Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06STATE66104
2006-04-26 22:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Secretary of State
Cable title:
Deputy Secretary Zoellick's April 18, 2006
how-toO P 262211Z APR 06 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 066104
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS PTER ECON EAID
KDEM, KTIA, KPKO, MARR, MASS, MOPS, OVIP, AG, CD, LY, ML,
SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary Zoellick's April 18, 2006
Meeting with Tunisian Defense Minister Kamel Morjane
Classified by: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla, Department
of State. Reason 1.4.(d)
MR, NG, SU, TS, TSCTI
C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 066104
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS PTER ECON EAID
KDEM, KTIA, KPKO, MARR, MASS, MOPS, OVIP, AG, CD, LY, ML,
SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary Zoellick's April 18, 2006
Meeting with Tunisian Defense Minister Kamel Morjane
Classified by: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla, Department
of State. Reason 1.4.(d)
MR, NG, SU, TS, TSCTI
1. (U) April 18, 2006; 4:00 p.m.; Washington D.C.
2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
D Staff Aaron Jost
Ambassador William Hudson
Embassy Pol/Econ Deputy Susannah Cooper
Tunisia Deskoff William Lawrence (notetaker)
Tunisia
Defense Minister Kamel Morjane
Ambassador Nejib Hachana
MFA Americas Director Mohamed Fadel Ayeri
Defense Attache Taieb Laajimi
Political Counselor Ali Ben Said (notetaker)
--------------
Summary
--------------
3. (C) During a one-hour April 18 meeting with Deputy
Secretary Zoellick on the margins of the 21St Tunisian-
American Joint Military Commission (JMC),Tunisian Defense
Minister Morjane announced the GOT would submit its draft
of a Status of Forces Agreement to the Embassy very
shortly and requested that a team of U.S. lawyers visit
Tunisia to finalize the text. He also expressed Tunisian
willingness to increase cooperation in regional
peacekeeping -- particularly in sub-Saharan Africa -- and
technical and economic assistance -- particularly in the
four poorest Sahel countries that are the focus of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. He deflected
U.S. calls for faster political reform by expressing
Tunisian concerns about the persistence of an Islamist
extremist threat throughout the region. The Deputy
Secretary challenged this assertion by raising the cases
of political participation by Islamists in Jordan and
Egypt, to which Morjane responded that this was not
relevant because Tunisians want to live in a secular
society. On Darfur, even though Tunisia does not intend
to send troops, he promised to pass on to President Ben
Ali the Deputy Secretary's request for diplomatic
assistance in moving the Arab League's position closer to
that of the African Union.
--------------
Economic Successes and Challenges
--------------
4. (C) Morjane stated that the high price of oil was
causing serious problems with the Tunisian budget despite
5.5% economic growth last year. He attributed Tunisia's
economic success primarily to the actions of President Ben
Ali in th 1980s and 1990s and former Prime Minister Nouira
in the 1960s and 1970s, during which Tunisia moved away
from the centralized "planning" approach that had
handicapped all of the other economies in the region. He
cited a wide variety of statistics that set off Tunisia's
economic and social success from its neighbors (life
expectancy, literacy, education, etc.),and expressed
gratitude for the large role that U.S. assistance played
in these successes. Morjane characterized the U.S.-
Tunisian relationship as a longstanding strategic alliance
and suggested that expanded economic relations would
further stabilize Tunisia by addressing the socioeconomic
roots of terrorism. He explained how Tunisia's greatest
challenge was not unemployment in general as much as
employment opportunities for its quickly rising number of
university graduates.
--------------
Triangulated Assistance to the Sahel
--------------
5. (C) Morjane proposed triangulated assistance to the
four poorest Sahel countries. He offered as a model what
the Japanese have proposed to the Tunisians to provide
technical assistance to the poorest African countries,
capitalizing on Tunisia's linguistic and cultural
affinities with the target countries. Morjane asserted
that Tunisia has realized greater success in its Sahel
development programs than outside donors and brings that
experience to the table. With an estimated 24,000
university graduates without employment for the last three
years, including 5,000 English literature majors, Tunisia
would like to mobilize this population economically in
Tunisia through foreign investment and developmentally
through educational and assistance programs both in
Tunisia and regionally.
--------------
Pace of Political Reform
--------------
6. (C) On political reform, Morjane referred to Tunisia's
deliberate implementation of reforms in a slow, step-by-
step fashion. He cited the Islamist threat as the primary
reason for this slow pace. He said that the crackdown of
the early 1990s was justified because the Islamist An-
Nahda party had violated the National Charter by using
religion politically. He then argued that despite
Tunisia's steady political reform underway -- nine
political parties, truly independent trade union, etc. --
the Islamist threat remained essentially the same as that
of the 1980s.
7. (C) Morjane deflected USG encouragement of a dialogue
on political reform by expressing Tunisian concerns about
the persistence of an Islamist threat throughout the
region. He implied that there was no such thing as an
Islamist moderate and that in an effort to wrest control
of regimes all Islamists engage in doublespeak,
particularly with foreign interlocutors.
