YOUR MEETING WITH BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KALFIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SOFIA 001342

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EUR FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FRIED

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EUN LY IZ BU
SUBJECT: YOUR MEETING WITH BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KALFIN

REF: A. SOFIA 968

B. SOFIA 1230

Classified By: Ambassador John Beyrle, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Your meeting with Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin in
New York on September 20 comes just six days prior to the
European Commission's final report on Bulgaria's readiness
for accession. Much of official Bulgaria is holding its
breath in anticipation of the report, which in turn will play
into presidential elections on October 22. President
Parvanov -- Kalfin's mentor -- seems likely to be the first
Bulgarian president re-elected since the fall of communism,
but a strong second-place showing by the extreme nationalist
Ataka party could prove embarrassing for the country. The
result is that Kalfin may be cautious about taking on any new
commitments, seeing Brussels over one shoulder and the
Bulgarian electorate over the other. Fortunately, Bulgaria
is already on board in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and the
Balkans, and we are aware of no major decision points between
now and the elections.


2. (C) The European Council will take its decision on
Bulgaria and Romania's accession on October 20. Unexpectedly
harsh conditions imposed by Brussels on Bulgaria's EU
membership or an upset loss by Parvanov could destabilize the
ruling three-party coalition, but otherwise we would expect
the current government to survive for at least another year.


3. (C) With little more than three months to go before
Bulgaria's hoped-for accession, the still-pending
ratification of the accession treaty by Germany, France,
Belgium, and Denmark adds to the sense of drama. Betting is
now strongly in favor of accession on January 1, but the
government worries that any safeguards imposed by Brussels
will be perceived by the public as "second-class membership."
We have advised the government to declare victory
regardless.


4. (C) Since taking office a little more than a year ago, the
government Kalfin represents has said "yes" to us on
virtually every major foreign-policy issue (ref A). The
signing of the Defense Cooperation Agreement by the Secretary
in April, which you participated in, is a strong symbol for
this government of our strategic partnership. They would
like to build on this momentum, particularly by increasing
bilateral trade and investment. Prime Minister Stanishev
would also like (and we would strongly support) a White House
meeting, but we have told him this will not happen in 2006.


5. (C) The one area where Bulgaria has traditionally lagged
is in the fight against organized crime and corruption, but
even here there are some recent positive signs. Since
replacing his notoriously corrupt predecessor in February,
Chief Prosecutor Boris Velchev has begun removing or
side-lining his predecessor's cronies in the Prosecution
Service. This internal housecleaning is a slow process due
to the constitutional protections enjoyed by members of the
judiciary, but Velchev has shown every intention of following
through. The next step must be putting a rejuvenated Service
to work against crime bosses and corrupt politicians, a move
that will perforce put him at odds with some powerful
political and economic interests. Not coincidentally,
Velchev, like Kalfin, came to his job directly from the
Office of the President. Kalfin may therefore have some
useful insights into the thinking of his former colleague.


6. (C) Bulgarian officials also expect that this week will
see the final hearing in the re-trail of the five Bulgarian
nurses accused of spreading the HIV virus in Libya (ref B).
A verdict is expected roughly three weeks later, adding to
the convergence of "hot-button" domestic and foreign-policy
issues faced by the GOB this fall. Kalfin will appreciate
your private reiteration of our support and willingness to
continue holding Libya's feet to the fire.


7. (C) Finally, you may wish to raise the issue of energy
security, perhaps using your recent meetings in Kiev as a
segue. Bulgaria gets about 85 percent of its energy from
Russia. At the risk of oversimplifying a complex web of
sometimes competing, sometimes overlapping interests, the
struggle in Bulgaria seems to be between those who would
guarantee Bulgaria's energy security by diversifying its
sources of supply and those who would do so by strengthening
the "special relationship" with Russia in the energy sector.
The latter camp is personified by Energy and Economy Minister
Rumen Ovcharov, while Kalfin's views appear more similar to
our own. While the upcoming tender for a new nuclear plant
at Belene seems to be tilting in Moscow's favor, the
Bulgarians can "diversify" the choice by selecting
Westinghouse for the instrumentation and control part of the
project, a point you should make to Kalfin.

BEYRLE