Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SOFIA783
2006-06-05 07:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Sofia
Cable title:  

BULGARIA OFFERS ITS SUPPORT ON KOSOVO TALKS

Tags:  PREL PGOV KRKO SR BU 
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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSF #0783/01 1560718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050718Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2015
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE PRIORITY 0376
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 1118
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0919
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA PRIORITY 0356
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000783 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO EUR/SCE STEPHEN GEE; EUR/NCE SCOTT BRANDON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KRKO SR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA OFFERS ITS SUPPORT ON KOSOVO TALKS

REF: SOFIA 719

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000783

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO EUR/SCE STEPHEN GEE; EUR/NCE SCOTT BRANDON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/25/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV KRKO SR BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA OFFERS ITS SUPPORT ON KOSOVO TALKS

REF: SOFIA 719

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In May 25 meetings with Ambassador Wisner,
Bulgaria's prime minister and foreign minister emphasized
Sofia's firm support for Ahtisaari's efforts to negotiate a
final status for Kosovo and acknowledged that independence
was the most likely outcome. Apart from continuing to
encourage reconciliation between the two sides through
various initiatives, Prime Minister Sergey Stanishev and
Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin agreed that Bulgaria could
help by sharing its own experience with Euro-Atlantic
integration with Belgrade and Pristina. Stanishev and Kalfin
both saw it as vital that Serbia be offered some
incentives--possibly a fast track to Euro-Atlantic
integration or infrastructure projects--in order to accept
the final outcome and preserve some degree of dignity. Both
pressed for continued international--but especially
U.S.--engagement in Kosovo following the negotiations and
underscored the importance of maintaining unity among the
Contact Group to avoid repeating the tragedy in the Balkans
in the 1990s. End Summary.

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Stanishev: U.S. Can Count on Bulgaria's Support on Kosovo
-------------- --------------


2. (C) PM Sergey Stanishev told Amb. Wisner that Bulgaria
fully supports the priorities and tasks of Ahtisaari and said
the U.S. can count on Bulgaria's assistance in encouraging
both sides to reach a peaceful solution. Stanishev explained
how Sofia has tried to encourage reconciliation between the
two sides by sponsoring a number of confidence-building
initiatives, but acknowledged that Belgrade and Pristina
still remain far apart. The talks have produced some
positive results, according to Stanishev, but remain fragile.
The prime minister expressed concern that the international
community may be suffering from "fatigue" in Kosovo and could
not stay there forever. Stanishev suggested that some fear
this is the reason why the international community is focused
now on Kosovo's independence.


3. (C) Stanishev said it was clear "one way or another" that
the outcome of the talks would have to be imposed. This
should not, however, be humiliating for the Serbs. He feared
that leaving the Serbs in a corner "with everything taken
away from them" would have serious internal consequences and
will strengthen the Radical party in Serbia. Inevitably this
would also affect Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to
Stanishev, something should be granted to the Serbs to make
the outcome more acceptable and to help them sell it to their
public. He said Bulgaria is ready to support any initiatives
that will help Serbia.


4. (C) According to Stanishev, the implementation of
standards in Kosovo is important for Bulgaria and necessary
for ensuring that the stability of the region is not
jeopardized. It is not only significant "what" the final
status is but also "what happens inside" this status, said
Stanishev. Unless the Kosovar Albanians can demonstrate
their ability to uphold standards on issues like human
rights, it would be difficult for full independence to come
into being.


5. (C) Ambassador Wisner explained to Stanishev the
importance of reestablishing the strategic relationship
between the U.S. and Serbia in order to bring long-lasting
stability to the region. He reassured Stanishev that
Kosovo's independence would be closely monitored by an
international civilian presence and that NATO would remain in
Kosovo after final status. Wisner praised Stanishev for
Bulgaria's efforts to get the two sides to talk to one
another, saying such actions clearly help Ahtisaari in his
job. He encouraged the prime minister to share Bulgaria's
experience in dealing with issues like taxation,
privatization, crime and corruption with the Kosovar
Albanians. He said Kostunica and Tadic still do not
understand the logic behind Bulgaria's decision to strive for
Euro-Atlantic integration and that it would be useful for
Bulgarian leaders to explain their motivations and thinking
to the Serbs. He encouraged Stanishev to use an upcoming
visit by Tadic to speak to the Serbian President privately
and ask him how the U.S. could assist Serbia in the current

SOFIA 00000783 002 OF 003


talks.


