JUNE 7 U.S.-CHINA CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL

S E C R E T STATE 113089


E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2021
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL CH KN IN IR PGOV

SUBJECT: JUNE 7 U.S.-CHINA CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL
AND NONPROLIFERATION

REF: A. A. 05 STATE 208661

B. B. 05 BEIJING 13326

C. C. 05 BEIJING 13327

D. D. 05 BEIJING 13328

E. E. 05 STATE 207039

F. F. 05 BEIJING 20109

G. G. 05 BEIJING 20110

H. H. 05 BEIJING 20008

I. I. STATE 74953

J. J. STATE 95206

Classified By: ISN Acting Assistant Secretary Francis C. Record for
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

Summary
--------------

(S) Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International
Security and Nonproliferation Frank Record and Chinese
Foreign Ministry Director General for Arms Control Zhang Yan
met June 7 in Washington for the latest round of bilateral
nonproliferation dialogue. This session was a follow-on to
arms control and nonproliferation talks held between AA/S
Stephen Rademaker and DG Zhang on November 1, 2005 (ref A).
While export controls, onward proliferation cases, strategic
modernization, regional matters (Iran, North Korea, India,
and the ASEAN Regional Forum),and arms control issues
(Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, Biological Weapons
Convention Review Conference, Convention on Conventional
Weapons, and the pace of destruction of chemical weapons
under the Chemical Weapons Convention) were discussed,
Executive Order 13382 dominated the meeting. While Zhang
shared information on recent efforts to strengthen China,s
export controls and provided examples of export enforcement
actions, he did not offer any information on specific actions
taken against the ten serial proliferators that the USG had
identified in previous E.O. 13382 discussions. Record
informed Zhang that the designation process would move
forward, and that the U.S. would be in touch with China
within the next week. (Note: On June 13, the Treasury
Department announced the E.O. 13382 designations of Beijing
Alite Technologies Company, Ltd. (ALCO),LIMMT Economic and
Trade Company, Ltd., China Great Wall Industry Corporation
(CGWIC),and China National Precision Machinery Import/Export
Corporation (CPMIEC),ref J. End note.) Zhang noted that
Beijing would host a workshop on implementation of UN
Resolution 1540 in mid-July, as well as an export controls
seminar, funded in part by the EU, in the near term. On
transparency and modernization issues, DG Zhang and Senior
Colonel Zhou Bo (Ministry of National Defense, PLA Air Force)
spoke fairly optimistically about the evolution of Chinese
thinking. Zhang acknowledged that in the past Beijing had
not been very forthcoming, but suggested Secretary
Rumsfeld,s 2005 visit to Second Artillery Headquarters may
be a &watershed event,8 proclaiming that &U.S. patience
will be paid off.8 Zhou characterized Chinese thinking on
the issues as &evolving in the right direction, though such
developments take time.8 Record expressed hope that
progress on these issues would be made in the 8th U.S.-China
Defense Consultative Talks scheduled for June 8-9. Overall,
Zhang voiced general support for U.S. nonproliferation
objectives, but took issue with our tactics and general
approach. Despite divergent views on many of the topics
discussed, both sides agreed to look for ways to increase
cooperation in areas of shared concern, and to take steps to
improve mutual understanding and cooperation.


Executive Order 13382
--------------

(S) Following up on the August, November and December 2005
U.S.-China consultations on Executive Order 13382 (&Blocking
Property of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferators and
Their Supporters8) (refs B-H),AA/S Record reaffirmed the
USG commitment to working cooperatively with China to address
serious U.S. concerns about the continued evasion of China,s
export controls by certain Chinese companies. Record made
clear however, that the United States had not, to date,
received the necessary assurances that China has adequately
taken specific, effective steps to stop the proliferation
activities of serial Chinese proliferators. He repeatedly
requested DG Zhang to share specific export enforcement steps
China was taking against the ten serial Chinese proliferators
that have been the subject of E.O. 13382 consultations, and
to what extent China was implementing the export control
measures the USG had suggested in August 2005 (refs B, C, E,
H). Record further urged Beijing to strengthen*and
publicize*enforcement measures, and also address
shortcomings in PRC licensing practices, catch-all controls,
and end-user verification checks.

