Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06STOCKHOLM1489
2006-09-15 14:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Stockholm
Cable title:  

SWEDEN'S SEPTEMBER 17 ELECTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR SW 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4540
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSM #1489/01 2581400
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151400Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1082
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001489 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S SEPTEMBER 17 ELECTIONS

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 1421


B. STOCKHOLM 952

C. STOCKHOLM 913

Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STOCKHOLM 001489

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR SW
SUBJECT: SWEDEN'S SEPTEMBER 17 ELECTIONS

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 1421


B. STOCKHOLM 952

C. STOCKHOLM 913

Classified By: Polcouns Casey Christensen, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------

1. (c) Swedes go to the polls September 17 to elect a new
parliament that will decide their government for the next
four years. The race has been the tightest Sweden has seen
in decades, with opinion polls see-sawing, but mostly giving
a slight lead to the opposition "Alliance for Sweden" over
the incumbent Social Democrat (SDP) minority government that
is supported by the Left and Green parties. The Alliance is
a two-year-old coalition of the opposition Moderate, Liberal,
Christian Democrat, and Center parties, created for the
purposes of this election. The unprecedented unity of the
opposition, along with the Alliance's pro-job policies and
soft touch on the popular Swedish welfare state system, have
provided a sustained boost in the opposition's campaign. An
opposition win, however, is far from assured. Nearly all
opinion polls put the -- most often Alliance -- lead within
the statistical margin of error. But the Social Democrats
have governed Sweden for all but nine of the past 74 years,
and are traditionally strong closers. The race remains a
dead heat.


2. (c) Preliminary election results will be available on the
evening of September 17. Final results will be announced on
September 20. If the race is very close, it may turn on the
projected 30,000-40,000 mail-in ballots that will be
announced September 20. Parliament will open on October 3,
and the government will be announced on an unspecified day
before then. If the opposition Alliance wins, Moderate
Fredrik Reinfeldt will be appointed Prime Minister of a
four-party non-socialist coalition, with other ministries
being dealt out among the parties after election results are
compared. On the other hand, if incumbent Prime Minister
Persson's SDP party makes a strong showing and seeks to form
another minority government with Green and/or Left support,
it is not clear what role those parties will take. If
neither the Alliance nor the SDP have or can attract a clear

majority, other alternatives may be considered. PM Persson
has given indications he would consider working with one or
more of the Alliance parties. End Summary.

The Calendar Countdown
--------------

3. (u) The election will take place on September 17, but
voting by mail started in mid-August and "early" voting at a
limited number of polling stations began on August 31. As of
September 14, nearly 1,100,000 mail-in and early voting
ballots had been received by the Election Authority. The
total number of eligible voters in this parliamentary
election is 6,891,172. Voter participation in the last
general election (2002) was 80.1 percent. From past
experience, 25-35 percent of voters will vote early or by
mail. Votes from abroad and those sent in late locally will
not be counted on election day, and will not be announced
until September 20. If the race ends up as close as opinion
polls now show, these remaining ballots, which are expected
to number 30,000-40,000, could decide the election.
Preliminary election results will be announced late on
September 17, but will only include numbers for the current
seven parties in the Riksdag. Only on September 20 will the
results for the smaller parties be available. None of the
small parties is expected to reach the four percent
threshold. (Note: The largest support among the small
parties is going to the nationalistic, anti-immigration
Sweden Democrats, who are currently registering 1.5-2.0
percent in the opinion polls.)


4. (u) On September 21, the allocation of the 349
parliamentary seats among the parties that reach the four
percent threshold for parliamentary representation will be
announced. Parliament will open on October 3. If the
election results are such that a change in Government will
occur, the new government will be announced as soon as
possible, but there is no fixed time. The last time there
was a change in government following an election, in 1994,
the new government was appointed within a week of the
election. The Speaker of Parliament (who would be new and
selected October 2, if there is to be a change of government)
first meets with party leaders, then presents a Prime
Ministerial candidate to Parliament. Unless a majority votes
against the candidate, he or she becomes the new Prime
Minister.


5. (c) In the case of a straight-forward opposition Alliance
victory, it is fairly clear that Moderate Party leader
Fredrik Reinfeldt would be the Prime Minister of a four party
coalition government, supported by ministers from each of

STOCKHOLM 00001489 002 OF 002


those parties. On the other hand, if the combined SDP,
Greens and the Left party have a majority of the votes (as is
the case in the current parliament),the final outcome is
less certain. Current PM Persson would almost certainly head
the government, but the respective roles of the Green and
Left parties appear still to be under negotiation; the
results will depend in large part on the election outcome.
At issue is whether the Greens and/or Left would form part of
and SDP-led government with ministerial representation, as
the Greens (and to a lesser extent the Left) are stridently
demanding, or will they remain non-participating support
parties. Although unlikely, the possibility of a failure by
the SDP, Green, and Left potential majority to reach
agreement cannot not be ruled out. In this event, possible
outcomes include the Greens siding with the Alliance parties
or one or two SDP parties supporting a SDP-Green government
that excludes the Left party (an outcome PM Persson has made
tantalizing but vague allusions to).

What is at Stake for the Swedes
--------------

6. (c) The election has turned almost entirely on domestic
issues. Moderate party leader Fredrik Reinfeldt, who will be
the prime minister if the opposition wins, has focused on
employment, while declaring the fundamentals of the welfare
state will not be tampered with. The Alliance claims real
unemployment is much higher than the official 4.6 percent
figure (as of the end of August). Reinfeldt says that if you
take into account working age people who are early retirees,
in job-training programs, and on long-term disability, the
unemployment figure may be over 20 percent. Reinfeldt's
Moderate party has styled itself the "new workers' party,"
taking a jab at the SDP strong alliance with labor unions.
He proposes to reduce unemployment benefits, decrease payroll
taxes for low-income workers, and provide tax breaks to
businesses that hire long-term unemployed. Reinfeldt's
approach has given the Moderates -- and the Alliance -- a
boost among disillusioned job-seekers. The SDP, on the other
hand, has characterized the Alliance's proposals as the thin
edge of a wedge attacking the welfare state. For its part,
the Alliance has pledged it will not undermine the
fundamentals of the welfare state, and intends to focus on
job creation.

What is at Stake for the U.S.
--------------

7. (c) Foreign affairs have been infrequently and never
prominently mentioned in the campaign. Both the SDP and the
Alliance support Sweden's participation in NATO PfP and the
EAPC, and agree there would have to be a national political
consensus for Sweden to join NATO. In the Alliance for
Sweden, the Moderates and Liberals support NATO membership,
but recognize the need for consensus, while the Christian
Democrats are agnostic on the issue and the Center Party is
skeptical, but says it is amenable if the SDP also joined
consensus.


8. (c) If the Alliance wins, the fundamentals of bilateral
relations could remain much the same in the short term,
although the tone would likely become less critical of U.S.
policy, and there would likely be a more open advocacy for
NATO membership. If the SDP returned to power with
non-participatory Green and Left support, foreign policy
would remain much as it is now. If, on the other hand, the
SDP had to cede ministerial seats to (not very likely) the
Greens or (very unlikely) the Left in order to form a
government, both the tone and the content of Swedish foreign
policy would become more U.S. critical. In Sweden's
government, decisions on major issues are collective and
taken by consensus of all ministers, including those whose
portfolio does not relate to the issue at hand. The Greens
and especially Left parties are Euro-skeptic and have been
highly critical of U.S. policy regarding human rights, rule
of law, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and
Palestinian issues.
NOBLE