 06
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3539
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 1443
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY PRIORITY 1034
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1225
RUEHNZ/AMCONSUL AUCKLAND PRIORITY 0251
RUEHDN/AMCONSUL SYDNEY PRIORITY 0656
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SUVA 000555 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM ASEC CASC FJ
SUBJECT: THE FIJI COUP: WHAT EFFECTS? WHAT IMPLICATIONS?

REF: SUVA 552 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
--------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SUVA 000555

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR PHUM ASEC CASC FJ
SUBJECT: THE FIJI COUP: WHAT EFFECTS? WHAT IMPLICATIONS?

REF: SUVA 552 (AND PREVIOUS)

Classified By: Amb. Dinger. Sec. 1.4 (B,D).

Summary
--------------

1. (C) A number of motivations lie behind Republic of Fiji
Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Bainimarama's coup, some
seemingly noble, some not. An unbiased observer would have
to conclude, though, that Fiji's situation was not so
wrenching as to require illegally removing the Qarase
Government. This cable analyzes a series of issues
potentially affected by the coup: corruption; electoral
reform; the ethnic divide; chiefly roles; land reform; civil
service reform; crime; PKO participation; rule of law; human
rights; the economy; the brain drain; judicial purity; fiscal
responsibility; and the RFMF/Bainimarama reputation,
including for truthfulness, decision-making, bullying, and
relying on "yes men." We wrap up by considering what the
coup means beyond Fiji, discussing troubles for Australia and
New Zealand, noting an attempt to play the China card, and
arguing (paras 6-7) that U.S. sanctions should be tough and
imposed with the aim to motivate the RFMF to return to
democracy ASAP so mil/mil relations can also return to normal
ASAP. Mere threats of sanctions didn't work before the coup
and will not work to motivate a return to normalcy. End
summary.

RFMF motives to "clean up" Fiji
--------------

2. (C) Last week's military coup in Fiji had multiple
motives. Commodore Bainimarama and his senior leadership
appear to truly believe that the government of PM Qarase was
irredeemably rotten: deeply corrupt, horribly racist, totally
committed to protecting those who engineered Fiji's coup in
2000, and intent on forcing through controversial legislation
at the risk of dangerous divisions in society. Pretty
clearly, the senior RFMF leadership was also intent on
countering the efforts of Qarase and Police Commissioner
Hughes to confirm the subordinate status of the RFMF under
Fiji's Constitution and to bring criminal charges against
RFMF leaders for subversion. Thus, to the RFMF leaders, a

"clean up" of government was essential, to bring a new,
bright future for Fiji; and the aim was to do so without
shooting.

Way too dark a lens
--------------

3. (C) Actually, only a relatively small minority here seem
to have viewed Fiji's situation through such a dark lens. In
fact, when Qarase created a truly multi-party, multi-ethnic
Cabinet after last May's elections, the atmosphere in Fiji
became quite upbeat. Certainly, difficult issues of race,
corruption, and nationalism remained, but it appeared
political leaders were grasping the opportunity to deal with
them within the democratic system. No unbiased observer
could have judged the situation two months ago was so dire
that a wrenching, illegal military overthrow was essential.
But it has occurred. This cable analyses the potential
pluses and minuses of the coup for the RFMF, Fiji, and the
international community.

Pluses -- with comments
--------------

4. (C) Embassy Suva has no doubt that the RFMF coup is a
disaster in a number of respects, as described below; but the
coup perpetrators insist their goals are noble. Below, we
consider possible benefits and counter-arguments.

Corruption. Bainimarama has been scathing of PM Qarase and
his "cronies" for being involved in corrupt practices. The
RFMF, without search warrants, is rummaging through the
offices and homes of those it believes are implicated. No
doubt corruption exists, and very likely Qarase's SDL Party
has dirt attached. One allegation suggests a plum airport
contract to Strategic Air Services Ltd included large slush
payments to SDL coffers. Another allegation suggests the SDL
stood to gain from issuance of a second cell-phone license.
If the RFMF were pure and if it were to encourage a
legally-enforcable clean up, that would be a plus. However,
skeptically, the RFMF has a slimy history, too. One obvious
example: the Army has for many years refused all Auditor
General requests to look at the books for regimental funds.
And warrantless searches that could not be used in court are
a strange way to "clean up" corruption.


