U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER'S MEETING WITH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000383

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR KS MK
SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER'S MEETING WITH
MACEDONIAN PRESIDENT CRVENKOVSKI

REF: SKOPJE 373

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4 (B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) During a tete-a-tete meeting April 13 in Skopje,
President Crvenkovski gave Amb. Wisner his assessment of
Serbian President Tadic as "pragmatic" in dealing with Kosovo
status issues, while characterizing Serbian PM Kostunica as
unlikely to compromise and more likely to walk out of the
status talks, call for a referendum, and then call for early
elections. Complaining that Belgrade lacks strong leaders
who can prepare the Serb public for independence as the
likeliest status process outcome for Kosovo, Crvenkovski
suggested a UN decision on future status that would appeal to
neither side, while at the same time ensuring that neither
party fully rejected the outcome, might cut through the
Gordian knot.


2. (C) Crvenkovski said some Serb leaders supported
independence for Kosovo provided the breakaway province did
not receive a UN seat, which they probably thought would
allow Belgrade to tell the public that Kosovo had not
received full independence. Wisner argued that the U.S. aims
for a Kosovar state with full attributes and
responsibilities. The President told Wisner that both Tadic
and Kostunica were trying to be more nationalistic than the
opposition Serbian Radical Party; it was therefore unlikely
that anything could induce leaders in Belgrade to level with
the public about Kosovo's future status. Wisner asked
Crvenkovski to continue regular contacts with Tadic and
Kostunica, and to urge them to take a more constructive
approach toward the final status process and its inevitable
outcome. End Summary.

WISNER-CRVENKOVSKI MEETING


3. (SBU) U.S. Special Representative for Kosovo Talks Frank
Wisner met in private with President Crvenkovski April 13 in
Skopje to discuss Kosovo status issues, with only the
Ambassador accompanying. The tte--tte meeting followed an
expanded discussion that included Crvenkovski, his chief of
cabinet and national security adviser. Reftel reports on
Amb. Wisner's additional meetings that day with other senior
GOM officials and party leaders.

TADIC PRAGMATIC, KOSTUNICA UNMOVING


4. (C) Amb. Wisner warned that Belgrade was acting in ways
that could have dangerous consequences for the status
process, using MUP agents to warn Kosovar Serbs that they
would suffer if they cooperated with the Kosovars and telling
Kosovar Serbs that they would be financially cut off if they
accepted salaries from local authorities. Belgrade was
sabotaging the process, which was unacceptable to the U.S.
How could the international community (IC) get President
Tadic and PM Kostunica to stop such actions?


5. (C) Crvenkovski recounted a conversation he had with Tadic
over dinner in December 2005 in Ohrid. He had asked Tadic a
hypothetical question -- if the IC agreed that Kosovo would
stay in Serbia and the Kosovars did not object, what was
Serbia's capacity to handle the resulting situation, given
the overwhelming K-Albanian population and the need for
Serbia to move ahead on the path to NATO and EU membership?


6. (C) Tadic had replied that that would be the worst
possible outcome. The best outcome, Tadic said, would be one
that protected the K-Serbs' religious/cultural sites and
property rights, and permitted continued K-Serb relations
with Belgrade. That outcome also would have to provide
continued trade ties with Kosovo, and a real prospect for
Serbia to receive EU membership and investment.


7. (C) Crvenkovski's assessment was that Tadic understood how
limited his options were, and that he would be pragmatic
about next steps in the status process. Crvenkovski said he
did not think Tadic was behind the use of the MUP agents to
intimidate K-Serbs, but agreed that someone in Belgrade,

SKOPJE 00000383 002 OF 003


possibly Serb military intelligence, was controlling them.


8. (C) PM Kostunica, on the other hand, refused to discuss
independence as a possible outcome. Tadic had told
Crvenkovski that he believed Kostunica would walk out of the
talks and would take the issue to a referendum "with a
question that would guarantee massive public support." After
that, the government would likely call for early elections.

STRONG LEADERSHIP LACKING


9. (C) Crvenkovski said Serbia needed, but did not have,
strong leadership to deal with impending challenges. Tadic
did not have any real power, and Kostunica's party's poll
ratings were under 10 percent. As a result, there was no one
in a leadership position who could tell the Serb public the
truth about the likely course of developments in Kosovo.
Former FM Siljanovic would be inclined to do so, Crvenkovski
thought, but his influence was limited.

