YOUR MEETING MAY 4 WITH BULGARIAN PRESIDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 000579

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT FROM AMBASSADOR BEYRLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/25/2016
TAGS: PREL MARR EUN LY IZ BG
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING MAY 4 WITH BULGARIAN PRESIDENT
PURVANOV


Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Bulgarian President Georgi Purvanov, whom you will
meet May 4 in Vilnius, Lithuania, has played a key role in
ensuring the continuity of this country's pro-U.S. foreign
policy through three administrations in Sofia. By any
measure -- percentage of GDP spent on deployments abroad,
number of soldiers serving in combat missions, or military
personnel and civilians killed in Iraq -- Bulgaria is making
a substantial contribution to international security relative
to its size and resources. Now we can also add the Defense
Cooperation Agreement (DCA) that Secretary Rice will sign in
Sofia April 28, which gives the U.S. access to two air bases
and an army training area as part of the brigade-sized
Eastern European Task Force. The long-awaited agreement is a
milestone in our relations with this consistently reliable
ally. President Purvanov's support for the agreement has
been essential.


2. (C) Bulgaria is in Iraq and Afghanistan largely because it
shares our interest in stability there, but Purvanov-- who
faces reelection in the fall-- wants to be able to show
voters that Bulgaria benefits from its strong support for the
U.S. It is important that he hear from you that Bulgaria is
a valued and equal partner, not just in the security sphere,
but across the entire spectrum of our relationship.
President Bush said as much when he met Purvanov in the White
House in October 2005, and the picture now, after the basing
agreement and new Iraq deployment, looks even better.


3. (C) The DCA negotiations have been the subject of
widespread -- and more often than not, inaccurate -- coverage
in the local news media. Many Bulgarians oppose the idea of
"foreign bases" on their soil, fear the United States will
use Bulgaria as a launching pad to attack Iran, or believe
that the U.S. presence will make Bulgaria a target for
terrorists. Polls show that the more people learn about the
proposed U.S. presence, the less they oppose it, but
Bulgarian officials -- including Purvanov -- need to do more
to explain the agreement to the public.


4. (C) The DCA comes on the heels of a government decision to
send troops back to Iraq (after campaigning last year on a
platform of immediate withdrawal),and coincides with the
ramping up of its presence in Afghanistan, where Bulgaria
will soon take over security for Kabul airport.
Consequently, the government is seeking to shift some of the
focus of public discussion away from the military aspects of
our relationship and toward the political and economic. Here
too, we have a good story to tell. Huge U.S. investments are
in the pipeline, including a 1.4 billion dollar clean-coal
power plant built by AES and a Hewlett-Packard call-service
center that will create some 1000 knowledge-based jobs. We
still lag behind our EU partners in terms of direct foreign
investment, but Purvanov should hear that we will not be
satisfied until our investment and trade relations match the
high level of our security cooperation.


5. (C) The current government is understandably focused on
getting into the EU on time, which means January 1, 2007. We
support this goal. Brussels is sending mixed signals, in
part to keep Bulgaria's feet to the fire on reform. Current
thinking appears to be that Bulgaria will join the Union as
scheduled, but with at least a Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
safeguard clause and continued EU monitoring in that area.
The Bulgarians are concerned by rumors the EU may be
designing additional monitoring mechanisms for Bulgaria even
after accession that could affect the flow of structural
funds. President Purvanov has just sent a plea to President
Bush asking for a personal expression of support for
Bulgaria's on-time EU accession. He will likely reiterate
this request in his meeting with you.


6. (C) Bulgaria's problems with Brussels are primarily in the
area of rule of law. Passivity in the face of corruption and
organized crime has been the weak point not only in this
government's record, but its predecessors' as well. This may
be starting to change under pressure from the EU and with the
appointment of a respected new Chief Prosecutor, a protege of
Purvanov's. However, Purvanov should understand that there
is no daylight between the U.S. and the EU on this issue:
corruption and organized crime are his country's Achilles'
heel.


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7. (C) In the longer term, we should encourage Bulgaria to
wean itself from over-dependence on Russian energy. Bulgaria
buys 88 percent of its gas and 73 percent of its oil from
Russia, resulting as well in a huge bilateral trade deficit.
This dependency is difficult to break, however, in part
because Bulgaria is paying 35 percent below market prices for
its gas, affording Moscow significant potential leverage.
Helping Bulgaria to avoid putting all its eggs in one basket
is a long-term project; moving toward market pricing is a
shorter-term tactic.


8. (C) Purvanov will be pleased if you assure him, as the
President did in October, that we are working hard to secure
the release of the five nurses unjustly imprisoned in Libya
since 1999 for allegedly spreading the HIV virus. The fate
of the nurses touches ordinary Bulgarians in the same way the
Iran hostage crisis touched ordinary Americans, and Purvanov
has been personally involved in discussions with Qadhafi to
obtain their release. Finally, you may want to privately
encourage Bulgaria to continue to play a constructive role on
the margins of the Kosovo final status talks by helping to
build confidence between the two sides. On that issue, the
government seems to accept that Kosovo will gain its
independence, but is concerned about a possible spill-over
effect, especially in neighboring Macedonia.
Beyrle