Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06STATE79031
2006-05-16 18:55:00
SECRET
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

MTAG 05-96: UKRAINIAN FIRM ZAPORIZHZHYA'S

Tags:  ETTC PARM PREL PGOV MTCRE MNUC UP IR 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO6709
OO RUEHAG
DE RUEHC #9031/01 1361902
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 161855Z MAY 06
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KIEV IMMEDIATE 2654
INFO EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 4988
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 4648
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 0545
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 7732
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 079031 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PGOV MTCRE MNUC UP IR
SUBJECT: MTAG 05-96: UKRAINIAN FIRM ZAPORIZHZHYA'S
CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH IRAN,S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

REF: A. 02 STATE 210013

B. 04 STATE 206000

C. 04 STATE 231922

D. STATE 037471

E. KIEV 000875

F. STATE 078661

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAMELA K. DURHAM
REASONS 1.4 (B),(C),(D).

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 079031

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL PGOV MTCRE MNUC UP IR
SUBJECT: MTAG 05-96: UKRAINIAN FIRM ZAPORIZHZHYA'S
CONTINUED COOPERATION WITH IRAN,S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)

REF: A. 02 STATE 210013

B. 04 STATE 206000

C. 04 STATE 231922

D. STATE 037471

E. KIEV 000875

F. STATE 078661

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAMELA K. DURHAM
REASONS 1.4 (B),(C),(D).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Kiev
please see paragraph 5.


2. (S) Background: Since 2002, we have discussed with the
GOU cooperation between the Ukrainian entity Zaporizhzhya
Regional Foreign Economic Association (RFA) and Iran's
missile program (Ref A). Most recently, in February 2006, we
informed Ukrainian officials that the director-general of
Zaporizhzhya planned to travel to Iran in late 2005 to meet
with officials from the Ettehad Technical Group (ETG),which
is a front company associated with Iran's liquid-fuelled
ballistic missile developer, the Shahid Hemmet Industrial
Group (SHIG) (Ref D). In response to this information, the
GOU informed the U.S. that it has closely monitored
Zaporizhzhya RFA's activities, but has been unable to uncover
any evidence of Zaporizhzhya RFA providing missile-related
assistance to Iran (Ref E).


3. (S) We now want to share with the GOU information
indicating that Zaporizhzhya RFA was recently working to
supply Iran with a variety of stainless steels. First, in
mid-March 2006, Zaporizhzhya RFA was attempting to finalize a
purchase of two types of stainless steel by Iran's Ettehad
Technical Group. The first type is known as 08X22HGT
stainless steel. This is a titanium stabilized duplex
stainless steel that is controlled by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and could be used by SHIG to produce
fittings and valves for missile fuel delivery systems. The
second steel, type CR18NI10TI, is not MTCR-controlled, but is
a stainless steel suitable for the production of a variety of
Scud engine parts. In addition, this order is likely

pursuant to the November 2005 discussions between
Zaporizhzhya RFA and Ettehad Technical Group that we raised
with Ukraine in February 2006.


4. (S) Second, in mid-April 2006, Zaporizhzhya RFA offered
to provide Ukrainian-origin stainless steel round bars and
strips valued at over $1.3 million to Iran's Pars Novin
Industrial Company (PANICO). Like Ettehad Technical Group,
PANICO is also associated with SHIG. These strips and bars
are made from a type of steel known as SUS-321 or CR18NI9TI
stainless steel, which, although not MTCR-controlled, is used
to produce an array of parts for Scud liquid rocket engines.
We want to request Ukrainian authorities immediately
investigate this latest information and urge them to use all
available measures to prevent Zaporizhzhya RFA from shipping
these metals or any other orders to Ettehad Technical Group.


5. (S) Action request: After delivery of demarche in Ref F,
Department requests Embassy Kiev approach appropriate host
government officials to deliver talking points in paragraph 6
and report response. Points may also be left as a non-paper.


6. (S) BEGIN TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER:

(SECRET REL UKRAINE)

-- In the spirit of our nonproliferation cooperation and PSI
partnership, we would like to raise with you a matter of
proliferation concern and request your assistance in
investigating this activity.