MACEDONIAN EXPERIENCE PARALLEL


10. (C) Drawing a parallel between the challenge facing
Serbia today and the challenge facing the GOM in the early
1990s when Macedonia was trying to join the UN and the name
issue seemed insoluble, Crvenkovski noted that, in the end,
the UN simply had told Athens and Skopje under which name the
country would be admitted to membership. Neither side had
been satisfied with the outcome, but the UN decision had cut
through the Gordian knot. Wisner argued that all of our
thinking about a Kosovar state had to be clear -- it would
have the full attributes of statehood.


11. (C) The key to the Kosovo conundrum, in Crvenkovski's
view, was arriving at a solution that neither side would
agree to or accept fully, while ensuring they did not
entirely reject the outcome. Wisner pointed out that the
current challenge confronting Belgrade was more complex than
the name issue. If a referendum were held, followed by early
elections, that would stop the status process for six months.
K-Albanian frustration would be difficult to contain.

BELGRADE'S ATTEMPT TO CREATE DE FACTO PARTITION


12. (C) Wisner said Belgrade's refusal to allow K-Serbs to
participate in Kosovar institutions suggested it was trying
to separate Serb areas from Kosovo in reality, if not on the
map. Belgrade had to allow the K-Serbs to make a deal in
Pristina, and then implement in good faith whatever deal was
reached. Regular practical implementation of the Kosovo
agreement would be critical; it would not suffice for both
sides simply to agree not to reject the status outcome.

MACEDONIA WILLING TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE


13. (C) Crvenkovski said he would talk to Tadic again to try
to persuade him to be more forthcoming. PM Kostunica, his
nationalism bolstered by the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC),
would be tougher to tackle. Wisner said the SOC was split on
Kosovo, with more moderate voices in the church calling for
cooperation with the Kosovars to save the SOC's patrimony and
to protect believers. He said the U.S. would work on getting
a "package deal" to address the SOC's concerns. Wisner asked
Crvenkovski to periodically visit Belgrade and to invite Serb
leaders to Skopje to "hold their hands through this process."

TWO SIMPLIFIED SOLUTIONS


14. (C) Crvenkovski replied that Tadic had been right in
pressing for elections before starting the talks, but it was
too late now to move forward with that idea. He suggested
proposing to Belgrade two simplified solutions: 1.) Kosovo
receives independence and Belgrade and the Kosovar Serbs
receive nothing in return as compensation; or 2.)
independence for Kosovo and maximum benefits in return for
K-Serbs and Belgrade. Wisner replied that, unfortunately,
there was a third, unstated, option: delayed status process
and the use of NATO forces in Kosovo to keep the K-Albanians
under control. The last was not an option anyone wanted to
contemplate.

SKOPJE 00000383 003 OF 003



INDEPENDENCE WITHOUT A UN SEAT?


15. (C) Crvenkovski said some Serb political leaders had told
him they could support independence for Kosovo as long as the
breakaway province did not receive a UN seat. Crvenkovski
had asked them what was the point of such an arrangement, and
they had not replied. His own assessment was that they
wanted to be able to tell the Serb public that Kosovo,
without a UN seat, would not be fully independent.


16. (C) Wisner said Tadic and Kostunica needed to clearly
articulate what incentives were needed for them to persuade
the Serb public that independence as an outcome was the only
feasible option. The USG would take a serious look at their
suggestions. Crvenkovski answered that it was not a question
of what outcome the leadership could sell to the Serb public,
but was instead a question of what Kostunica himself could
accept.

STABILITY OF SERBIA AFTER STATUS


17. (C) Crvenkovski said that the main issue for the region
at the end of 2006 would be the stability of Serbia.
Belgrade's leaders would find 2006 a terrible year for
Serbia: losing Montenegro and Kosovo, the impact of
Milosevic's death, and having to hand over Mladic. He noted
that the Serb opposition, along with Milosevic, had lost
Kosovo by trying to be more nationalistic than Milosevic
himself. The same thing was happening now in Serb politics.
Tadic and Kostunica were trying to be more nationalistic than
the opposition Serbian Radical Party. Given that approach,
it was hard to see what could induce either leader to level
with the public about Kosovo's future status.
MILOVANOVIC