BULGARIA/GEORGIA: DAS BRYZA, FM KALFIN PREVIEW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001542

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL OSCE GG RU BU
SUBJECT: BULGARIA/GEORGIA: DAS BRYZA, FM KALFIN PREVIEW
"FRIENDS OF GEORGIA" MEETING

REF: STATE

Classified By: A/DCM Brad Freden, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY. By hosting the Friends of Georgia on November
9, Bulgaria seeks to send a message of support to the GoG
while at the same time urging the Georgians to "stop giving
Russia excuses to crack down." Bulgarian Foreign Minister
Kalfin and EUR DAS Bryza agreed that both objectives would be
supported by giving Georgia a clear path to European
integration. They also agreed that "dilution" of the Russian
peacekeeping presence with OSCE monitors is more realistic at
this point than pushing for their total withdrawal, as the
GoG would prefer. Kalfin, who will travel to Moscow in early
December, noted the difficulty of explaining Kosovo as "sui
generis," but said Bulgaria rejected the Russian logic on
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. He said the Bulgaria would
continue its current policy of selling small arms and light
weapons to the GoG despite Russian pressure to halt such
sales. Kalfin made a plea for U.S. assistance in securing
the release of a Bulgarian ship and its captain, which were
seized recently by Georgian authorities. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) EUR DAS Matt Bryza met with Bulgarian Foreign Minister
Kalfin November 3 to discuss Georgia and U.S. policy toward
the Black Sea region. Kalfin confirmed that Bulgaria will
host the New Friends of Georgia on November 9; the group
consists of Bulgaria, the three Baltic States, Poland,
Romania, and the Czech Republic. The latter joined recently,
after it became clear that "observers" could not be invited
without including Russia. Most participants are sending
deputy foreign ministers, while Bulgaria and Georgia will be
represented by their ministers. Bulgaria briefly considered
postponing the meeting due to heightened tensions between
Georgia and Russia, but decided it made more sense to go
ahead. There is no formal agenda, but Kalfin said he
expected discussion to center around current tensions with
Russia and Georgia's NATO/EU aspirations. In lieu of a joint
statement at the end of the meeting, Bulgaria is considering
a chairman's statement. Kalfin noted that Bulgaria is also
the NATO contact embassy in Tbilisi.


3. (C) Bryza said that Georgia has a good chance to emerge as
a regional success story; if it cannot succeed -- due to
unacceptable levels of Russian pressure -- what country can?
Saakashvili is anxious and wants to get into NATO quickly;
Russian pressure reinforces this sentiment, creating a
vicious circle. Georgia's friends need to support the GoG
while at the same time trying to calm them. A clear path to
NATO membership will help in both respects. Our message
should be to "tell them to behave like the Balts" in their
dealings with Russia; all three are now in NATO and the EU.
Regarding South Ossetia (SO) and Abkhazia, Russia is being
obstructionist; it is trying to keep the GoG off balance and
make it less attractive to NATO. Georgia would like to see
-- and we support -- the internationalization of
peacekeeping. The difference between our approach and that
of the Georgians is that the GoG wants all the Russian
peacekeepers out, whereas we would support their dilution, at
least as an initial step.


4. (C) Bryza told Kalfin that the U.S. would like the OSCE to
(1) jointly administer/monitor the Roki tunnel (which sees
large flows of military hardware and contraband, probably
including radioactive materials); (2) increase the number of
observers moving around in SO in order to reduce tensions
there; and (3) place a contingent at the Didi Gupta road
junction, again to control military/contraband traffic. The
Secretary recently told Russian FM Lavrov in no uncertain

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terms that bilateral relations would suffer if SO declared
independence. The Georgians, for their part, handled the
recent Russian spy case badly, but the subsequent Russian
crackdown on individual Georgians, especially schoolchildren,
is reprehensible.


5. (C) Kalfin told Bryza that Bulgaria shares our views.
Georgia needs to be shown the path to European integration,
but also needs to stop giving Russia "an excuse to tighten
the screws." Georgia would like to see Russian peacekeepers
disappear, but it might be wiser at this point to give the
OSCE total access instead. Kalfin noted the difficulty of
explaining Kosovo as "sui generis," but said Bulgaria
rejected the Russian logic on SO and Abkhazia. Noting that
Kalfin will travel to Moscow December 7-8, Ambassador Beyrle
advised him that Lavrov "needs to hear that from you," since
Bulgaria has generally good relations with Moscow. Kalfin
noted that Bulgaria continues to sell small arms/light
weapons to Georgia despite Russian pressure to halt such

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sales. Bryza said the USG had no objections in principal to
such sales, noting Georgia's objective need to rearm itself
after years of neglecting the military.


6. (C) In closing, Kalfin mentioned a Bulgarian ship owned by
Lukoil Bulgaria that had been seized recently off the coast
of Georgia and the captain thrown in jail. He asked for USG
assistance in gaining the release of the ship and its crew,
which apparently entered a restricted area near Poti by
mistake. Bryza agreed to call the Georgian Prosecutor
General on Bulgaria's behalf.


7. (U) DAS Bryza did not have the opportunity to clear this
message. His discussions on energy security will be reported
septel.
BEYRLE