Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SOFIA958
2006-07-10 13:04:00
SECRET
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:
ZFR ONE YEAR AFTER ELECTIONS, STANISHEV EXCEEDING
how-toVZCZCXRO4097 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV DE RUEHSF #0958/01 1911304 ZNY SSSSS ZZH P 101304Z JUL 06 ZFR FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2193 INFO RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000958
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ECON PGOV IZ BG
SUBJECT: ZFR ONE YEAR AFTER ELECTIONS, STANISHEV EXCEEDING
EXPECTATIONS ZFR
REF: SOFIA 926
SOFIA 00000958 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Jeffrey Levine, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
MESSAGE SENT IN ERROR. PLS DISREGARD, REMOVE ALL COPIES AND BLANK THIS
MRN. MESSAGE WILL BE RESENT AT ANOTHER TIME UNDER ANOTHER MRN.
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
LEVINE
SOFIA 00000958 002 OF 003
total reimbursement of USD 48 for meals and incidental
expenses in the first quarter of 2006. His personal wealth
consists of an 1800 square-foot apartment where his mother
lives and "a one-sixth share of a 1986 Mazda" left by his
father. His income for 2005 was approximately BGN 20,000
(USD 13,000). Even his harshest critics do not question his
personal integrity or his intelligence. Stanishev's
knowledge of the EU accession process and its implications
for Bulgaria is encyclopedic. This familiarity with European
institutions and policymakers has given him credibility in
Brussels, allowing him to push back when he felt the
Commission was unfairly holding Bulgaria to a higher standard
than the ten previous new members. Nor should Stanishev's
political skills be underestimated. He has used the
accession process to bind together his three-party coalition
and push needed reforms through parliament. His decision to
appoint as Finance Minister Plamen Orecharski, a technocrat
closely associated with the opposition Union of Democratic
Forces, took political courage and showed that he was capable
of putting Bulgaria's interests above the interests of his
party.
--------------
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
--------------
6. (C) Organized crime and political corruption are the
government's Achilles heel. Faint progress has been made
against either over the last ten months. Interior Minister
Rumen Petkov is often blamed for this lack of progress, in
our view deservedly -- his gaffe-prone performance and weak
administrative skills mark him as a provincial leader who
still looks out of his league at the national level. But the
problems go deeper than any one individual. Political
parties are dependent for financing on unregulated cash
donations. Many of the richest people in the country -- and
therefore the main patrons of political parties -- made their
money through organized crime or misuse of public resources.
Add to this a judicial system that is inefficient and subject
to corruption, and you have an "iron triangle" of corruption,
criminality and judicial inefficiency that is extremely
difficult to break. Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev, who
began his seven-year term in February and is independent of
the government, has shown signs that he is serious about
tackling the problem (reftel). Velchev, however, has his
work cut out for him and will need all the support he can get
from the government.
7. (C) Interior Minister Petkov's apparent inability or
unwillingness to reform his own agency and vigorously pursue
major organized crime figures highlights another of PM
Stanishev's problems: the perception that he is not fully in
control of his cabinet. In fact, the Bulgarian constitution
posits a consensus-based decision-making process within the
Council of Ministers, making it difficult even for a strong
personality to impose his or her will. Stanishev carries the
additional burden of being a relative newcomer to high-stakes
politics, having been plucked from near obscurity by former
BSP leader Georgi Parvanov when Parvanov won the 2000
presidential election. In contrast, Petkov and Economy and
Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov -- both of whom at various
times in the past were seen as coveting the premiership --
are experienced political operatives. Beyond his own party,
Stanishev must also manage the competing personal and
political interests of his coalition partners.
--------------
COMMENT: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
--------------
9. (C) If we could choose the face of Bulgaria's future
political leadership that would best serve U.S. interests,
Sergei Stanishev would be at or near the top of the list. In
spite of the burdens placed on him by his own party and a
political system that seemingly can be changed only at
glacial speed, Stanishev has shown himself to be a capable
leader and a dedicated reformer. He has successfully kept
his government focused on its top priority of early
membership in the European Union, with all of the complex
internal changes that goal entails. Once this is achieved,
Stanishev will have more time to devote to building his
government's domestic legacy. This is likely to include
addressing major social issues such as education and health
care, both of which are in or near crises. He will also have
to work harder to keep his coalition together after the
"glue" of EU accession starts to weaken. Yet the coalition
is probably stable in the medium term, if for no other reason
than that the two junior partners have nowhere else to go
SOFIA 00000958 003 OF 003
right now. In short, further USG investment in Stanishev
will likely pay dividends for some time to come. His
government represents stability and continuity in foreign
policy, and he personally represents the young, reform-minded
Bulgarian politician of the future. To the extent we are
able support him and other like him, U.S. interests in
Bulgaria will be strengthened.
