Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06STATE83673
2006-05-23 22:18:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

ALLIED SHARING AND SIPRNET

Tags:  AMGT AOMS PINR ACOA KCCP 
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DE RUEHC #3673/01 1432224
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 232218Z MAY 06
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 7614
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 083673 

SIPDIS

NOFORN, SIPDIS, FOR DCMS AND ALL CABLE DRAFTERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2031
TAGS: AMGT AOMS PINR ACOA KCCP
SUBJECT: ALLIED SHARING AND SIPRNET

Classified By: RM A/S Brad Higgins, For Reasons 1.4 (d) and
(g).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 083673

SIPDIS

NOFORN, SIPDIS, FOR DCMS AND ALL CABLE DRAFTERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2031
TAGS: AMGT AOMS PINR ACOA KCCP
SUBJECT: ALLIED SHARING AND SIPRNET

Classified By: RM A/S Brad Higgins, For Reasons 1.4 (d) and
(g).


1. (U) This is an action message. As a part of the
continuing war on terrorism and in response to
recommendations of the 9/11 and the WMD Commissions, the
Congress and the President have mandated a number of
changes in the way information is to be shared, within the
federal government, between the federal government and
state, local and tribal officials (including in some cases
the private sector),and with certain of our allies. These
changes are making obsolete certain assumptions that have
governed the way that we in the State Department write,
classify and mark telegrams and other communications.
Chief among these are the assumptions that classified State
Department telegrams and other communications will not be
further disseminated by recipient agencies without the
authorization of the originating agency, and that they will
similarly not be shared with foreign countries without
specific originating agency authorization. This does not
mean that agencies originating classified information will
not restrict its further dissemination, but this will
increasingly require an affirmative action to mark
documents to be restricted. The ground rules for
additional sharing (and for restricting dissemination) are
rapidly being developed within the USG, and posts will be
informed as the new rules and procedures are adopted. This
telegram deals with sharing information with certain
allies.


2. (S//NF) The President has instructed that the DOD-
controlled SIPRNet be a primary mechanism by which certain
information is to be shared with our closest allies in the
war on terror: the UK, Australia, and Canada (direct
contact is still a primary mechanism also). In carrying
out this directive DOD intends to provide UK, Australian,
and Canadian users access to all of SIPRNet except for
those documents, email, data repositories and services
explicitly protected as US-only. DOD will prohibit allied

access to documents marked NOFORN, as well as telegrams
containing various categories of information such as Arms
Export Control Act, NATO information, and Restricted Data.
Moreover, DOD's official implementation guidance lists
"diplomatic communications" and "foreign policy
information" as categories of information generally
prohibited from release to these UK/Australia/Canada
personnel.


3. (S//NF) For exempting these categories from sharing, the
DOD solution relies on a variety of network mechanisms,
software tools, "dirty-word" filters, and network
monitoring systems to prevent UK/Australia/Canada user
access to non-releasable content on SIPRNet. The State
Department remains engaged in discussions related to this
DOD decision. In March 2006 State provided DOD with a
comprehensive list of keywords, phrases, markings and other
unique identifiers for DOD to use within filters to
identify and prevent disclosure of non-releasable, US-only
diplomatic reporting information on SIPRNet. A variety
of State-specific channels and captions were included among
this list of prohibited reporting, e.g., NODIS, LIMDIS,
ROGER, EXDIS, SIPDIS, STADIS, OIG, DISSENT, MED, and DS
Channel. State at that time also instructed DOD to
blacklist all of State's US-only SIPRNet websites to
prevent allied user access, meaning that all URLs that
begin with "ses.state.sgov.gov","source.ds.state.sgov.go v",
"state.sgov.gov", and "ncd.state.sgov.gov" among others are
blocked.


4. (S//NF) The Department remains actively engaged with the
DOD and Director of National Intelligence to ensure that
appropriate technical controls are implemented to protect
State US-only reporting on SIPRNet. At this stage,
however, the filters may not protect all State Department
information that should not be shared. Therefore, any
State Department reporting that should not be directly
accessed by UK/Australia/Canada officials must be marked
"NOFORN". This will include, for instance, much
information obtained from or about other countries in
normal diplomatic intercourse. In many cases this will be
a more stringent restriction than desirable because some
information not appropriate for sharing with the UK,
Australia and Canada will need to be shared with other
countries, and in other cases State officials may determine
that the information should at some point be released to
appropriate allies with access to SIPRNet. However,
pending the development of a more refined filtering system
or the adoption of additional marking categories, all State

STATE 00083673 002 OF 002


Department classified material not intended to be shared
with the UK/Australia/Canada, as well as material
explicitly intended for a US-only audience, including
memorandums, briefings, cables, emails, and other
electronically disseminated information, must be marked
NOFORN.


5. (S//NF) As information is increasingly disseminated
electronically within the USG, drafters should adopt
insofar as possible common interagency classification and
dissemination markings. Diplomatic reporting that is
authorized for release to a specific country, or countries,
should insofar as possible be marked as "REL TO X", where X
is the ISO country code for the country specified for
release. Such marking should include the USA country
code in addition to the foreign country code. For example,
a USG CONFIDENTIAL document approved for release to the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada must be marked,
"C//REL TO USA, GBR, AUS, CAN". Cables marked releasable
to our UK, Australian, and Canadian partners will not be
released to other foreign governments unless specifically
included within the REL TO field using the appropriate ISO
country code. If necessary, additional sharing
instructions should be included in the first paragraph of
the text. Again, however, it is recognized that it is
often not possible to determine when drafting a document
to which countries it may be appropriate to release some or
all of the information at which point in time. Accordingly,
a NOFORN marking or the absence of a "REL TO" marking does
not constitute a prohibition on further dissemination of
Department of State information when an authorized
Department of State official decides that dissemination is
appropriate. Other agency information, however, should not
be disseminated except in accordance with markings or with
the subsequent authorization of the agency in question.


6. (U) The A bureau is currently preparing related document
classification and dissemination marking instructions for
inclusion within the FAM, and it is likely that additional
guidance will be provided via telegram in the coming
months. For directives relating to the collaborative
sharing with the UK, Australia, and Canada mandated by the
President, see: http://www.ismc.sgov.gov/Collaboration/gbr-
aus-proxy-info/. For a current listing on of ISO country
codes,visit:http://capco.dssc.sgov.gov/security_info/iso3 16
6-countrycodes.html.


7. (U) Minimize considered.
RICE