MACEDONIA: ETHNIC ALBANIAN LEADERS ON ELECTIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 SKOPJE 000451

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: ETHNIC ALBANIAN LEADERS ON ELECTIONS
AND KOSOVO STATUS

REF: A. SKOPJE 373


B. SKOPJE 420

SUMMARY and COMMENT


1. (C) During separate meetings May 4, the Ambassador told
DUI and DPA leaders Ali Ahmeti and Arben Xhaferi,
respectively, to refrain from importing K-Albanian "muscle"
to assist them during upcoming parliamentary elections. She
reiterated the USG position on Macedonia-Kosovo border
demarcation and asked both leaders to refrain from further
public comment on the matter. She reminded both men that the
2001 Skopje-Belgrade agreement delimiting the border was not
subject to renegotiation.


2. (C) Both leaders denied they intended to rely on
K-Albanian "muscle" to assist them during the election, and
pledged to adhere to democratic norms during the political
campaign. DPA Vice President Thaci admitted there were
eAlbanian "extremists" amidst the DPA ranks, but argued it
was easier to control them if they remained inside the party.
On border demarcation, both Ahmeti and Xhaferi said they
agreed the matter should remain a technical matter, rather
than becoming a political issue in the election campaign.


3. (C) Anecdotal evidence indicates that DUI and DPA, despite
their protestations to the contrary, have imported K-Albanian
"muscle" to assist them in the elections. Such K-Albanian
involvement could lead to electoral fraud and violence,
damaging Macedonia's democratic system and near-term
prospects for NATO membership. It would be useful if local
authorities in Tirana and Pristina strongly urged K-Albanian
political parties to avoid providing such "reinforcements" to
their eAlbanian counterparts in Macedonia, and to recall
those already here. End Summary and Comment.

MEETING WITH eALBANIAN LEADERS IN TETOVO


4. (U) Ambassador met separately with DUI (ethnic Albanian
governing coalition junior partner) President Ali Ahmeti and
DPA (main ethnic Albanian opposition party) President Arben
Xhaferi on May 4 in Tetovo. Ahmeti was accompanied by DUI
Vice President Agron Buxhaku. Xhaferi was joined by DPA Vice
President Menduh Thaci. DCM and P/E Chief (notetaker)
accompanied the Ambassador.

GETTING THE WORD OUT ON FREE AND FAIR ELECTIONS


5. (SBU) Ahmeti told the Ambassador that DUI's grassroots
organization for the electoral campaign was taking shape.
Party staffers covering areas where DUI would contend for
parliamentary seats would spread the message regarding the
need to conduct "proper elections" and to ensure high
turnout. He was confident there would be few problems on
election day.

DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURES THE ONLY WAY FORWARD


6. (SBU) Xhaferi, asserting that DPA had "accepted democratic
procedures as the only way forward" in the elections, said
the party viewed free and fair elections as the sole way to
validate the political legitimacy of the state. Commenting
that DUI's "unrealistically high percentage of votes"
received in last year's local elections had undermined the
legitimacy of the democratic process, Xhaferi complained that
the international community's reaction to DPA's subsequent
complaints had been too "soft."

DPA CAMPAIGN -- NO "NEURALGIC" THEMES


7. (C) Xhaferi said DPA would not campaign with themes that
are "neuralgic" to eMacedonians (e.g., the name dispute with
Greece and other identity issues). The party would question
Ali Ahmeti's moral authority, and would attack DUI's alleged
failure to ensure implementation of the Framework Agreement.
It also would focus on economic equality for eAlbanians by
tackling "systemic obstacles" to eAlbanian investment.


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8. (C) Thaci added that DPA would not directly attack ruling
SDSM during the campaign, since "that would raise its poll
ratings." The party would seek to show through its
professional cadres that it was ready to enter government and
to work effectively as a coalition partner. He blamed DUI's
lack of professional staff for its alleged failure to
implement the FWA.

KOSOVAR "MUSCLE" TO INFLUENCE ELECTIONS?


9. (C) The Ambassador raised with Ahmeti rumors circulating
in international community circles that DUI had imported
Kosovar Albanian "muscle" to help the party during the
campaign, and said she hoped the rumors were unfounded. If
true, she said, the USG would expect DUI to send such forces
back to Kosovo immediately. She repeated that message to
Xhaferi and Thaci, adding that the elections should be viewed
as a political, not a physical, contest. Kosovar Albanian
involvement in Macedonia's political process would reflect
poorly on all eAlbanians, including those in Kosovo.

NO NEED FOR K-ALBANIAN HELP?


10. (C) Ahmeti denied that DUI had employed K-Albanians to
interfere in the elections. He added that the party had
never used such forces in the past; it did not need them now.
Ahmeti admitted there were some Kosovar associates of DUI
living in Macedonia, such as Emrush Suma, but he would soon
return to Kosovo. At any rate, he had forbidden Suma from
interfering in the electoral campaign. Ahmeti noted that DUI
enjoyed good relations with eAlbanian parties in both
Pristina and Tirana, and that the party had declined recent
offers of assistance from several of them.