Levine
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR ECON PGOV IZ BG
SUBJECT: ZFR ONE YEAR AFTER ELECTIONS, STANISHEV EXCEEDING
EXPECTATIONS ZFR
REF: SOFIA 926
SOFIA 00000958 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: CDA Jeffrey Levine, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
MESSAGE SENT IN ERROR. PLS DISREGARD, REMOVE ALL COPIES AND BLANK THIS
MRN. MESSAGE WILL BE RESENT AT ANOTHER TIME UNDER ANOTHER MRN.
ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR ZFR
LEVINE
SOFIA 00000958 002 OF 003
total reimbursement of USD 48 for meals and incidental
expenses in the first quarter of 2006. His personal wealth
consists of an 1800 square-foot apartment where his mother
lives and "a one-sixth share of a 1986 Mazda" left by his
father. His income for 2005 was approximately BGN 20,000
(USD 13,000). Even his harshest critics do not question his
personal integrity or his intelligence. Stanishev's
knowledge of the EU accession process and its implications
for Bulgaria is encyclopedic. This familiarity with European
institutions and policymakers has given him credibility in
Brussels, allowing him to push back when he felt the
Commission was unfairly holding Bulgaria to a higher standard
than the ten previous new members. Nor should Stanishev's
political skills be underestimated. He has used the
accession process to bind together his three-party coalition
and push needed reforms through parliament. His decision to
appoint as Finance Minister Plamen Orecharski, a technocrat
closely associated with the opposition Union of Democratic
Forces, took political courage and showed that he was capable
of putting Bulgaria's interests above the interests of his
party.
--------------
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
--------------
6. (C) Organized crime and political corruption are the
government's Achilles heel. Faint progress has been made
against either over the last ten months. Interior Minister
Rumen Petkov is often blamed for this lack of progress, in
our view deservedly -- his gaffe-prone performance and weak
administrative skills mark him as a provincial leader who
still looks out of his league at the national level. But the
problems go deeper than any one individual. Political
parties are dependent for financing on unregulated cash
donations. Many of the richest people in the country -- and
therefore the main patrons of political parties -- made their
money through organized crime or misuse of public resources.
Add to this a judicial system that is inefficient and subject
to corruption, and you have an "iron triangle" of corruption,
criminality and judicial inefficiency that is extremely
difficult to break. Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev, who
began his seven-year term in February and is independent of
the government, has shown signs that he is serious about
tackling the problem (reftel). Velchev, however, has his
work cut out for him and will need all the support he can get
from the government.
7. (C) Interior Minister Petkov's apparent inability or
unwillingness to reform his own agency and vigorously pursue
major organized crime figures highlights another of PM
Stanishev's problems: the perception that he is not fully in
control of his cabinet. In fact, the Bulgarian constitution
posits a consensus-based decision-making process within the
Council of Ministers, making it difficult even for a strong
personality to impose his or her will. Stanishev carries the
additional burden of being a relative newcomer to high-stakes
politics, having been plucked from near obscurity by former
BSP leader Georgi Parvanov when Parvanov won the 2000
presidential election. In contrast, Petkov and Economy and
Energy Minister Rumen Ovcharov -- both of whom at various
times in the past were seen as coveting the premiership --
are experienced political operatives. Beyond his own party,
Stanishev must also manage the competing personal and
political interests of his coalition partners.
--------------
COMMENT: WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS
--------------
9. (C) If we could choose the face of Bulgaria's future
political leadership that would best serve U.S. interests,
Sergei Stanishev would be at or near the top of the list. In
spite of the burdens placed on him by his own party and a
political system that seemingly can be changed only at
glacial speed, Stanishev has shown himself to be a capable
leader and a dedicated reformer. He has successfully kept
his government focused on its top priority of early
membership in the European Union, with all of the complex
internal changes that goal entails. Once this is achieved,
Stanishev will have more time to devote to building his
government's domestic legacy. This is likely to include
addressing major social issues such as education and health
care, both of which are in or near crises. He will also have
to work harder to keep his coalition together after the
"glue" of EU accession starts to weaken. Yet the coalition
is probably stable in the medium term, if for no other reason
than that the two junior partners have nowhere else to go
SOFIA 00000958 003 OF 003
right now. In short, further USG investment in Stanishev
will likely pay dividends for some time to come. His
government represents stability and continuity in foreign
policy, and he personally represents the young, reform-minded
Bulgarian politician of the future. To the extent we are
able support him and other like him, U.S. interests in
Bulgaria will be strengthened.
Levine