SUVA 00000555 002 OF 005


Electoral reform. International observers judged last May's
elections to be generally free and fair. The RFMF, which had
campaigned loudly against Qarase's SDL only to see the SDL
win an overwhelming preference from ethnic Fijians and a
majority of parliamentary seats, alleges widespread fraud.
The RFMF reportedly intends to conduct a census (once
intended for 2006, already rescheduled for 2007) and revise
electoral laws and regulations prior to holding new
elections. Reforms, within the current constitutional
framework, would be useful, and Australian and New Zealand
were providing assistance with Qarase's encouragement.
Sanctions may slow that effort. Larger-scale reforms, like
removing all race-based voting from the Constitution, would
be truly revolutionary and would trigger intense concerns
from both major ethnic groups. In the end, it is very
possible that, unless the RFMF manipulates voting, the next
election will bring in an SDL-like crowd again.

Ethnic divide. The British created Fiji's ethnic divide, and
colonial policies encouraged it. Since independence, all
three Fiji constitutions have included racial distinctions.
Qarase pushed "affirmative action" for ethnic Fijians.
Bainimarama opposed Qarase's reconciliation bill, calling it
racist. No doubt Fiji desperately needs racial
reconciliation. The RFMF's interim PM says that tops his
agenda. To the extent the RFMF delivers, it will be a plus
for Fiji. However, the RFMF, itself, is almost entirely
ethnic-Fijian in makeup, in contrast to Fiji's police.
"Practice what you preach" comes to mind. A worrying element
is that, within the ethnic-Fijian communities, rumors are
spreading that ethnic-Indians were among those whispering
sedition in Bainimarama's ear. The coup is stimulating yet
another play of the race card, a volatile game.

The Chiefs. The British embellished a loose traditional
chiefly system into an arm of government. The Great Council
of Chiefs (GCC) and the Native Lands Trust Board (NLTB) that
the GCC heavily influences have major control over how
communal land (about 90% of Fiji's total) is utilized, and
reportedly the chiefs garner most of the benefits. To the
extent the RFMF could reform the GCC and NLTB into more
effective mechanisms for assisting the common Fijian, that
would be good. It would also be extremely difficult.
Touching the GCC and NLTB, seen by many as protectors of
Fijian rights against Indian and Western usurpation, would
stir fears in the ethnic-Fijian community of Indian dominance
and could spark instability.

Land reform. The Fijian communal ownership of most land
makes outside investment difficult. Qarase's qoliqoli bill
was attempting to include beaches and water out to the reef
edge under the NLTB umbrella. It could have made transparent
a now-opaque process of "good will" payments to local chiefs,
but it could also have increased complexity for many. To the
extent the RFMF could "clean up" the land issue, Fiji's
economic prospects, particularly in tourism, might flower.
But, again, such a clean up could stir fears in the
ethnic-Fijian community.

Civil Service reform. Fiji's civil service is bloated and
very inefficient. Qarase endorsed the idea of reform but
never had the political will to achieve it. The RFMF's PM
says this is high on his list. Today he announced a 10% cut
in the PM's salary. Qarase has pointed out, rightly, that
cutting significant numbers of jobs and/or taking major
whacks at salaries will be very difficult politically.

Crime control. Police Commissioner Hughes (an Aussie) made
great strides in professionalizing the Fiji Police, Qarase
stayed out of the way, and crime statistics improved until
recent months when reports of home invasions by gangs of
thugs increased. Bainimarama says the RFMF and Police will
work together to control crime. So long as the Army is
patrolling streets with firearms, that may well happen.
Historically, though, when the RFMF had influence over the
Police, professionalism declined. An example is former
Police Commissioner Savua, an Army man, who declined to put
police in Suva's streets during the 2000 coup, thus allowing
rioting to occur unimpeded.

PKO. Bainimarama has signaled strong interest in expanding
the RFMF's role in international peacekeeping, including by
joining the "coalition of the willing" in Iraq (MNFI). The
Qarase Government, nervous about Bainimarama and at times
seemingly trying to bait him, slowed the bureaucratic process
on a variety of RFMF priorities, including MNFI. Now in

SUVA 00000555 003 OF 005


control, Bainimarama seemingly can do what he wants on PKO
deployments. In the longer term, public unhappiness with the
RFMF's acting like thugs could bring, under renewed
democracy, an attempt to scale back the size and abilities of
the RFMF.

