MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS DICARLO'S VISITTO SKOPJE,

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000983

SIPDIS

NOFORN SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE (PFEUFFER AND DAS DICARLO)
SARAJEVO PLS PASS TO DAS DICARLO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016 BY STEPHEN A. HUBLER REASON 1.4 (b,d)
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: SCENESETTER FOR EUR DAS DICARLO'S VISITTO SKOPJE,
OCTOBER 22-25REF: SKOPJE 953CORE MESSAGES



1. (U) Your visit comes at the right time, two months into
the new VMRO-DPMNE-led government of PM Gruevski, to deliver
the following core messages to the government and opposition:

Government:

--Need broad consultations and consensus-building with DUI
and opposition parties on key legislation and implementation
of reforms. Need genuine will on both sides to reach
compromise, not just meeting and talking without results.

--Demonstrate through results your commitment to Framework
Agreement (FWA) implementation, in close consultation with
opposition parties and parties not in government (DUI).

--Need broad political consensus now to implement your
ambitious economic growth and reform agenda and to fulfill
key criteria for NATO and EU membership, including combating
corruption and strengthening rule of law in a balanced,
non-partisan manner.

--The PM is responsible for ensuring coalition partners play
as members of one team -- individual efforts not coordinated
within the government can derail talks with opposition and
delay reforms.

Opposition/Party Not in Government (DUI):

--Need to play constructive, positive role as opposition.
The country needs a loyal opposition, not efforts to
undermine the government and delay reform efforts.

--Genuine dialogue and willingness to compromise are
essential if opposition expects government to include it in
consultation and consensus-building process.

--Strong opposition is healthy for democracy, but any
suggestion that failure to reach compromises on important
legislation will jeopardize political stability or lead to
violence is unacceptable.

POLITICAL CONTEXT -- DIALOGUE INCHES FORWARD, BUT WHAT IS THE
END GAME?


2. (SBU/NF) You arrive in Skopje nearly 60 days after the new
government was sworn-in on August 26. In those two months,
the government has implemented little of its ambitious
legislative and economic growth agenda. Part of the reason
for that is the government's inability so far to work
effectively with the ethnic Albanian DUI party, led by Ali
Ahmeti, which won the majority of eAlbanian votes in the July
parliamentary elections but was not included in the governing
coalition. (Having won the majority of eAlbanian votes, DUI
considers itself "out of government" but not in the
opposition.) In addition, the government has failed to rein
in its eAlbanian DPA coalition partner, whose ministers have
engaged in haphazard, poorly-coordinated actions, some of
which targeted DUI supporters and further alienated DUI
leaders. Ahmeti and other DUI leaders believe DPA's intent
is to destroy DUI as a political force. Also hampering
progress is the fact that the government has dismissed or
downgraded many civil servants, and has not yet replaced
them, or has replaced them with neophytes.


3. (SBU/NF) There have been recent efforts by the
VMRO-DPMNE-led government and DUI to discuss their
differences, in a variety of settings (reftel),but the
dialogue has not produced any practical positive results.
The GOM needs to acknowledge that it must work differently
with DUI, which, given its eAlbanian majority support, cannot
be considered just a "typical" opposition party.
Consultation and compromise with DUI on key legislative
initiatives, especially those related to the FWA, must begin
early on, and the government should demonstrate flexibility
and generosity in reaching consensus on those initiatives;
that has not been the case so far. At the same time, DUI
needs to show it can engage in genuine dialogue and is
prepared to reach compromises before negotiations conclude;
it cannot assume it has veto power over legislative proposals.


SKOPJE 00000983 002 OF 004


DRAFT POLICE LAW -- LITMUS TEST


4. (SBU/NF) The government has been debating for the past
several weeks a draft police law intended to enhance the
professionalism of the police and implement FWA provisions
for the selection of municipal police chiefs. The draft law
was originally compiled by the former SDSM-led government,
and SDSM (now in opposition) initially indicated it would
support the law. I was not put to a vote under the previous
government because there was no agreement with DUI on key
elements of the bill. When the new government took up the
bill, DUI complained that Gruevski did not intend to pass the
law with a qualified (Badinter) majority. Ahmeti said the
party either would boycott the vote or would vote against the
legislation (reftel).