(S) AA/S Record continued that the USG is also interested
in learning about actions China is taking to protect its
financial sector from being used to assist proliferators. He
reminded China that the U.S. had conveyed in May concerns
that North Korea, Iran and Syria were using Chinese banks to
further their proliferation activities (ref I). He
encouraged DG Zhang to ensure that financial institutions in
China do not facilitate and/or support the activities of
proliferation entities of concern, including those the U.S.
has designated under E.O. 13382.

(S) DG Zhang lamented that the U.S. still put China in the
&proliferators8 category, and referred to AA/S Record,s
points as another example of the U.S. trying to exert
pressure on China. He urged the U.S. to change its mentality
on China, warning that the U.S. view of China as &bad
students8 may complicate future cooperation. Zhang stated
that as a developing country, China was new to the export
controls process, but assessed that Beijing was &moving in
the right direction and at an impressive pace.8 With
respect to U.S. suggestions on export control measures, he
stated Beijing would carefully and seriously consider the
ones it found useful, but would disregard those it judged to
be inconsistent with Chinese policies.

(S) DG Zhang claimed that, in fact, Beijing had already
taken significant export control steps over the past several
months, including some very specific actions on North Korea
and Iran that have produced complaints from both countries.
However, Zhang maintained that he would not be able to share
with the U.S. all of what China has done in order to protect
the China-Iran and China-North Korea bilateral relationships.
When pressed by AA/S Record to describe the steps Beijing
had taken, Zhang briefly described the &internal emergency
contingency mechanism8 consisting of the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Commerce, State Security, and General
Administration of Customs, used to address export control
cases. Zhang claimed that any company found to be in
violation of Chinese export control laws would be severely
fined and/or punished. He also shared that in May he called
a meeting of the managing directors of the ten entities to
inform them of U.S. concerns. Record welcomed this step, but
pointed out that many companies engaging in proliferation use
denial and deception to avoid detection. DG Zhang countered
that he did not believe China,s state-owned companies could
evade PRC export control laws, though some private
individuals may be able to do so.

(S) AA/S Record expressed disappointment at the lack of
information provided by the Chinese on the ten entities, and
informed DG Zhang that nothing in the day,s discussions had
changed the USG position that there continued to be a need
for more rigorous and consistent implementation of specific,
effective export control steps against Chinese serial
proliferators. He reminded Zhang that the U.S. had
originally informed China that we needed corrective action by
the end of November 2005, but that we are now long past that
time. Record indicated the USG designation process would
move forward, and that the U.S. would be in touch with China
within the next week. (Note: On June 13, the Department of
the Treasury announced the E.O. 13382 designations of Beijing
Alite Technologies Company, Ltd. (ALCO),LIMMT Economic and
Trade Company, Ltd., China Great Wall Industry Corporation
(CGWIC),and China National Precision Machinery Import/Export
Corporation (CPMIEC),ref J. End note.)



Open Cases
--------------

(S) AA/S Record then moved to a discussion of onward
proliferation cases where the U.S. is still awaiting PRC
responses. He passed to DG Zhang a non-paper listing those
cases and asked for an update on the PRC,s investigations.
Zhang stated that some cases have been resolved and
acknowledged that others are still being processed. He
explained that PRC investigations require a lot of resources
and time, and that if China has not yet provided the U.S.
with a clear answer, then China is still working on the case.
Zhang also repeated previous requests for the U.S. to
provide more precise information on cases.
Dandong Xinshidai Trading Company Ltd.

(S) DG Zhang said that China had already informed the U.S.
that its investigation into Dandong Xinshidai Trading Company
Ltd. did not reveal any illegal activities. (Note:
Department officials have no record of this. End note).
Zhang said China needed more information to substantiate U.S.
information that the Chinese company had shipped
missile-useful stainless steel bars to North Korea.
Bellamax United Trading Company

(S) DG Zhang reported that in response to U.S. information,
China immediately organized an interagency task force to keep
a close watch on Bellamax and Hong Kong Piramid Trading
Company. He explained that both companies have a complicated
background, as one is North Korean and the other is Chinese,
and they are somehow related. However, he maintained that
Chinese authorities so far have no proof that either company
has engaged in illegal activities and noted that China will
not be lenient should illegal activities be discovered.