Minuses -- with comments
--------------

5. (C) Coups that remove democratic governments raise a
variety of worrisome issues. For Fiji, history accents the
problems. This is Fiji's fourth coup in 20 years (2 in 1987,
one in 2000, and now).

Undermining the Constitution. This blatantly illegal
subversion of Fiji's constitutional system undermines rule of
law, and reaffirms to future leaders that coups are OK. It
asserts that the powers of the RFMF Commander are unlimited,
contrary to the 1997 Constitution. It leaves unclear what
roles the people, including civil society, can play.

Bill of rights. In the attempt to manage its "peaceful
transition," RFMF leaders have used strong-arm tactics to
intimidate those who speak publicly against the coup. They
have also threatened the media. And they have engaged in
repeated warrantless searches. All those steps clearly
violate the "bill of rights" provisions of Fiji's
Constitution. NGOs had recently been thriving. A number
have spoken out loudly against the coup and for the rule of
law. The RFMF has been working tirelessly to silence such
comment, thus far mostly using threats rather than overt
force.

Economic effects. Tourism had become Fiji's biggest economic
engine. With the coup, airlines and hotels have seen a
dramatic drop in bookings. Reportedly, numerous potential
foreign investors have retreated. After the 2000 coup,
tourism took two years to rebound. More broadly, Fiji
economists figured the first three coups set Fiji's economy
back at least 20 years. Undoubtedly, some risk-takers will
flow in to grasp opportunities forsaken by others, but the
net effect will surely be devastating in the short to medium
term.

Brain drain. After the 1987 coups, the best and brightest
from the Indian community grabbed every opportunity for visas
to Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. After
2000, that trend accelerated. One of the causes of Fiji's
public-service ineptness is that most of the best bureaucrats
fled years ago. One must ask what sort of talent the RFMF
will attract to its interim government via newspaper ads, and
how much truly good governance the RFMF can foster without
quality bureaucrats. This time, even expat businessmen who
stuck it out through the past 20 years are saying "three was
enough; I'm leaving."

The judiciary. Fiji has prided itself on an independent
judiciary. A judicial faction was deeply disturbed by
evidence that in 2000 a few judges provided advice to
Bainimarama, Ratu Mara, and others on how to convert the
Speight coup into a "constitutional" removal of then-PM
Chaudhry. In 2006, we are hearing credible rumors that those
judges who criticized colleagues in 2000 have been
encouraging Bainimarama's coup and advising how to try to
color it as legal. One of those judges presided over a
2000-related criminal trial in recent weeks. If/when all
that becomes public, the Fiji judiciary's credibility will
suffer a blow. To the extent Bainimarama succeeds in
quashing police and public-prosecutor efforts to bring
criminal charges against himself and the RFMF, the judicial
process will be further weakened.

Fiscal responsibility. During the Qarase era, Fiji's
national budget has been in deficit every year, in part
because the PM was attempting to stimulate economic growth,
in part because of a bloated civil-service. The RFMF, too,
has a history of spending beyond its budget. Reportedly,
Bainimarama has gone way into the red to finance the current
coup effort. It is not at all obvious that a
military-oriented government is the solution to Fiji's fiscal
crisis. Historically, coups have stimulated outflow of
private money from Fiji, as rapidly as possible. The Reserve
Bank has put controls in place, as it did in 2000, to stem
that tide.

RFMF reputation. The approach Bainimarama and his senior
RFMF leaders have taken during the past year or more has

SUVA 00000555 004 OF 005


tarnished the military's reputation, perhaps irreparably.

-- Information ops. Repeatedly Bainimarama and his RFMF
spokesman have made statements to the media that are simply
false. Sometimes when confronted, they respond that they
never made the statements. Sometimes they simply add on more
lies.

-- Knee-jerk decisions. Bainimarama is not afraid to make
decisions and he appears to make them rapidly. However,
often it appears he has not thought through the consequences
or considered alternatives. As a result, the RFMF frequently
has to make corrections. Examples in the past week include
openly attempting to control the press, then reverting to
more subtle intimidation efforts; and moving to evict VP
Madraiwiwi instantly from his official residence, then saying
never mind. On the other hand, the actual coup plan appears
to have been percolating behind RFMF scenes for quite a
while.