8. (C) The Deputy Secretary argued that the cases of
Jordan and Egypt offer interesting food for thought about
how Islamists might play a role in political systems, but
Morjane countered that Tunisians wanted a secular society.
He argued that Tunisia's economic and social success was
evidence of Tunisia's seriousness in moving the country
forward and that many Islamists were simply "orphaned"
leftists, Ba'thists, and other unhappy Arab nationalists
who had simply found a more populist rallying cry in
Islam, referring to opposition leader Nejib Chebbi among
others. He also repeated the argument that the Islamists
would have abolished democracy and freedom had they come
to power, and he referred to former A/S Djeridjian's
prediction of "one man, one vote, one time." He asked the
U.S. to keep an open mind and to trust the GOT. He said
that the Tunisian way, which was using moderation and
socioeconomic development to fight the terrorists, would
prevail in the region despite all criticism. He said that
this struggle was not new in Islam and would not go away
soon.
--------------
Algeria and Libya
--------------
9. (C) On Algeria, Morjane underscored how important
Bouteflika's health was to the success of Algerian
reconciliation efforts, noting that many civilians are
still being killed in Algeria on a daily and monthly
basis. (Comment: The Tunisians reinforced this point via
a statistical analysis at the JMC. End Comment.)
However, he believed that Algeria was in the final phase
of its struggle to defeat Islamism. On Libya, he said
that despite Qadhafi's mercurial and unpredictable
personality and Libya's lack of capable government
institutions, improved relations with the U.S. were
helping regional stability. He also contended that
Libya's difficult time with its own Islamists has been
underreported outside of the country.
--------------
Darfur and Regional Peacekeeping
--------------
10. (C) On Darfur, Morjane said that Tunisia would not
send troops because it felt could play a better role with
its neighbors by keeping militarily uninvolved and by
exerting a moderating political influence. Darfur, in an
Arabic-speaking part of the continent, was simply too
close to home. However, he did agree to pass the Deputy
Secretary's request to President Ben Ali to try to bring
the Arab League closer to the African Union's position on
the crisis and reduce its quasi-defense of Khartoum's
position. However, Tunisia was very interested in working
closely with EUCOM and others to improve its peacekeeping
capacity and, with more training and capacity-building,
doing more in sub-Saharan Africa similar to what Tunisia
is doing currently in Ivory Coast, Congo, and
Ethiopia/Eritrea.
--------------
SOFA
--------------
11. (C) Morjane announced that Tunisia has almost
finalized its proposed text for a SOFA in response to our
November 2005 diplomatic note and would present it in the
coming days to Embassy Tunis. He requested that a U.S.
legal team be sent to Tunis to negotiate the final details
and concluded the meeting by requesting more U.S. official
delegations to Tunisia in every potential field of
cooperation.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
RICE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR PINS PTER ECON EAID
KDEM, KTIA, KPKO, MARR, MASS, MOPS, OVIP, AG, CD, LY, ML,
SUBJECT: Deputy Secretary Zoellick's April 18, 2006
Meeting with Tunisian Defense Minister Kamel Morjane
Classified by: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla, Department
of State. Reason 1.4.(d)
MR, NG, SU, TS, TSCTI
1. (U) April 18, 2006; 4:00 p.m.; Washington D.C.
2. (U) Participants:
U.S.
The Deputy Secretary
D Staff Aaron Jost
Ambassador William Hudson
Embassy Pol/Econ Deputy Susannah Cooper
Tunisia Deskoff William Lawrence (notetaker)
Tunisia
Defense Minister Kamel Morjane
Ambassador Nejib Hachana
MFA Americas Director Mohamed Fadel Ayeri
Defense Attache Taieb Laajimi
Political Counselor Ali Ben Said (notetaker)
--------------
Summary
--------------
3. (C) During a one-hour April 18 meeting with Deputy
Secretary Zoellick on the margins of the 21St Tunisian-
American Joint Military Commission (JMC),Tunisian Defense
Minister Morjane announced the GOT would submit its draft
of a Status of Forces Agreement to the Embassy very
shortly and requested that a team of U.S. lawyers visit
Tunisia to finalize the text. He also expressed Tunisian
willingness to increase cooperation in regional
peacekeeping -- particularly in sub-Saharan Africa -- and
technical and economic assistance -- particularly in the
four poorest Sahel countries that are the focus of the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative. He deflected
U.S. calls for faster political reform by expressing
Tunisian concerns about the persistence of an Islamist
extremist threat throughout the region. The Deputy
Secretary challenged this assertion by raising the cases
of political participation by Islamists in Jordan and
Egypt, to which Morjane responded that this was not
relevant because Tunisians want to live in a secular
society. On Darfur, even though Tunisia does not intend
to send troops, he promised to pass on to President Ben
Ali the Deputy Secretary's request for diplomatic
assistance in moving the Arab League's position closer to
that of the African Union.