(S) DG Zhang also claimed that while the U.S. had provided
information on Bellamax,s location, name, etc., China had
not received any specific information on the commodities
involved in the case. ISN/MTR Director Pamela Durham said
that the U.S. had provided such information, and agreed to
retransmit all the information we previously have provided
China in this case (septel).


Potassium Bifluoride

(S) DG Zhang reported that in December 2005, China acted
upon information provided by the U.S. and Israel that a South
Korean company was supplying potassium bifluoride to Iran
through China. (Note: Potassium bifluoride is a precursor
for nerve agents and also has nuclear-related uses in uranium
conversion and uranium hexafluoride (UF6) production. End
note.) While the ship carrying the chemicals had already
left Shenzhen, it was stopped later in Singapore. China
found that the ROK company, Yullin Technology Corporation,
violated its end-use agreement and attempted to transfer the
chemicals to Iran without PRC knowledge. As a result,
China,s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) will not approve the
export of any chemical compounds to Yonglin Technology or any
export applications listing Yonglin Technology as the
end-user. According to Zhang, the ROK also imposed penalties
on Yonglin Technology.

Beijing Huayun International Trading Company

(S) DG Zhang stated that after reviewing Beijing Huayun,s
transactions over a long period of time, Chinese authorities
found no evidence that Beijing Huayun had received a request
from the DPRK for chemicals. Thus, Zhang concluded, no
export of chemicals to the DPRK took place. When AA/S Record
raised the possibility that an export could have occurred
absent written documentation from the North Korean customer
and without PRC knowledge, Zhang insisted that would be
impossible as the Chinese company,s leadership &would face
severe penalties.8

Shanghai Abochem Chemical Company, Chembay, CPMIEC

(S) With regard to U.S. information about Syrian interest in
purchasing CBW-useful chemicals from various Chinese firms,
including Shanghai Abochem Chemical Company, Chembay, and
China Precision Machinery Import/Export Corporation (CPMIEC),
DG Zhang responded that PRC authorities could not identify
Chembay and have requested CPMIEC to report all of its
activities falling within a certain period of time. He did
note, however, that PRC authorities had located Shanghai
Abochem but did not find that it had exported chemicals to
Syria. Zhang indicated that investigations are still in
progress and pledged to keep the USG informed.

Gao Yiming, Aluminum Production Line

(S) AA/S Record shared with DG Zhang new information
regarding Chinese national Gao Yiming,s efforts to supply
Pakistan,s unsafeguarded nuclear program with an aluminum
production line that could assist Pakistan,s development of
an indigenous capability to manufacture uranium centrifuge
components. Record urged China to re-double its efforts to
stop the transfer given our very serious concerns that the
window to stop this export is closing. (Note: Non-paper
containing the new information will be provided to Embassy
Beijing via septel.) Zhang promised to relay the new
information to the appropriate law enforcement agencies in
Beijing.


PRC Law Enforcement Actions

(S) DG Zhang then turned to specific export enforcement
actions that China had taken on its own without cooperation
from foreign governments. In the first case, initially
reported in ref E, China discovered in June 2004 that a
Korean individual and some Chinese citizens attempted to
smuggle a three-axis test bench to the DPRK. China's General
Administration of Customs confiscated the equipment and
determined that it was a controlled item that could be used
to test missile guidance systems. In August 2005, a Chinese
court sentenced one person to nine years imprisonment and
confiscated 100,000 RMB in personal property; a second person
was sentenced to eight years imprisonment and fined 130,000
RMB. While China has not made this case public, it is
looking into whether it can publish something about this case
on the internet. The U.S. welcomed this effort and noted
that publicizing penalties imposed on companies that violate
China,s export controls can serve as deterrent to other
firms to not violate Chinese law.

