Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06STATE54012
2006-04-05 14:55:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Secretary of State
Cable title:  

IRAN: STATUS OF USG THINKING

Tags:  PREL PGOV KNNP IR XE JA 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHC #4012 0951503
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 051455Z APR 06
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0000
S E C R E T STATE 054012 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP IR XE JA
SUBJECT: IRAN: STATUS OF USG THINKING

Classified By: Classified by EAP PDAS Kathleen Stephens
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

S E C R E T STATE 054012

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/05/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP IR XE JA
SUBJECT: IRAN: STATUS OF USG THINKING

Classified By: Classified by EAP PDAS Kathleen Stephens
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request cable; see paragraph 8.


2. (C) Summary. In response to recent news articles
alleging USG pressure on GOJ regarding Azadegan, the
Department wants to share with the GOJ the USG's latest
thinking on Iran. Post is asked to share the
information provided with appropriate interlocutors,
and report back reponses. End Summary.

--------------
Background on Japan's situation
--------------


3. (S/NF) Japan chairs the IAEA Board of Governors and
has been supportive of the U.S. approach on Iran.
Japanese officials and diplomats have provided post and
the Department with detailed readouts of Iranian FM
Mottaki's meetings with the Japanese Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister. During Mottaki's visit to Tokyo last
month, PM Koizumi and FM Aso urged Iran to abandon
uranium enrichment and fully comply with IAEA
requirements. Still, 15 percent of Japan's oil comes
from Iran, and Tokyo must weigh its support of
nonproliferation against its concerns that China might
take over all development of the Azadegan oil fields.


4. (U) Japanese newspapers reported April 4 that the
USG requested Japan terminate its involvement in the
Azadegan Project. In its April 4 edition, Yomiuri
cited an unidentified State official in reporting that
the USG has decided to ask the GOJ to halt its Azadegan
oil field project and to join the U.S. in punitive
measures against Iranian financial assets if ongoing UN
talks on sanctions against Tehran falter. According to
this article, the message will be relayed before
Koizumi visits Washington in late June. A similar
article ran in the Sankei two weeks ago, saying the USG
had informally asked the GOJ to suspend its development
in Azadegan.


5. (U) The Sankei piece quoted a Department source who
is alleged to have said that the Deputy Secretary and
U/S Joseph had urged Japan to cancel the Azadegan
project because the project's continuation gave Iran

the financial means to seek additional nuclear
technology.


6. (C) Note. Both the Deputy Secretary and U/S Joseph
denied this allegation, and press guidance used by
A/S McCormack reflected that. End Note.


7. (S/NF) A MoFA contact suggested that the worst
possible outcome would be for Japan to be seen as
bowing to U.S. pressure by pulling out of Azadegan
only to watch China quickly take it over. He said a
behind-the-scenes approach would be more effective,
but hinted that without an alternative to replace the
substantial loss in oil imports, the answer might simply
be "no." He said he thought Japan had slowed Azadegan
development as the nuclear issue moved toward a UNSC
referral.

--------------
Action Request
--------------


8. (SBU) Action Request. Post is asked to convey the
information in paragraph 9 to appropriate GOJ
interlocutors. End Action Request.


9. (S/REL JAPAN) Begin Information.

-- We appreciate Japan's support for the March 29
adoption by the UNSC of a Presidential statement; the
pressure is on Iran to comply fully within 30 days
with all steps called for in the IAEA Board's
February 4 resolution.

-- The U.N. Security Council Presidential Statement on
Iran demonstrates that the international community is
united in its concern over Iran's nuclear program and
Iran's efforts to conceal it nuclear activities.
Iran is more isolated now than ever and the Security
Council has signaled international resolve.

-- The Security Council has joined the IAEA Board in
calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment related
activity, fully cooperate with the Agency's
investigations, and return to negotiations over the
long-term status of Iran's nuclear program.

-- Despite the IAEA Board decision in February to
report Iran to the United Nations Security Council
and repeated calls to suspend its enrichment related
activities, Iran is engaged in a determined effort to
press ahead as quickly as possible on mastering
centrifuge enrichment technology.

-- Iran has introduced UF6 gas, the feed material for
centrifuges, into a ten centrifuge cascade to enrich
uranium at a pilot plant. This is the beginning of
a much larger cascade at this pilot facility.

-- Iran has also openly notified the IAEA that this
fall it will begin installing the first 3000
centrifuges at an industrial enrichment plant at
Natanz, which is, in fact, designed to hold tens of
thousands of centrifuges. Once operational, a
cascade of this size would give Iran the capability
to produce enough highly-enriched uranium (HEU) for
nuclear weapons in less than one year.

-- In the event that Iran does not fully comply with
the March 29 UNSC Presidential Statement, we expect
to work with Japan and other UNSC members to seek a
UNSC resolution invoking Chapter VII authority to
require Iran to take the steps called for by the
IAEA Board.

-- Failing full compliance, we should consider
seeking subsequent UNSCRs that impose targeted
sanctions on Iran. These measures would target
regime leadership and the nuclear/missile program
first. However, in considering such action at the
UNSC, we do not seek to harm the Iranian people.
Nor do we wish to take the issue away from the IAEA.

-- Indeed, even as the UNSC continues to consider
the Iran issue, we will continue to offer full
support for the IAEA's ongoing investigations in
Iran. Dr. ElBaradei's February 27 report to the
IAEA Board identified a number of unresolved
concerns that the IAEA continues to investigate,
even in the face of Iran's refusal to fully
cooperate. Those unresolved concerns include:

--- The scope and history of Iran's interactions
with AQ Khan, including why Iran received
information from Khan related to fabrication of
nuclear weapons components, and whether Khan
provided advanced "P2" centrifuge components to
Iran;

--- The history of Iran's plutonium separation
experiments;

--- The possibility of undeclared uranium
conversion work known as the "Greensalt project",
which the USG and the IAEA believe are
administratively related to efforts by Iran to
modify a missile re-entry vehicle, which the IAEA
believes may have "a nuclear military dimension";

--- Efforts by a military affiliated organization,
the PHRC, to acquire dual-use materials that have
nuclear weapons applications;

--- The history of the PHRC's work at the
Lavisan-Shian facility, which Iran razed in 2004
before allowing the IAEA access to the site; and

--- The possibility of a military connection at
the formerly-secret G'chine uranium mine.

-- We would also encourage Japan to consider ways
to take advantage of its leverage, including by
implementing bilateral measures to exert greater
pressure on Iran. We are urging the EU, Russia,
and others to do the same.

-- We hope that Iran responds to the growing
international consensus by suspending its uranium
enrichment related activities and fully
cooperating with the IAEA. But, if Iran does not,
we must be prepared to take the next steps to
increase pressure on Iran.

-- UNSC unity is essential to increasing the
pressure on Iran. As we move ahead, we will
continue to consult closely with you, the EU3,
and the remaining Security Council members.

-- We recognize that Japan has energy security
interests that we want to address in parallel
with the Iran issue, e.g., via bilateral
energy dialogues. We rely on Japan to take the
correct actions should the UNSC impose sanctions.

-- The U.S. and Japan also must expand
international consensus on the regime's nuclear
ambitions to address Iran's other threatening
policies, particularly its support for terrorism
and violent extremism, its meddling with its
neighbors, and its human rights abuses.

End Information.
RICE