-- Bullying. To Bainimarama's credit, he seems intent not to
engage in overt violence if possible. On the other hand, he
and other leaders are using threats constantly, trying to
dissuade opponents of the coup from complaining publicly or
building support for resistance. Some intimidation has been
"stop or else" language; in some cases, words have been
combined with a bit of force; one female human-rights
advocate received a very nasty telephoned rape threat.

-- "Yes men." Bainimarama has a thin skin and he does not
like criticism. For several years, he has shunted aside
those who have expressed dissent within the RFMF. Others
have departed of their own accord. The result is a group of
"yes men," who do not provide the boss a range of views.

What the coup means outside Fiji
--------------

6. (C) The international community, led in particular by
Australia and New Zealand, is imposing tough sanctions to
evidence displeasure about the coup and to urge a return to
democracy and rule of law ASAP. Given the coup's many
negative consequences, as noted above, such pressure is very
appropriate. Fiji leaders, including Vice President
Madraiwiwi, have urged such international efforts, though
some in the business community have argued against.

U.S. sanctions: the tougher, the better for normalcy
-------------- --------------

7. (C) Under U.S. law, we must halt all FMF, IMET, GPOI, and
ESF assistance until free and fair democratic elections bring
a new government to power. Washington is considering more
extensive sanctions as well. From our perspective, the U.S.
aim should be to motivate the RFMF to a return to democracy
ASAP, so our relations, including mil/mil relations, can
return to normal ASAP. To us, that indicates U.S. sanctions
should be tough and expansive, clearly signaling "no mil/mil
business as usual," within whatever constraints Washington
considers clearly necessitated by important PKO requirements
in the Middle East. Mere threats will have no effect, as our
pre-coup threats of sanctions illustrated. In addition,
imposing a travel ban on all those in the RFMF leadership who
have had a hand in the coup, and on participants in an
interim government, would have real effect, especially since
Australia and New Zealand are doing the same.

U.S. business interests suffering
--------------

8. (C) The U.S. commercial relationships with Fiji are
suffering from the coup. Several major U.S. hotel companies
have investments or management contracts with Fiji resorts.
The tourism sector is gasping for breath as consumers, with a
global menu, choose destinations other than Fiji. We expect
potential U.S. investors are also turning their attention
elsewhere.

Fiji relations with Australia and New Zealand troubled
-------------- --------------

9. (C) The coup has significantly bruised the relationship
between Fiji and its nearest Western neighbors, Australia and
New Zealand. This has been in part a deliberate effort by
Bainimarama to drum up "defense of sovereignty" support from
the general public by alleging a "foreign invasion" is in the
works. In part, some of Australia's and New Zealand's
political leaders contributed to the problem, as when FM
Downer appeared patronizing and PM Howard needlessly
announced publicly he had rejected a Qarase request for

SUVA 00000555 005 OF 005


military help. Presumably, over time the bruises will heal.
Still, the two nations the U.S. has expected to do the most
to help promote and protect Western interests in this part of
the Pacific are perceived to have stumbled.

The China and other cards
--------------

10. (C) The RFMF's interim PM has played the "China card,"
suggesting that Western sanctions will simply cause Fiji to
turn to friends in Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and China for
support. With the Commonwealth, the UN, the Pacific Islands
Forum (PIF),the EU, and a host of others lined up against
the coup, the RFMF's interim administration may find itself
with very limited options. The PRC's public reaction to the
Fiji coup has been muted, but China would have to
dramatically increase its assistance to bridge the sanctions
gap. Malaysia, the main Fiji friend in Southeast Asia, has
said it joins the Commonwealth in opposing the coup.

To conclude
--------------

11. (C) As the post-coup political process here plays out, it
will primarily be Fiji's ethnic-Fijian population that
determines the outcome. Ethnic-Fijian politics and
decision-making processes are often opaque. Still, we figure
international actors can have influence. We will continue to
maintain contacts broadly and will try to encourage as rapid
and progressive an outcome as possible given the
circumstances.
DINGER