(S) In another case, first reported in ref H, authorities
in Jilin province stopped and confiscated an illegal 10 ton
export of sodium cyanide to the DPRK by Tumen Chemistry Light
Industry Company (Tumen Shi Huaxue Qinggongye Gongsi). When
the company failed to pay the 50,000 RMB fine, Jilin
officials seized the manager,s house. This case is
published on the National Development and Reform
Commission,s (NDRC) website and is being used by Jilin
officials as an example in export controls and industry
outreach efforts.

(S) In a third case, Shanghai Customs discovered a shipment
of zirconium powder to Iran that was identified by a
harmonized system code (HS code) that did not match the HS
code for the actual commodity. Because of this discrepancy,
Chinese authorities confiscated the goods and issued a
warning to the Chinese company.

(S) DG Zhang also noted that Chinese firms have been working
around Chinese controls on certain types of graphite. To
address this issue, the State Council has approved a new
requirement to license all exports of graphite and
graphite-related items.



Export Controls
--------------

(S) DG Zhang noted that in January 2006, the PRC implemented
new measures to regulate the export of dual-use goods and
technology. Furthermore, China is revising its controls on
nuclear exports and nuclear-related dual-use items to match
the current NSG Trigger List and Dual-Use Annex. China is
also revising its control lists on dual-use biological agents
and related technologies, said Zhang, and the revisions have
already been submitted to the State Council for approval.

(S) Specifically on graphite, Zhang stated that China has
found its regulations insufficient because Chinese companies
have been exporting graphite that fall below the control
thresholds. At the end of May 2006, the State Council
approved new administration measures that will require a
license for any export of graphite, reported Zhang. He said
that the new measures would be published &soon8 and interim
measures are currently in place.

(S) General comments were also exchanged on export controls,
with AA/S Record acknowledging that China had taken some
steps thus far, but emphasizing that enforcement and
implementation were still key areas lacking in China, and
that more needed to be done to bring Chinese export controls
up to international standards. DG Zhang suggested
intensifying information exchanges on specific cases and
strengthening cooperation in training, law enforcement, and
personnel. He shared that Beijing was receptive to workshops
sponsored by the Export Control and Related Border Security
(EXBS) program tentatively planned for September/October in
Beijing, at which U.S. experts would be welcome. Zhang also
highlighted China-EU cooperation, and announced that the EU
had agreed to provide funds for an export controls seminar in
Bejing in the near future. A workshop on implementation of
UN Resolution 1540, scheduled for mid-July in Beijing, is
another China nonproliferation effort. Zhang repeated that
it was important for the U.S. to create a &good
atmosphere,8 and called for the U.S. to be &sensitive and
cautious,8 stressing that Washington should refrain from
taking punitive measures, as that would damage U.S.-China
efforts and be &totally counterproductive.8

(S) DG Zhang noted that China wants U.S. support for its bid
to join the Missile Technology Control Regime and pointed out
that his country is willing to follow all MTCR-related
control lists. He also expressed great concern regarding the
U.S. decision to implement Wassenaar Arrangement catch-all
controls. He stated that such concerns were expressed at the
Bush-Hu meeting, and that President Bush had stated that the
U.S. wanted to promote our bilateral trade and commercial
relationship. Zhang welcomed an offer by the U.S. Commerce
Department to have timely and frank bilateral discussions
before formal implementation of the catch-all proposals.

(S) Responding to DG Zhang,s request that the U.S. not take
action without careful consideration, AA/S Record assured
Zhang that such consideration had been undertaken, and that
U.S. regulatory changes were aimed at improving verification
and monitoring. Record reiterated that the provisions were
still under review and that the State Department was working
closely with the Commerce Department.

(S) The Energy Department's Acting Assistant Deputy
Administrator Cindy Lersten expressed DOE interest in
developing tools such as a technical guide on WMD commodities
to further assist Chinese nonproliferation efforts. She
highlighted safeguards as a good start and looked forward to
more cooperation, offering to address any particular requests
for assistance Beijing may have. DG Zhang expressed
gratitude for Lersten's offer, and lauded DOE cooperation as
being very productive, adding that, "ongoing and further
assistance would be welcomed with open arms." AA/S Record
applauded good U.S.-China cooperation, and added that he
hoped to achieve the same success with the EXBS program.
ISN/ECC's Kathy Crouch announced that the State Department
now has funding to provide more comprehensive training that
complements DOE's on-going efforts.


