Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SUVA133
2006-04-03 02:32:00
SECRET
Embassy Suva
Cable title:  

FIJI MILITARY'S INTENTIONS: A WORRYING UPDATE

Tags:  PINS PGOV MARR PREL FJ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9893
PP RUEHPB
DE RUEHSV #0133/01 0930232
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 030232Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SUVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3002
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 1178
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0071
RUEHPB/AMEMBASSY PORT MORESBY 0798
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 0974
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHJJAA/JICPAC HONOLULU HI
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000133 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2031
TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI MILITARY'S INTENTIONS: A WORRYING UPDATE

REF: A. SUVA 64


B. SUVA 72

C. SUVA 92

D. SUVA 98

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Dinger. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SUVA 000133

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/31/2031
TAGS: PINS PGOV MARR PREL FJ
SUBJECT: FIJI MILITARY'S INTENTIONS: A WORRYING UPDATE

REF: A. SUVA 64


B. SUVA 72

C. SUVA 92

D. SUVA 98

Classified By: Ambassador Larry Dinger. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (S) The secret report of a late-February conversation
between Fiji Police Commissioner Hughes (protect) and
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) Commander Bainimarama
is worrisome reading, with Bainimarama signaling he is
willing to remove Prime Minister Qarase and place himself in
power if the PM and his party win reelection in May and
continue their present course. Hughes noted (as we have)
that the Commander's views in a conversation often vary from
benign to a sense that military intervention is nearly
inevitable. Hughes concludes that Bainimarama is distorting
and exaggerating the Fiji situation in describing what he
sees as a duty to the nation that transcends democratic
principles and processes. Hughes reportedly warned the
Commander that he is contemplating "treason," which would
bring him into conflict with the police, the courts and the
international community. Bainimarama dismissed such "by the
book" concerns as not applying to the Fiji context. He added
that he does not care about a possible loss of aid from
Australia, the United States and New Zealand. Hughes sees a
"strong possibility" of a coup, if Qarase wins and doesn't
alter course.


2. (C) In other developments, Bainimarama led 200-400 armed
troops in a "parade" through Suva on the day Fiji's
Parliament went into pre-election dissolution. Our
conversations with RFMF senior officers lately leave the
impression the Commander has the support of his troops. In
conversations with Bainimarama, the Embassy and senior
visitors have made clear U.S. views of the proper
civil-military relationship and have signaled the sort of
negative consequences that would follow a coup. It is
possible the RFMF's recent statements are bluff, intended to
influence voters against Qarase and his party in the
elections; but even that would be disturbing. We will
continue efforts to convince military leaders to act in

appropriately democratic fashion. Commander Bainimarama's
Iraq-planning visit to Washington in late April will be
another opportunity to reiterate USG views. End Summary.

Fiji's fractured civil-military relations
--------------

3. (C) We have received several indications in recent weeks
that the Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) is seriously
contemplating a coup if the current Qarase government is
reelected and doesn't change course. Reftels lay out the
fractured relationship between RFMF Commander Bainimarama and
Prime Minister Qarase's government and indications that the
RFMF might seek to remove the government if it continues to
act contrary to the RFMF's view of the national interest.
Bainimarama drew two lines in the sand in February: if Fiji's
Great Council of Chiefs selections in early March of Fiji's
new President and Vice President were tainted by the 2000
coup (in the end the GCC reselected the incumbents, fine with
the RFMF) or if constitutionally required elections in 2006
are flawed. Bainimarama has since qualified the elections
issue, saying the RFMF believes the elections will inevitably
be manipulated by the Qarase government and will not be free
and fair; however, the new government may be given a chance
to perform appropriately: to set aside flawed reconciliation
and fishing-rights bills; to turn away from
"racist/nationalist" politics.

Added evidence of RFMF "coup" contemplation
--------------

4. (S) We received on March 30 a copy of a "secret" memo
Fiji Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes (protect) wrote after
meeting with Commander Bainimarama on February 27.
Admittedly the memo is a month old, but Hughes told an
interlocutor on March 30 he considers it still accurate.
(Hughes, an Australian Federal Police officer on secondment
to Fiji, is home on holiday for two weeks, so we cannot
follow up at the moment. We have known him to be a solid,
professional policeman with excellent judgment.) In recent
months, relations between Hughes and Bainimarama, which
appeared relatively close seven months ago, have clearly
become strained. The Feb. 27 meeting did not help matters.
Hughes portrayed an erratic Bainimarama surrounded by a
compliant officers corps that is feeding the Commander's

SUVA 00000133 002 OF 003


sense of righteous grievance against the Qarase government.


5. (S) Hughes attempted unsuccessfully to allay
Bainimarama's concern that the police were gearing up to
confront the army. The conversation then broadened to the
RFMF's Pakistan-like "doctrine of necessity," put forth as
justification for potential military action against the
government (ref A). Bainimarama railed against the "evil,
corrupt, cannibalistic" Qarase government and expressed
regret for putting Qarase in power during the events of 2000.
He said he should have retained power himself, for 5, 10,
even 40 years. Now, if he must remove the distasteful Qarase
government, he would not appoint an interim government but
would rule by himself. Bainimarama discussed three possible
flashpoints. First was the March president and vice
president selection process (now OBE). Second would be
re-election of the Qarase government. Bainimarama said he
"would not tolerate regression back to ethno-nationalism."
Third, if the Indo-Fijian-dominated Labor Party wins the
election and civil disorder results, the military would step
in to restore order (seemingly to buttress the government,
not to remove it).