5. (SBU/NF) Eventually, DPA suggested two DUI-backed
amendments -- one that would reduce the number of years
required to qualify for nomination as a police chief (opening
more opportunities to eAlbanian police),and another
amendment proposing the addition of a ninth regional police
district headquartered in the eAlbanian-dominated city of
Struga. DUI had pressed for both amendments when it was in
earlier in government. SDSM immediately objected to the
latter amendment. Fearing the loss of SDSM support, the
government immediately allowed DPA to withdraw the Struga
amendment, irritating DUI in the process.


6. (SBU/NF) Since then, there have been confidential
discussions between DUI and government representatives on the
police law, but without concrete results. DUI claims the
government is not negotiating in good faith, while the
government accuses DUI of submitting frivolous amendments to
the law that would not improve policing. DUI would like to
see an amended law that, inter alia, would enhance external
oversight of police action and eliminate regional police
districts as unnecessary layers of authority between the
central government and municipalities. The government has
responded that those changes could be incorporated into the
implementing by-laws of the final legislation, but does not
want to make any changes to the existing draft law. DUI
fears this is a GOM tactic and that once the law passes the
GOM will not necessarily implement its pledge to include the
DUI recommendations in the by-laws.


7. (SBU/NF) Whether the government and DUI can reach some
sort of modus vivendi on the draft law before it goes to a
vote is likely to determine, to a large extent, whether they
can move on to dealing with other issues in a positive,
constructive manner. If DUI feels its concerns are
completely overlooked in passing the legislation, it may feel
pressured to take action that could be politically
destabilizing. We should firmly and clearly let Ahmeti know
that such an approach is both unconstructive and
unacceptable. At the same time, we should tell the GOM that
it must publicly commit to including DUI's requested changes
to the police law in the implementing by-laws, and should
implement those changes in short order.

FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION -- MISSION NOT YET ACCOMPLISHED


8. (SBU) The new government has on more than one occasion
tried to claim that FWA implementation is complete. In fact,
all FWA-related legislative requirements have been met.
Implementation of decentralization and equitable
representation are proceeding well but are in the initial
stages only. Moreover, FWA-related requirements -- including
the police law and a law on languages -- remain to be
completed. Both DUI and DPA believe there is still much to
do before the FWA chapter can be closed; DPA leader Arben
Xhaferi has even stated that the government needs to go
beyond the FWA in meeting eAlbanian demands. The government
needs to be reminded that FWA implementation is not a closed
chapter; it must demonstrate results in implementing
FWA-related reforms, including decentralization and equitable
representation.

NATO AND EU MEMBERSHIP -- REFORMS MUTUALLY REINFORCING


9. (SBU) The government has stated its commitment to NATO and

SKOPJE 00000983 003 OF 004


EU membership as top foreign policy priorities, and is
supported by opinion polls showing 90 percent or higher
public support for membership in both organizations.
Nevertheless, the impasse with DUI over the police law, and
the government's general inability to manage effectively
intra-coalition and government-opposition relations, have
hampered progress on the rule of law, judicial reform, and
other political and economic criteria Macedonia needs to
fulfill to be considered a strong candidate for membership in
either organization.


10. (SBU) Macedonia could be a strong candidate for a NATO
invitation at the next enlargement summit. The government is
hoping for positive language at Riga recognizing its
achievements and indicating that enlargement will be a topic
at any 2008 summit. Government interlocutors need to hear
that, in order to achieve those goals, they must work with
DUI to overcome the current impasse, and must find a
mechanism for building broad consensus with other opposition
members for economic and other reforms. In addition, the
government must avoid using its declared commitment to fight
corruption as cover for launching witch hunts against members
of the former government.