11. (C) DPA's Thaci said that the party was working with
counterparts in Tirana and Pristina to urge them to press
eAlbanians in Macedonia to work for free and fair elections.
DPA had told authorities in Pristina that Kosovar Albanians
in Macedonia who might interfere in the electoral process
would "not be allowed to remain here." The expulsion of
Kosovar Albanian political groups from Macedonia would, Thaci
contended, "reduce by 50 percent" the number of election
fraud incidents on election day. (Note: Thaci later provided
us with a list -- forwarded to the Department -- of the
K-Albanians DPA claims will be employed by DUI during the
elections. End Note.)

DPA's HOMEGROWN "MUSCLE"


12. (C) Thaci admitted that some local DPA members, such as
former UCK member Daut Rexhepi-Leka and criminal gang leader
Agim Krasniqi, had "extremist backgrounds," but he tried to
assure the Ambassador that he could control them. It was
better for such persons to be "inside the DPA tent than to
operate outside of it," he said.


13. (C) Thaci pledged that DPA would "take responsibility for
the behavior of our troops," claiming that the party's strict
hierarchy would make that possible. At the same time, he
said, "DPA followers are courageous and will clash with DUI's
Kosovars if problems arise." If the Kosovars left before the
elections, that "balance of power" would not be necessary.

KOSOVO STATUS AND BORDER DEMARCATION


14. (C) Referring to recent statements by DUI and especially
by DPA leaders that had muddied the waters on demarcation of
the Macedonia-Kosovo border, the Ambassador restated the US
position on the matter, underscoring that it should be
resolved as part of a final status solution for Kosovo. In
the meantime, it would be prudent for all parties to avoid
making public statements about the matter. It was especially
important to keep border demarcation from becoming an issue
in the upcoming electoral campaign.


15. (C) Ahmeti noted that he had recently discussed the
demarcation issue with Kosovar authorities, and conceded that
Kosovar PM Ceku had made some "extreme" statements on the

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matter, perhaps under pressure from hardliners. The main
concern, in his view, was to ensure that Kosovo maintained
and improved its relations with Macedonia throughout the
final status process. As the status talks process
progressed, it was important not to allow demarcation, which
"could be completed at the appropriate time," to become a
major political distraction.


16. (C) Ahmeti slammed DPA leader Xhaferi's visit to Kosovo
the previous week as "unfruitful" for having stirred Kosovar
emotions over the demarcation issue. He noted that actual
demarcation could lead to violent reactions on the part of
eAlbanian citizens living in the border region who did not
want to live on Macedonian soil. The Ambassador made it
clear that the 2001 Skopje-Belgrade border delimitation
agreement was not subject to renegotiation. What needed to
be done was a technical demarcation of the existing border.
It was important, therefore, to keep the issue off the status
process agenda for now. Ahmeti agreed, adding that a
"technical MOU" on demarcation might help resolve the matter.



17. (C) Xhaferi argued that press reports about his
statements on the border issue during a recent visit to
Pristina had inaccurately characterized his position. In
fact, he had said that Pristina could not resolve the
demarcation issue at the present time because Kosovo still
had no international legal standing to do so.

KONDOVO AND KRASNIQI CANDIDACY


18. (C) Thaci said that the early March police raid on
Kondovo, which left one eAlbanian dead and one seriously
wounded, had sorely tested DPA's crisis management skills,
but that the party had managed to control the eAlbanian
reaction and to prevent further violence. He said he had
chastised Krasniqi for having harbored the three criminals
involved, and said the notorious Kondovo gang leader would
not, contrary to earlier reports, be included on DPA's list
of candidates for parliament.

CONTROVERSIAL MONUMENT CONSTRUCTION


19. (SBU) The Ambassador asked whether the DUI-led Struga
municipality would obey a recent local court order
prohibiting construction of a controversial monument to a
deceased former NLA and DUI member, the plan for which
already had raised inter-ethnic tensions there. Ahmeti
blamed the inter-ethnic fracas over the monument on the
Struga mayor's inexperience. He said he had persuaded
backers of the monument project to temporarily suspend work
on it, and pledged that the issue would be resolved after the
parliamentary elections. The Ambassador noted the importance
to Struga's economic prospects, particularly its touristic
appeal, of resolving the issue peacefully.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST


20. (C) Although both DUI and DPA deny that they plan to use
Kosovar Albanians to "assist" them during the elections,
anecdotal evidence, including from OSCE field observers,
indicates that both parties already have Kosovar
"reinforcements" on the ground here. K-Albanian involvement
in the Macedonian electoral process would likely result in
isolated electoral fraud and violent clashes, given the
heated campaign climate and DPA's "do or die" approach to
winning. Such an outcome would damage the democratic process
here and would jeopardize Macedonia's chances for NATO
membership in the next two years. It also could have
negative regional repercussions, with political leaders in
Belgrade using such involvement to charge that K-Albanians
are destabilizing the neighborhood.


21. (C) Embassy is raising this issue at IC Principals'
meetings to ensure the IC here uses similar language and
arguments in admonishing DUI and DPA. It would be
particularly useful, therefore, if local authorities in
Tirana and Pristina would strongly urge K-Albanian political

SKOPJE 00000451 004 OF 004


parties to avoid providing such "reinforcements" to their
eAlbanian counterparts in Macedonia, and to recall those
already here.
WOHLERS