"Coup as catastrophe" argument falls on deaf ears
-------------- --------------

6. (S) Bainimarama rejected Hughes view that a military
government would be catastrophic for Fiji, suggesting that
unnamed Indo-Fijian businessmen had told him Fiji could
bounce back from another coup in 18 months. Bainimarama
added that he does not care about international reaction,
including the possible loss of aid money from Australia, the
United States and New Zealand.

"Don't worry" v. "the stick"
--------------

7. (S) Hughes noted (as we have) inconsistencies in
Bainimarama's logic. He swung between saying "Don't worry,
there won't be a military intervention" to implying a near
inevitability of intervention no matter what happens at the
polls. Hughes reported he told Bainimarama that removing the
government "would amount to treason." The police, the
courts, and others would be compelled in turn to take action
against him. Bainimarama dismissed this as "doing it by the
book," which would not work under the circumstances. Hughes
suggested Bainimarama should educate rather than threaten.
The Commander said education wouldn't work. The Fijian
people "only respond to the stick from us." When Hughes
raised practical issues for his police under a coup scenario,
including for personal-protection officers who might be
caught in the middle, Bainimarama responded: "as long as they
didn't get in the way, they would be all right." The Hughes
memo notes that the police would be powerless to prevent a
takeover.

Lines have been drawn
--------------

8. (S) In conclusion, Hughes painted a bleak situation in
which "the lines have been drawn." Hughes alleged the
Commander is "distorting and exaggerating" the situation in
Fiji to suit his own agenda. He sees a duty to protect the
nation in a role that "transcends democratic principles and
processes." He professes not to want to intervene
militarily, but unless the government and Great Council obey
his demands, he will take over. He will not listen to
contrary views and is underestimating or ignoring the
repercussions of a coup. Hughes concludes that Bainimarama
is prepared for a military takeover, and there is a strong
possibility this will occur if Qarase is returned to power in
May and pursues policies that offend the Commander's sense of
what is right. Hughes ends by judging that the RFMF is not
as strong nor as well-led as in 1987 (Fiji's first coups).
In any coup attempt, factions would occur. Hughes predicts
any military government would be inherently unstable, which
would lead to bloodshed and, inevitably, to that government's
downfall.

Recent events: an RFMF march in the streets
--------------

9. (U) In March, Bainimarama and his spokesmen injected
themselves frequently into Fiji's political debate. On March
27, the day Parliament was dissolved to make way for the
elections (May 6-13),the commander led some 200-400
(estimates vary) of his troops in a military "parade" across
the capital city, passing by the Parliament compound. The
soldiers and their leader dressed in camouflage and carried
weapons. Bainimarama told the media the soldiers were doing
"what soldiers should be doing - taking long walks, but this

SUVA 00000133 003 OF 003


is a public display of reassurance to the public."

RFMF inner circle: support for the Commander
--------------

10. (C) At a recent social event hosted by the Embassy DATT,
the Ambassador talked at length with several of Commander
Bainimarama's inner circle, stressing the importance of the
military taking its appropriate place subordinate to the
elected civilian leadership in a democracy. A few months
ago, similar conversations with RFMF officers brought
reasonably comforting responses: that the RFMF fully
understood the lessons from 1987 and 2000: coups are a
disaster for Fiji, and the nation "can not go down that road
again." Now the responses are unsettling: that the Qarase
government and its corrupt, racist policies are a disaster;
the RFMF has a duty to protect Fiji's best interests; the
Commander has the support of his troops; the RFMF does not
want to act but will do so if necessary.

Comments
--------------

11. (S) The Ambassador, the DATT, and senior-level visitors
like PACOM Commander Fallon, CENTCOM Commander Abizaid, and
MFO Director General Larocco have good relations with
Commander Bainimarama. All have used interactions with the
Commander in recent months to emphasize the U.S. view of
civil-military relations. Bainimarama is certainly giving
the impression that, despite such advice, he is prepared to
remove the Qarase government, if that government is reelected
in May and if it then does not immediately change course to
policies that meet RFMF approval. The realities that such a
course would contribute to Fiji's "coup culture," would have
severe economic consequences, especially for Fiji tourism,
and would result in ruptured military relations, including
cancellation of the U.S. Army Pacific PAMS conference which
is now scheduled for Fiji in September, appear not to be
major factors in Bainimarama's calculations. Such factors
also do not seem to sway the senior officers we have been
talking to lately.


12. (S) It is conceivable that the rhetoric is just bluff,
intended to influence the voting public to reject Qarase and
his cohort in the elections. Bainimarama has backed away
from extreme statements before, suggesting he had been
misunderstood. Bainimarama and some of his senior officers
have repeatedly tried to reassure us, saying "you don't need
to worry." Still, Commissioner Hughes is clearly worried
that the threats are not bluff. We worry, too. We worry
that the threats may be real, and we worry that, in any case,
such threats will warp Fiji's electoral environment to the
detriment of a free and fair election. We will continue to
utilize opportunities to try to convince RFMF leaders to play
their proper, limited role in Fiji's governance. Commander
Bainimarama is planning to attend an Iraq planning conference
in Washington later this month. That will be another
opportunity for the USG to reiterate its views.
DINGER