11. (SBU) Although Macedonia received EU candidate status
last December, it is unlikely to receive the invitation it
hopes for from the EU to begin accession negotiations in

2007. The government will receive an assessment from the EU
in November on its progress in meeting the EU acquis; that
assessment is likely to point to the current standoff with
DUI, lackluster results in combating corruption, and slow
progress in implementing judicial reforms as some of the main
reasons for not beginning accession negotiations next year.

KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- KEEPING BORDER DEMARCATION OFF THE
FRONT PAGE


12. (U) The government's official position on Kosovo final
status has been closely aligned with ours -- support for
Ahtisaari and the Contact Group, for a settlement by the end
of the year, and resolution of the demarcation issue in the
context of a final status settlement. PM Ceku visited Skopje
shortly after the Gruevski government took office, Deputy
Prime Minister Selmani (DPA) recently led a small delegation
to Pristina, and PM Gruevski plans to visit Kosovo in early

2007.


13. (SBU/NF) Despite these positive indications, however,
some GOM officials have been off-message on the border
demarcation issue, and on a final status outcome (Selmani
reportedly said in Pristina that the US and EU should resolve
the final status issue). The government needs to hear yet
again that it should avoid discussing these issues in the
media, but that, if its officials do so, they need to ensure
they speak in one voice and deliver only messages consistent
with the GOM's official policy.


14. (SBU/NF) MFA contacts recently told us that they are
developing language they think should be included in a Kosovo
final status settlement that would specify in greater detail
how the border demarcation issue should be resolved. FM
Milososki likely will run that language by you for reaction.
They have not shared a draft of the proposed language with
us, but we suspect it will reference, perhaps indirectly, the
2001 Skopje-Belgrade border accord and the need for
demarcation to proceed in accordance with that agreement.

NAME DISPUTE -- CONTINUED UN PROCESS, BUT NO RESOLUTION ON
THE HORIZON


15. (SBU/NF) The government has reiterated its "dual name"
formula as the basis for further discussions with the Greek
government on the name dispute, and has indicated willingness
to proceed on that basis with negotiations under UN auspices
mediated by Ambassador Nimetz. Nimetz is expected to visit
Skopje in November, but MFA interlocutors do not expect any
major developments in the discussions this year.

ECONOMIC GROWTH -- NEED STABLE POLITICAL BASE


SKOPJE 00000983 004 OF 004



16. (SBU) When he first came to office, PM Gruevski called
for a moratorium on inter-ethnic issues so as to allow the
government to focus on its top-priority economic growth goal.
That position disregarded the fact that political stability
has helped to undergird Macedonia's recent economic growth
and will be necessary for the economy to reach the 6-8
percent annual GDP growth targets the government has set for
itself.


17. (SBU/NF) The macro-economic climate remains positive,
with low inflation and a stable exchange rate, and a US firm
(Johnson Controls) recently broke ground for the first major
greenfield investment in Macedonia's free trade zone near
Skopje. Nevertheless, Gruevski needs to accept and fully
internalize that there can be no economic growth without the
political stability that will accompany improved inter-ethnic
relations.

UNGA PRESIDENCY CANDIDATE SRDJAN KERIM


18. (SBU) Macedonia has proposed former foreign minister
Srdjan Kerim as a candidate for the UNGA Presidency in
2007-2008. Kerim had a distinguished diplomatic career in
the former Yugoslavia and in the early days of Macedonia's
independence. He currently works as general director of a
local media consortium that is a member of the German WAZ
group. MFA officials have told us that only two other
countries, Georgia and Armenia, may propose candidates, and
FM Milososki might ask you for USG support for Kerim. We
sent Kerim's bio data to USUN for information, but have
reminded MFA contacts that we do not commit in advance to
support such candidates.

MILOVANOVIC