U.S.-UN HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 041409

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/16
TAGS: PREL UNSC IZ
SUBJECT: U.S.-UN HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS ON IRAQ

(U) CLASSIFIED BY IO A/S KRISTEN SILVERBERG, REASON 1. 4 (B)
AND (D).

REF: BAGHDAD 565


1. (U) This is an action request. The following guidance
should be used by the U.S. delegation, led by Senior
Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, in the March 16, 2006 U.S.-UN
High-Level Consultations on Iraq. Para 2 contains U.S.
priorities for UN Assistance Mission to Iraq (UNAMI)
activities; para 3 contains guidance on other issues
expected to be raised.


2. (C) UN ROLE IN IRAQ: The U.S. seeks continued and
expanded implementation of current UNSCR-derived UNAMI
mandates, as well as further expansion of the UN presence
in Iraq as soon as possible. Specifically, the U.S. hopes
the UN will continue or begin work in these areas (in
prioritized order):

-- Electoral Process: Providing technical support for any
local/provincial elections and/or referendums, including

assistance with electoral laws and logistics; and support
for civic participation in upcoming elections.

-- Political Process (Sunni Engagement): In particular,
the UN could encourage and facilitate marginalized groups,
particularly Sunni Arabs, to pursue a coherent and
realistic agenda peacefully through the political system,
and work to ensure that such initiatives are given serious
consideration by the Iraqi government. The UN could
specifically seek to reassure Sunni Arabs that any
constitutional review process will be structured in a way
that guarantees Sunni interests will be considered fairly.
This may require contact and dialogue with Iraqi elements,
both Sunni and Shia, that may in the past have resorted to
or be affiliated with groups currently resorting to
violence (e.g., Sadr's group, the Muslim Ulema Council,
and the Iraqi Islamic Party). At the same time it is
vital that the UN not take on, or be seen to be taking on,
a role of mediating between the insurgency and the
government (or the Coalition). Also, the UN should foster
dialogue between Iraqi communities (while respecting other
similar initiatives). The UN should empower SRSG Qazi to
play this role, and ensure Iraqis know Qazi speaks
definitively for the UN.

-- Constitutional Review and/or Implementation: Whether,
when, and how to undertake a constitutional review is an
Iraqi matter; the international community should not
prejudice the outcome of this decision. UNAMI could fill
an important role in providing/coordinating technical and
procedural support for any constitutional review process
and for legislative implementation of the constitution.
Helpful activities related to the possible constitutional
review would include drafting and sharing options for how
a Review Committee could organize itself (i.e.,
membership, structure and process, schedule and
secretariat); creating a resource bank of outside

SIPDIS
constitutional specialists; facilitating public outreach
to key constituencies; and promoting national dialogue and
consensus-building on any constitutional review process.
The UN's assistance to any constitutional review should
focus substantively on technical-legal issues, not policy
issues. Regardless of whether the Iraqis undertake a
review of the constitution, international assistance to

legislative implementation of the constitution will be
important. Some analyses estimate that hundreds of laws
are called for by the constitution. The UN should design
constitutional assistance to be flexible enough to support
implementation alone or both implementation and review.

-- Donor Coordination: Continuing coordination, both on
the ground and through International Reconstruction Fund
Facility for Iraq (IRFFI),has proven to be an effective
way to channel contributions from smaller donors. A
strengthened UN coordination role on the ground under
Stephan di Mistura has been very helpful. UN leadership
will also be vital to getting the new GOI to reaffirm
existing donor coordination mechanisms, and in expanding
the scope of sectors beyond the current four sector
working groups. More UN development staff on the ground

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(vice in Amman) would help further improve coordination at
the sector level. As part of its donor coordination role,
the UN should work with the World Bank to advise Iraq on
improving its National Development Strategy and/or another
document - similar to the Afghanistan Compact - committing
the new Iraqi Government to implement specific reforms,
which would help donors make decisions about new
commitments of support. The UN proposal for an Iraqi-
shareholders meeting in May in Irbil and
Iraqi/international meeting in June outside Iraq is
reasonable, but we need to hear from the new Iraqi
government before committing to a time or venue.

-- Humanitarian and Reconstruction/Development Assistance:
Urge quicker disbursement of UN IRFFI funds in the UN
clusters other than elections and refugees/IDPs, where
disbursements have been impressive, specifically including
expanding direct provision of technical humanitarian and
reconstruction assistance, particularly in primary and
higher education, housing and capacity development;
assisting Iraqis in donor mobilization and coordination;
expanding assistance to refugee returnees and other
vulnerable populations; and expanding assistance on
environment/marshland operations, cultural
heritage/museums and telecommunications. These activities
are funded through IRFFI; express willingness to approach
other donors to contribute additional funds to IRFFI.