Strategic Modernization
--------------

(S) AA/S Record stated that the U.S. welcomes the emergence
of a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, but is
concerned about China,s military buildup, and the lack of
transparency surrounding Beijing,s efforts to modernize and
enhance the capabilities of its armed forces. Record urged
China to be more forthcoming about its modernization program,
and stated that it was in China,s interest to do so as a
responsible stakeholder in the international system. While
he recognized the publication of Chinese Defense White Papers
as an important step, Record noted that the papers include
very little on nuclear or strategic issues. Record
encouraged China to engage in a candid and open dialogue with
the U.S. on defining &transparency,8 and welcomed any
discussion by the Chinese of general directives and trends
underlying China,s strategic modernization efforts.

(S) Ministry of National Defense (MND) Senior Colonel Zhou
Bo stated the MND was making great efforts to be more
transparent, and highlighted the biannual publication of
defense White Papers as evidence of such improvement. He
noted that the White Papers were even cited by U.S. experts
in USG reports, and acknowledged that the last scheduled
White Paper was not published due to internal debate within
the Chinese government. Zhou stated that most documents the
U.S. considers public are confidential within the Chinese
government, but noted there was some change in this mindset,
which he characterized as &evolving in the right direction,
though such developments take time.8 With respect to the
nuclear issue, Zhou cited Defense Secretary Rumsfeld,s 2005
visit to Second Artillery Headquarters as an unprecedented
event. He also referenced PACOM Admiral Fallon,s May visit
to the 8th Division, Eastern, and Southern fleets as another
exercise in transparency, permitting Fallon a close look at
China,s new domestically produced Fighter Bomber 7, which
Zhou indicated was a total rework of the Navy Bomber 7. Zhou
also mentioned that the agenda of the June 8-9 Defense
Consultative Talks in Beijing included topics such as the
future of China,s military and its nuclear buildup.

(S) DG Zhang noted great U.S. concern about strategic
modernization, particularly on the nuclear issue. He pointed
to China,s Article VI commitment to eliminate all nuclear
weapons and continued adherence to a &No First Use8 policy,
and underscored the small size and defense-oriented nature of
China,s nuclear force. Zhang stated that Beijing intends to
stay at this level and not engage in an arms race, and
assured AA/S Record that it was &very difficult to fathom8
a Chinese attack on any state, let alone the U.S. He also
stated that China had already signed the CTBT and was
actively working to ratify the Treaty, which is already in
Congress, and further noted China,s agreement to a
moratorium on nuclear tests before the Treaty even entered
into force. He highlighted U.S. information indicating
China,s halting of fissile material production, and
reiterated Beijing,s adherence to the 1998 U.S.-China
understanding not to target weapons at each other. Zhang
insisted Beijing is making efforts in all fields to improve
transparency as China too wanted to minimize misinformation
and concerns, but continued that much depended on the overall
bilateral relationship and general atmosphere. He urged the
U.S. to be constructive by stopping reports generated on
&baseless information,8 a reference to the 2006 Defense
Department Report to Congress on the Military Power of the
People,s Republic of China.

(S) AA/S Record stated that the U.S. wanted to continue
dialogue in this area and asked Beijing to informWashington
if/when U.S. information was found to be inaccurate, and
expressed hope that clarification on some of these items may
take place in the DCT. Record then referenced a set of
strategic modernization questions initially passed by then
Acting Assistant Secretary Stephen Rademaker to Director
General Liu Jieyi in February 2004, but for which a Chinese
reply was never received. Zhang acknowledged that in the
past China had not been forthcoming, but suggested the
Rumsfeld visit may be a &watershed event,8 proclaiming that
&U.S. patience will be paid off.8

(S) VCI DAS Chris Ford asked how China responds to
criticisms from non-P-5 countries regarding Chinese
compliance with Article VI of the NPT . DG Zhang stated that
if all states agreed tomorrow to eliminate nuclear weapons,
China would do it, but that such an understanding did not
seem possible. Instead, he suggested action be taken to
minimize the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine,
and to maintain the unity of nuclear weapon states.