--------------
Economic Successes and Challenges
--------------
4. (C) Morjane stated that the high price of oil was
causing serious problems with the Tunisian budget despite
5.5% economic growth last year. He attributed Tunisia's
economic success primarily to the actions of President Ben
Ali in th 1980s and 1990s and former Prime Minister Nouira
in the 1960s and 1970s, during which Tunisia moved away
from the centralized "planning" approach that had
handicapped all of the other economies in the region. He
cited a wide variety of statistics that set off Tunisia's
economic and social success from its neighbors (life
expectancy, literacy, education, etc.),and expressed
gratitude for the large role that U.S. assistance played
in these successes. Morjane characterized the U.S.-
Tunisian relationship as a longstanding strategic alliance
and suggested that expanded economic relations would
further stabilize Tunisia by addressing the socioeconomic
roots of terrorism. He explained how Tunisia's greatest
challenge was not unemployment in general as much as
employment opportunities for its quickly rising number of
university graduates.
--------------
Triangulated Assistance to the Sahel
--------------
5. (C) Morjane proposed triangulated assistance to the
four poorest Sahel countries. He offered as a model what
the Japanese have proposed to the Tunisians to provide
technical assistance to the poorest African countries,
capitalizing on Tunisia's linguistic and cultural
affinities with the target countries. Morjane asserted
that Tunisia has realized greater success in its Sahel
development programs than outside donors and brings that
experience to the table. With an estimated 24,000
university graduates without employment for the last three
years, including 5,000 English literature majors, Tunisia
would like to mobilize this population economically in
Tunisia through foreign investment and developmentally
through educational and assistance programs both in
Tunisia and regionally.
--------------
Pace of Political Reform
--------------
6. (C) On political reform, Morjane referred to Tunisia's
deliberate implementation of reforms in a slow, step-by-
step fashion. He cited the Islamist threat as the primary
reason for this slow pace. He said that the crackdown of
the early 1990s was justified because the Islamist An-
Nahda party had violated the National Charter by using
religion politically. He then argued that despite
Tunisia's steady political reform underway -- nine
political parties, truly independent trade union, etc. --
the Islamist threat remained essentially the same as that
of the 1980s.
7. (C) Morjane deflected USG encouragement of a dialogue
on political reform by expressing Tunisian concerns about
the persistence of an Islamist threat throughout the
region. He implied that there was no such thing as an
Islamist moderate and that in an effort to wrest control
of regimes all Islamists engage in doublespeak,
particularly with foreign interlocutors.
8. (C) The Deputy Secretary argued that the cases of
Jordan and Egypt offer interesting food for thought about
how Islamists might play a role in political systems, but
Morjane countered that Tunisians wanted a secular society.
He argued that Tunisia's economic and social success was
evidence of Tunisia's seriousness in moving the country
forward and that many Islamists were simply "orphaned"
leftists, Ba'thists, and other unhappy Arab nationalists
who had simply found a more populist rallying cry in
Islam, referring to opposition leader Nejib Chebbi among
others. He also repeated the argument that the Islamists
would have abolished democracy and freedom had they come
to power, and he referred to former A/S Djeridjian's
prediction of "one man, one vote, one time." He asked the
U.S. to keep an open mind and to trust the GOT. He said
that the Tunisian way, which was using moderation and
socioeconomic development to fight the terrorists, would
prevail in the region despite all criticism. He said that
this struggle was not new in Islam and would not go away
soon.
--------------
Algeria and Libya
--------------
9. (C) On Algeria, Morjane underscored how important
Bouteflika's health was to the success of Algerian
reconciliation efforts, noting that many civilians are
still being killed in Algeria on a daily and monthly
basis. (Comment: The Tunisians reinforced this point via
a statistical analysis at the JMC. End Comment.)
However, he believed that Algeria was in the final phase
of its struggle to defeat Islamism. On Libya, he said
that despite Qadhafi's mercurial and unpredictable
personality and Libya's lack of capable government
institutions, improved relations with the U.S. were
helping regional stability. He also contended that
Libya's difficult time with its own Islamists has been
underreported outside of the country.
--------------
Darfur and Regional Peacekeeping
--------------
10. (C) On Darfur, Morjane said that Tunisia would not
send troops because it felt could play a better role with
its neighbors by keeping militarily uninvolved and by
exerting a moderating political influence. Darfur, in an
Arabic-speaking part of the continent, was simply too
close to home. However, he did agree to pass the Deputy
Secretary's request to President Ben Ali to try to bring
the Arab League closer to the African Union's position on
the crisis and reduce its quasi-defense of Khartoum's
position. However, Tunisia was very interested in working
closely with EUCOM and others to improve its peacekeeping
capacity and, with more training and capacity-building,
doing more in sub-Saharan Africa similar to what Tunisia
is doing currently in Ivory Coast, Congo, and
Ethiopia/Eritrea.
--------------
SOFA
--------------
11. (C) Morjane announced that Tunisia has almost
finalized its proposed text for a SOFA in response to our
November 2005 diplomatic note and would present it in the
coming days to Embassy Tunis. He requested that a U.S.
legal team be sent to Tunis to negotiate the final details
and concluded the meeting by requesting more U.S. official
delegations to Tunisia in every potential field of
cooperation.
MINIMIZE CONSIDERED
RICE