-- Governance: The UN could provide technical assistance
to build capacity (via specialized agency interaction) in
select ministries; and assisting with local governance
capacity building,including outreach to constituents and
increased transparency and accountability. The UN could
provide support for civic education on citizen's political
and civil rights as well as training for governmental
officials on political and civil rights.

-- Human Rights: The UN could provide human rights
support (training) to non-governmental organizations
enabling them to monitor and report on human rights
situation; providing technical assistance to build the
capacity of the Ministry of Human Rights, the Human Rights
Commission, and the National Center for Missing Persons;
and expanding assistance in the areas of mass graves
exhumation and identification of missing persons.

-- Rule of Law: The UN could expand direct provision of
technical assistance for rule of law; and facilitating
judicial and legal reform, especially to ensure such
reform conforms with international standards.

-- Kirkuk/Disputed Areas: The UN could assist in
developing options for the resolution of the final status
of disputed areas and re-drawing of some administrative
boundaries, including conducting the census. If the issue
of Kirkuk is raised during the constitutional review
process, UN technical assistance may be helpful. The UN
might also helpfully assume responsibility for assisting
the Iraq Property Claims Commission. Disputed
areas/Kirkuk is an exceptionally sensitive issue; the
forthcoming government's views should be sought before any
efforts are begun. Delegation should seek UN views on
UN's contingent role in the Transitional Administrative
Law Article 58 process.

-- National Reconciliation: The UN could play a role in
fostering community and macro-level peace and
reconciliation efforts.

In all cases, we will want to ensure continued, close
coordination to avoid duplication of U.S. and other donor
programs.

In order for the UN to take on these tasks, the U.S.
strongly supports deployment of UN specialized agency
personnel to Iraq. Generally, we would like to see the UN
conduct the range of operations it undertakes in countries
around the world.


3. (C) OTHER ISSUES:

-- U.S. POLICY: THE U.S. delegation should be prepared to
brief on current components of U.S. Iraq policy, including
the November "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," the
December force adjustment decisions, and the budget
requests in the FY 06 supplemental and for FY 07 including
program rationales.

-- CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW: Constitutional review should

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not be on the agenda during government formation talks; it
would be a distraction and a divisive issue at this stage.
Whether, when, and how to undertake a constitutional
review is an Iraqi matter; the international community
should not prejudice the outcome of this decision.

-- ARAB LEAGUE NATIONAL ACCORD CONFERENCE: If a national
unity government is successfully formed, all concerned
will need to reevaluate the usefulness of such a
conference. Any conference should: be inclusive; support
the existing political process; be a forum for Iraqi (vice
foreign) views to be discussed and solutions to be found;
and not treat political groups as equal to the Iraqi
government. All arrangements for a conference should be
acceptable to the Iraqi government. The U.S. continues to
view UN participation in any conference as constructive.

-- CONTACT GROUP: The United States remains supportive of
the existing international coordination mechanisms,
including the UN's Baghdad Coordination Group. However,
we do not see a useful role for a Contact Group outside of
Iraq. We do not see what such a group would do that
existing forums for discussing Iraq - such as UNSC
discussions, the donors' Core Group, donor conferences,
the IRRFI Donors' Committee, and meetings of Iraq's
neighboring countries and of regional organizations
cannot. We believe the focus should be on encouraging the

development of healthy bilateral relations between Iraq
and other members of the international community, who
should be represented at the Ambassadorial-level in
Baghdad and fully engaged with the Iraqi government.

-- MNF-I, DFI/IAMB AND UNAMI MANDATE REVIEWS: We are
optimistic that the (nlt June 15) MNF-I mandate, the (nlt
June 15) DFI/IAMB arrangements and (nlt August 11) UNAMI
mandate reviews will go smoothly; expect PRSTs reiterating
the UNSC's support will be sufficient.

-- IAMB: The International Advisory and Monitoring Board
(IAMB) can play an important role in urging the Iraqi
government to implement transparent financial mechanisms.
We urge the UN, through its chairmanship of the IAMB, to
fulfill the IAMB's mandate as defined in UNSCR 1483 to
ensure Iraq's oil sales "are consistent with...international
market best practices...in order to serve transparency."

-- DEDICATED AIRCRAFT FOR UNAMI: We still want to assist
you in finding a country to donate aircraft for dedicated
UNAMI use. MNF-I continues to meet requests for UN
transport as needed until that time.

-- MAKHMOUR: We share UNHCR's assessment that the civilian
character of Makhmour Camp has been compromised by active
PKK terrorists, that the camp must be closed, and that its
legitimate refugees must be given a viable choice between
repatriation or local integration. Security must be the
responsibility of the ISF. Coordination with KRG and
Iraqi Government is delayed by security and government
formation concerns.
RICE