Regional Issues: Iran, North Korea,
U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation, and ARF
--------------

Iran

(S) Stating that it was critical to avoid a nuclear Iran
&at all costs,8 AA/S Record emphasized that the issue of
WMD proliferation to Iran was of utmost importance to the
U.S., and urged China to help press Iran to accept the P5 1
offer. He stated that the U.S. was willing to give Iran
weeks, not months, to make a decision, and that the next step
must be UNSC sanctions if Tehran rejected the offer.

(S) DG Zhang stated that China,s position on Iran was not a
question of political will, but of capability and resources,
as China simply did not have the same resources and
intelligence capabilities as the U.S. to devote to the issue.
Zhang acknowledged that it was time for Tehran to make a
choice, and welcomed the U.S. offer to negotiate with Tehran
if Iran suspends enrichment activity, calling it an important
and &correct8 step. Acknowledging the significance of the
U.S. offer, Zhang offered: &They may not say it, but Iran
knows your weight.8 He stated that China is seriously
considering the U.S. invitation to join the negotiations.
With respect to the UNSC, Zhang warned that the UNSC must be
used cautiously, and that Beijing hoped the matter would not
be taken up by the body; however, he stated that Beijing
would &act responsibly if a Security Council situation
arises.8 Zhang again stressed P5 unity and finding a
diplomatic solution, and added that China would talk with the
Iranians in an effort to persuade them to be cooperative.


North Korea

(S) Responding to AA/S Record,s mention of the possibility
of a DPRK missile/space vehicle launch, Zhang stated that
Beijing &consulted closely on this issue at a very high
level.8 Addressing doubts by &some8 that the PRC is not
serious about a nuclear-free Korean peninsula, Zhang stated
that Beijing sees itself as a &main player,8 but not the
¢ral player8 in the Six-Party Talks, and lamented
China,s inability to &do anything8 due to DPRK and U.S.
positions on U.S. defensive measures. Zhang warned that it
was a &grave mistake8 for the U.S. to wait for the DPRK to
return without offering some sort of &compromise action8 to
Pyongyang. He further called on the U.S. to prioritize
nuclear and financial issues; while China supported in
principle U.S. action to protect the U.S. financial system,
Beijing feels that such a concern, while legitimate, should
nevertheless be secondary to the nuclear issue. He cited the
Administration,s placement of counterterrorism and
nonproliferation as priorities, and remarked that the U.S.
should follow that policy.

(S) AA/S Record clarified that the U.S. saw the financial
defensive measures as actions pursuant to U.S. law and that
it was not an &either or8 situation with respect to
pursuing defensive measures and denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula. ISN/RA,s Eliot Kang observed that, given
the small scale of defensive measures, the DPRK was seizing
upon the issue as an excuse to delay returning to
negotiations about which it may not be serious. DG Zhang
countered by stating that the U.S. was giving the DPRK
excuses to stay away from the talks, but concurred with AA/S
Record on the need to remain united on this issue.


U.S.-India Nuclear Cooperation

(S) DG Zhang questioned whether the U.S.-India agreement
would discourage or encourage other states to sign the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and asked why the U.S. did
not have India sign the NPT before agreeing to the deal?
AA/S Record responded that cooperation between the U.S. and
India would not undermine the NPT.



Asian Regional Nonproliferation Efforts ) The ASEAN Regional
Forum

(S) In response to ISN/RA,s Eliot Kang expression of hope
for China to co-chair a 1540 seminar in ARF, DG Zhang noted
that the U.S.-proposed seminar in the ARF and a workshop on
1540 implementation that China will host with the United
Nations in July PRC 1540 conferences were scheduled too close
to one another. (China,s seminar with the UN is to be held
in July 2006; the U.S. seminar in the ARF will be held in
Spring 2007). Beijing would not be willing to fund both
conferences within such a short time period, considering that
the participants for both eventswould be mostly the same. He
stressed that China supported the proposal, and that its
reasons for not co-chairing with the United States and
Singapore were not political.


