NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SOFIA 000198

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2011
TAGS: PREL KCOR KCRM BU
SUBJECT: NEW CHIEF PROSECUTOR READIES FOR "WAR"

REF: SOFIA 82

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle, for reason 1.4 (b) & (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In a February 3 meeting with the Ambassador,
newly elected Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev made clear that
despite pressure to produce immediate results for an EU
audience, his main focus would be on building solid cases
against OC figures and asserting control over a deeply
dysfunctional prosecution service. Velchev conceded the
challenge of managing short-term expectations, but displayed
impressive candor and resolve in outlining his priorities and
the obstacles he expects to face once in office. We should
be prepared to support Velchev's reform of the prosecution
service with technical assistance, however difficult a time
he may have meeting the high expectations of Bulgaria's
political elite and EU observers. END SUMMARY.

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DISARMING A 'TERRORIST' PROSECUTION SERVICE
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2. (C) Velchev spoke frankly about the current state of
affairs in Bulgaria's prosecution service, stating that from
what he has learned in recent weeks, the situation is "even
worse than I had imagined." In his words, the prosecution
service under current Chief Prosecutor Nikola Filchev has
evolved into "some kind of terrorist organization" used to
settle political and business scores, but totally incapable
of fighting crime. So entrenched is the outgoing Chief
Prosecutor's influence that just three weeks shy of Velchev's
inauguration, his future deputies refuse to speak with him,
openly hinting at fears of repercussions from Filchev.
Citing a lack of access to information, Velchev declined to
provide a detailed "100-day plan," but outlined three
potential sources of opposition to change: criminals,
politicians, and the prosecutors themselves. Velchev
declared that he was "not afraid" of criminals, and "could
find a way to deal with" politicians, but was most surprised
and discouraged by resistance from within the prosecution
service. He indicated that his first moves as Chief
Prosecutor would be to prepare for "some kind of a war" with
corrupt incumbent prosecutors.


3. (C) Velchev did not expect this struggle to be easy. Like
the Chief Prosecutor, Deputy Chief Prosecutors are elected
rather than appointed, and the current deputies have several
years remaining in their terms. In Velchev's evaluation, his
only near-term chance to build a team he can trust will be to
approach these deputies individually and convince them to
resign. As he attempts to assemble his team of trusted
deputies, Velchev plans to simultaneously tackle the "easy
work" of sending signals that political influence in
prosecutions will no longer be tolerated, as well as the more
challenging task of beginning to collect hard evidence on 15
years of unchecked OC activity. After a house-cleaning
period of 3-4 months, Velchev hopes to start moving against
high-profile OC and corruption targets.


4. (C) On the issue of Filchev's future, Velchev acknowledged
the conventional wisdom that he will likely be sent abroad as
ambassador to Belarus or Kazakhstan. Filchev, who counts
Belarussian President Lukashenko as a personal acquaintance
and has made several official and unofficial trips to Minsk
in the past year, has lobbied for such a post unabashedly.
Velchev acknowledged that many aspects of his job would be
easier if Filchev were physically out of the country and not
"looking over my shoulder." However, Velchev also worried
out loud that as details of Filchev's activities became
clear, pressure to investigate him might build, causing
bilateral problems with the country of his posting.

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EU EXPECTATIONS
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5. (C) Velchev acknowledged the importance of the EU's April
monitoring report on Bulgaria's readiness for accession, but
said he could not plan his priorities as Chief Prosecutor
based on the European Commission's timeline. The previous
Chief Prosecutor's lack of progress in fighting corruption
and solving over 30 high-profile OC-related killings has long
been a concern of the EU and the U.S. Embassy alike.
Although many OC figures in Bulgaria continue to operate in
plain sight, progress toward speedy prosecutions will be
hampered by years of shoddy evidence collection and a team
whose previous lack of success indicates they are
"incompetent, afraid, or corrupt." In his meetings with EU
officials, Velchev intends to stress the importance of real,
rather than cosmetic reform, while holding out hope that a
reformed, functioning prosecution service will eventually
"give hope to people" that the war on organized crime and
corruption can be won. With regard to domestic public
opinion, the future Chief Prosecutor mentioned the possible
need to publicly reveal "the facts" regarding the state of
the prosecution service in order to manage expectations and
illustrate the scope of the challenges before him.

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BENDING THE RULES?
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6. (C) Despite his respect for the rule of law, Velchev
argued that bending rules of evidence and procedure was
justified in the case of certain organized crime leaders.
Referring again to the failure of Bulgarian prosecutors and
law enforcement officials to collect more than "feeble
evidence" against OC figures, Velchev announced his intention
to pursue a "contract with the courts" - i.e., to appeal to
judges to convict OC leaders based on evidence that otherwise
might not pass muster. He estimated that such an arrangement
would be justified against the country's 20-30
highest-ranking criminals, in whose cases adherence to
"strict legal principles will be counterproductive."
According to Velchev, Interior Minister Petkov had already
enlisted his support in deploying this strategy in the
high-profile prosecution of the Marinov brothers for
attempted murders linked to organized crime.

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THE U.S. ANGLE
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7. (C) Velchev said he appreciated the Ambassador's offer of
USG support, and agreed with the Ambassador's statement that
while the U.S. could help build the technical competency of
prosecutors, the moral and ethical foundation for an
effective prosecution service would have to come from the
Bulgarian side. Velchev stressed that while technical
assistance would be necessary in time, the need to
consolidate control of the prosecution service and initiate
successful cases made USG cooperation in gathering and
sharing information a more pressing priority. Velchev cited
Bulgarian law enforcement's lack of previous success against
OC as justification for a lack of confidence in
"professional" officials of the Ministry of Interior, raising
the possibility that even USG information previously shared
with GoB law enforcement counterparts might be "filtered"
before making it to his desk. In a request that highlighted
his lack of support among the corps of prosecutors, Velchev
asked Post's Resident Legal Advisor to suggest a shortlist of
effective regional prosecutors we have worked with in other
cities who could serve as potential allies in his reform
efforts.

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LIBYA
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8. (C) Despite working extensively on the issue of the
Bulgarian medics in Libya in his role as the President's
Legal Advisor, Velchev was not aware of the outcome of recent
meetings in London. He expressed guarded optimism about the
prospects for an eventual favorable resolution of the case.
Specifically, he predicted that the Libyan side would push
for a solution "in the hardest possible way for us" - by
re-convicting the nurses, sentencing them to death again, and
finally pardoning them, perhaps by late summer. He thanked
the Ambassador for the USG's efforts on behalf of the nurses,
and noted that the last six months had seen a notable
increase in Libya's willingness to find a quick resolution to
the crisis.

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COMMENT
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9. (C) Velchev is clearly open to cooperation with the U.S.:
he specifically mentioned that some public expression of U.S.
support for his efforts once in office would send a strong
and positive message to the Bulgarian people and strengthen
his position. Velchev's outline of his concerns and
priorities struck us as right on target: only a short-term
focus on internal house-cleaning will make the longer-term
war against organized criminals effective. However, even if
his attempts at meaningful reform are fully successful,
results are likely to materialize in months, not days. The
high expectations of many observers for short-term results
are unrealistic given the extent to which the "old way of
doing business" is entrenched in the prosecution service.
Nonetheless, after seven years of pervasive, systemic
corruption under the outgoing prosecutor, Velchev offers the
best chance for change Bulgaria could have hoped for, and we
should be ready to offer all the support he can use. END
COMMENT.
Beyrle