-- Since 2002, we have discussed with you our concerns that
the Ukrainian entity Zaporizhzhya Regional Foreign Economic
Association (FRA) has been assisting the Iranian missile
program.

-- In September 2004, the U.S. imposed sanctions against

STATE 00079031 002 OF 003


Zaporizhzhya RFA pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000 (now known as the Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act)
for transferring technology controlled under the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to Iran.

-- More recently, in February 2006, we informed you that the
director-general of Zaporizhzhya, Vitaliy Ignatevich
Krasnoselsky, planned to travel to Iran in late 2005 to meet
with officials from the Ettehad Technical Group (ETG),which
is a front company associated with the Shahid Hemmet
Industrial Group (SHIG).

-- As you are aware from our previous discussions of this
issue as well as from numerous presentations at annual MTCR
Information Exchange meetings, SHIG is the organization
responsible for Iran's liquid-fuelled ballistic missile
program.

-- However, in our most recent exchange on this issue, you
indicated that your government has been monitoring
Zaporizhzhya RFA's activities closely and has not found any
indication that this firm has shipped, or intends to ship,
missile-related items to Iran.

-- In particular, you noted the absence of any export
licensing applications by Zaporizhzhya RFA for transfers of
defense- or missile-related items to Iran as evidence that it
has not violated Ukraine's export control regulations.

-- You will recall that during our February 2006 discussions,
we emphasized that Zaporizhzhya RFA is not a reputable firm
and that just because it has not submitted an export license
to your government does not mean it is not exporting items to
Iran.

-- Rather, we believe Zaporizhzhya RFA has not applied for
export licenses for the transfers we have brought to your
attention because it is aware that your government, as an
MTCR Partner, would not authorize such exports to
missile-related end-users in Iran.

-- Given our serious and well-established concerns with this
firm's activities, we now would like to provide you with
additional information indicating that Zaporizhzhya RFA is
continuing to engage in cooperation with Iran's missile
program and request you take immediate action to address it.

-- Specifically, we understand that in mid-March 2006,
Zaporizhzhya RFA was working to finalize the purchase of two
types of stainless steel by Iran's Ettehad Technical Group.

-- The first type is known as 08X22HGT stainless steel. This
is a titanium stabilized duplex stainless steel that has been
used in the production of Scud and NoDong propellant tanks
and is controlled by the MTCR. Because Ettehad Technical
Group is seeking this steel in bar form, we believe it will
likely be used by SHIG to produce fittings and valves for
missile fuel delivery systems.

-- The second steel, type CR18NI10TI, is an austenitic
stainless steel that is not MTCR-controlled, but is used in
the production of a variety of Scud engine parts.

-- Zaporizhzhya RFA intends to sell Ettehad Technical Group
35 metric tons of each of these types of steel.

-- We believe this order is pursuant to the November 2005
discussions between Zaporizhzhya RFA and Ettehad Technical
Group that we discussed with you in February 2006.

-- In addition, we have received information that
Zaporizhzhya RFA offered to provide Ukrainian-origin
stainless steel round bars and strips valued at over $1.3
million to Iran's Pars Novin Industrial Company (PANICO) in
mid-April 2006.

-- Like Ettehad Technical Group, PANICO is also associated
with SHIG.

-- These strips and bars are made from a type of steel known
as SUS-321 or CR18NI9TI stainless steel, which, although not
MTCR-controlled, is used to produce an array of parts for
Scud liquid rocket engines.

STATE 00079031 003 OF 003


-- We urge you to immediately investigate these recent
dealings between Zaporizhzhya RFA and Iran's missile program
and use all available measures to prevent Zaporizhzhya RFA
from shipping these metals or any other orders to Ettehad
Technical Group or PANICO.

-- We look forward to continued cooperation on missile
nonproliferation issues and would appreciate hearing the
results of the actions your government takes in response to
this information.

END TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER


7. (U) Please begin your response with MTAG in the subject
line and slug any reporting on this issue for ISN, EUR/PRA,
EUR/UMB, and NSC/David Stephens, and NSC/Damon Wilson.
RICE