Arms Control Issues
--------------


Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

(S) AA/S Record stated that the Conference on Disarmament
(CD) had been deadlocked for nearly ten years, and risked
irrelevance if meaningful work does not start soon. He
highlighted the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) as one
subject on which there is consensus, and stated that the U.S.
believed a legally binding ban on the production of fissile
material would be an important contribution to strengthening
the nuclear nonproliferation regime; the text proposed by the
U.S. was designed to build on this consensus and break the
deadlock. Record noted that the U.S. stopped producing
fissile material for nuclear weapons in 1988, and encouraged
China to publicly declare such a moratorium given that China
is the only one out of the five NPT nuclear-weapon states to
have not done so. VCI PDAS Christopher Ford stated that it
was a U.S. priority to move forward with FMCT negotiations,
and observed that collective experience in the CD revealed
that one sure way to not/not make progress was to link in
other issues, such as verification. PDAS Ford also stated
that attempting the impossible, such as effective
verification, was also a deal-breaker.

(S) DG Zhang stated that China had just received a draft of
the U.S. proposal and would study it, but asserted that the
U.S. must accommodate Beijing,s concerns. He questioned the
rationale and timing, and inquired if discussions had been
held with other states, and if so, what the feedback was.
Zhang emphasized that a verification element was useful to
make the FMCT credible, and that a majority of states held
the same view.

(S) VCI/NA Director Stanley Fraley informed DG Zhang that
the U.S. had submitted a White Paper explaining U.S. policy,
and offered to meet for further discussions. Zhang responded
to the offer by directing the U.S. to China,s Geneva
delegation as the appropriate counterparts.


Convention on Conventional Weapons

(S) AA/S Record reaffirmed U.S. dedication to de-mining for
humanitarian reasons and
asked China not to block consensus on adopting a Mines Other
Than Anti-Personnel Mines (MOTAPM) protocol in 2006. Record
stated that the U.S. viewed the CCW as the best forum in
which to take up the issue of an anti-vehicle mines protocol.
DG Zhang stated that it was not a good idea to move forward
with negotiations without support or participation from China
or Russia, suggesting such an outcome may be useless and
destroy consensus. Zhang said that countries, concerns must
be resolved before starting negotiations, and that the
Chinese package deal was a good compromise to the problem.


Extension of Chemical Weapons Convention Deadline

(S) AA/S Record reaffirmed U.S. commitment to the CWC, and
noted that the U.S. has destroyed more than 10,000 tons (36%)
of its chemical agent stockpile, at a cost of $1.5 billion a
year. Record confirmed that the U.S. requested an April 29,
2012 deadline (the latest date permitted by the CWC) but
acknowledged that current projections indicate the U.S. will
not meet this deadline. Record expressed U.S. desire to work
constructively with China to secure approval of the U.S.
request during the July meeting of the OPCW Executive Council.

(S) DG Zhang noted the U.S. request to extend the deadline,
and expressed China,s desire for all CW states to destroy
weapons according to CWC obligations. He questioned whether
Japan would also need an extension. Zhang indicated he
understood problems countries, faced, and that China would
look at all requests &objectively and properly.8


Biological Weapons Convention

(S) AA/S Record registered U.S. disappointment with the
Biological Weapons Convention BWC) Preparatory Committee
meeting, and encouraged China to help steer the RevCon toward
addressing practical, relevant world problems requiring
urgent attention in capitals, such as legislation and
pathogen security.

(S) DG Zhang expressed his wish for a successful RevCon in
November and stated that it should focus on: 1) reviewing the
past five year,s implementation efforts; 2) discussing
outcomes of annual experts group meetings; 3) identifying
future work in arms control and bio issues; 4) devising ways
to strengthen cooperation in this area; and 5) aiming for
practical multilateral measures to improve universal
implementation of the BWC. Zhang indicated he did not know
whether other states shared this view, but that Beijing would
consult with BWC countries.
RICE


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