IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION ACT --

S E C R E T STATE 203587


E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2031
TAGS: PARM MTCRE PREL MNUC ETTC RS

SUBJECT: IRAN AND SYRIA NONPROLIFERATION ACT --
NOTIFICATION OF SANCTIONS AGAINST FOUR RUSSIAN ENTITIES (C)

REF: A. A. STATE 199890

B. B. 05 STATE 225792

C. C. 05 STATE 205206

Classified By: ISN/MTR DIRECTOR PAM DURHAM
FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D),and (H).


1. (U) This is an action request. Embassy Moscow please see
paragraph 5.


2. (S) Background: The Iran and Syria Nonproliferation Act
(ISNA) requires periodic reports to Congress identifying
foreign entities with respect to whom there is credible
information indicating that they have transferred to or
acquired from Iran or Syria items on multilateral lists
(Australia Group (AG),Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG),and the Wassenaar Arrangement) or other items
with the potential to make a material contribution to
missile, WMD, or certain other weapons programs. The USG has
determined that Rosoboronexport, Kolomna Design Bureau of
Machine-Building (KBM),Tula Design Bureau of Instrument
Building (KBP) and Aleksey Safonov have engaged in
activities, as noted above, that warrant the imposition of
measures pursuant to Section 3 of the ISNA.


3. (S) Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the ISNA,
the following penalties are imposed on these entities, (or
individuals),their subunits, subsidiaries, and successors:

a. No department or agency of the United States Government
may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement
of any goods, technology, or services from them;

b. No department or agency of the United States Government
may provide any assistance to them, and they shall not be
eligible to participate in any assistance program of the
United States Government;

c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United States
Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to them of any
defense articles, defense services, or design and
construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are
terminated; and

d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items, the export of which is controlled
under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export
Administration Regulations, and existing such licenses are
suspended.

These measures, which will take effect shortly, will remain
in place for two years. We want to provide advance notice to
the Russian Government of this decision, note that this
determination will be published soon in the Federal Register,
and make clear that the penalties are only on the entities or
individuals. End Background.


4. (S) Purpose/Objective: To inform the host government of
the sanctions determination prior to its publication in the
Federal Register. Post may also draw from reftels (A ) C)
to reiterate U.S. concerns regarding the supply of
conventional arms and items with the potential to make a
material contribution to missile or WMD programs. Post
should make clear that the U.S. will continue to raise cases
of proliferation concern with the Government of Russia and
look for opportunities to cooperate.


5. (S) Action request: Post is requested to provide the
following suggested talking points to appropriate Russian
government officials and report response. Talking points
also may be provided as a non-paper.


6. (S//REL RUSSIA) Suggested Talking Points:

The United States has determined that there is credible
information indicating that Rosoboronexport, Kolomna Design
Bureau of Machine-Building (KBM),Tula Design Bureau of
Instrument Building (KBP) and Aleksey Safonov transferred to
or acquired from Iran since January 1, 1999, or transferred
to or acquired from Syria since January 1, 2005, items on a
multilateral control list, or other items that have the
potential to contribute materially to WMD, missile, or
certain other weapons programs in Iran or Syria.

-- We have regularly advised the government of Russia of the
requirements and potential effects of U.S. sanctions laws,
and the sanctions being imposed at this time are consistent
with the information we have provided you in the past.

-- As we have recently discussed, Iran and Syria are both
leading State Sponsors of Terrorism and Russian entities that
have previously or continue to make proliferation-related
transfers to these states risk incurring sanctions under U.S.
law.

-- We hope to be able to provide you with additional
information on the ROE case soon.

-- In the case of Kolomna Design Bureau (KBM),the
information relates to the vehicle-mounted short-range air
defense systems, including the Igla-S missiles, it sold to
Syria. We previously raised our concerns and requested at
the highest levels of your government during 2005 and 2006
that you halt this transfer.

-- In the case of Tula Design Bureau (KBP),the information
relates to the transfer of conventional arms to Syria during
this reporting period.

-- In the case of Aleksey Safonov, the information relates to
the transfer in early September 2005, of a shipment of
Russian-origin VG-951 fiber optic and MG-4 dynamically tuned
gyroscopes, A-16 accelerometers, and other guidance,
navigation and control equipment to the Iranian missile
entity Fadjr Industries Group. We advised you of this
transfer in December 2005.

-- As we have discussed on numerous occasions, we view
military- and proliferation-related transfers to Iran very
seriously, particularly in light of Iran's continuing refusal
to meet IAEA and UN requirements with regard to its nuclear
program: a statement which it recently repeated following the
passage of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737,
imposing targeted sanctions on Iran,s nuclear and missile
program.

-- Continued arms sales to Iran and Syria undermine our joint
diplomatic efforts to resolve the Iranian nuclear weapons
issue and the crisis in the Middle East.

--The U.S. has thus decided to impose penalties on ROE,
Safonov, KBM, and KBP as provided for in the Iran and Syria
Nonproliferation Act (ISNA).

-- Accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of the ISNA, the
following measures are imposed on these entities, (or
individuals),and their successors, subunits, and
subsidiaries:

a. No department or agency of the United States Government
may procure, or enter into any contract for the procurement
of any goods, technology, or services from them;

b. No department or agency of the United States Government
may provide any assistance to them, and they shall not be
eligible to participate in any assistance program of the
United States Government;

c. No USG sales to them of any item on the United States
Munitions List are permitted, and all sales to them of any
defense articles, defense services, or design and
construction services under the Arms Export Control Act are
terminated: and

d. No new individual licenses shall be granted for the
transfer to them of items, the export of which is controlled
under the Export Administration Act of 1979 or the Export
Administration Regulations, and existing such licenses are
suspended.

-- These measures will take effect shortly and will remain in
place for two years.

-- This determination will be published soon in the Federal
Register.

SECRET/Rel Russia

If Raised:

Appearance of Federal Register notice. The Federal Register
notice will appear in the coming week. We,ll make sure you
receive a copy.

The Federal Register notice will be similar to the August
Federal Register notice regarding INPA sanctions.

Termination of Sanctions.

-- As a matter of policy, the U.S. has been willing to
reconsider the sanctions if the company provided further
information and/or made certain commitments. This was the
case with Sukhoy.

End Talking Points


7. (U) Please slug any reporting on this issue for ISN/MTR,
EUR/PRA, and EUR/RUS. A response is requested as soon as
possible. Department point of contact is Ralph Palmiero,
ISN/MTR, 202-647-3737(palmierorm@state.sgov.gov).
RICE


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