6. (C) Stanishev agreed to speak to Tadic and said Bulgaria
was well situated geographically to act as a natural
go-between between Serbia and Kosovar Albanians. Stanishev
reiterated that his overall message is that Bulgaria is ready
to cooperate, to share its own experience with its Western
Balkan neighbors and to work with Ahtisaari. He underscored
the importance of the Contact Group to stay unified on this
issue and to keep the talks on a high level.


7. (C) Update: Stanishev's foreign policy adviser
subsequently told Ambassador Beyrle that the prime minister
had delivered the message to Tadic, but said Tadic's response
had focused on the difficulties facing Belgrade over Kosovo
without references to how he planned to manage those
difficulties.

-------------- --------------
Kalfin: Serb Position Does Not Allow for Much Flexibility
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Foreign Minister Kalfin in his meeting with Ambassador
Wisner echoed many of the same points as the prime minister.
He said Bulgaria's position on Kosovo is essentially to
support what Ahtisaari is doing and the GOB is trying to
position its initiatives to help Ahtisaari in his work. The
foreign minister regarded the current format of talks as
important and was pleased to hear Ahtisaari had refused
Belgrade's latest attempt to restructure the talks, saying no
one should be able to stop the process of the negotiations.
The foreign minister said he did not see a reason for setting
a deadline for the talks but agreed it could make the talks
more dynamic.


9. (C) Kalfin expressed concern that the current government
in Belgrade would be held responsible for the loss of Kosovo,
despite the absence of many options. "The problem of Kosovo
came long before this government," Kalfin noted, and
Belgrade's position does not allow for much flexibility. The
foreign minister emphasized the need to stimulate the Kosovar
Serbs to participate more in the process. Bulgaria had
repeatedly raised this with Belgrade--stressing that Serbia
cannot help their minority if they do not participate more.
According to Kalfin, Kosovo Serb leaders all agree with this
view privately, but are afraid to express it publicly. He
felt the Kosovar Albanians had assumed a "wait-and-see"
attitude and needed to be pushed to show progress on
standards and to demonstrate more clearly that they are ready
to govern.


10. (C) Kalfin viewed the economic sustainability of Kosovo
as a potential problem in the future, saying "there is not
much light there." Regarding security, he believed the
international community needed to remain in Kosovo for an
undefined amount of time and saw the Kosovo protection force
as "not adequate" and "potentially dangerous." Kalfin warned
Wisner not to overestimate the EU's ability to take over in
Kosovo and said the EU cannot totally replace UNMIK. He also
believed that it would be better to first stabilize Kosovo's
economy before establishing a Kosovar army, which might
become aggressive towards minorities.


11. (C) In order for Serbia to accept independence, which
Kalfin said he knew would be the final outcome, Serbia should
be offered a number of carrots. According to Kalfin, Serbia
should be offered an economic package, starting with
investment and loans to stimulate growth. Additionally, if
not a "fast-track" to EU accession, Belgrade should at least
be given a more clear promise of EU accession, Kalfin said.
The easing of visa regimes by European countries could be one
way to build greater public support for the outcome.

-------------- --------------
PASSY: Kosovo's Independence is Not News for Many
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Ambassador Wisner also met with select members of the
parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, including its
chairman former Foreign Minister Soloman Passy. Committee
members asked a number of questions regarding the Kosovo
talks, such as what would be the conditions of Kosovo's
independence, and the role of the EU in the plan. Other
members asked about Russia and its fears that Kosovo will

SOFIA 00000783 003 OF 003


represent a precedent for other currently "frozen" separatist
conflicts. Passy told Wisner that the independence of Kosovo
is not news for many, but instead has been a "delayed
reality" since 1998. Passy echoed the concerns of others on
how to effectively make the Serbs part of the European family
and reiterated the need for certain incentives for Belgrade.
Other Bulgarians who met Ambassador Wisner, expressed
concerns about the potential for a rise in Albanian
nationalism, arguing that Albania is still a relatively new
Balkan state whose regional ambitions may still be evolving.
To this, Wisner responded that he felt reassured by
discussions in Tirana and Skopje, that Albanians were focused
squarely on joining Europe, rather than on creating a Greater
Albania.
Beyrle