U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER'S KOSOVO STATUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 000373

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK KS
SUBJECT: U.S. SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE WISNER'S KOSOVO STATUS
DISCUSSIONS WITH MACEDONIAN LEADERS


Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY.


1. (C) During April 13 discussions in Skopje with U.S.
Special Representative on Kosovo Talks Frank Wisner,
Macedonian leaders focused on the unresolved issue of the
delineated but not yet demarcated Kosovo-Macedonia border as
the only open issue between Skopje and Pristina, and said
they would try to get Kosovar PM Ceku to make a public
statment affirming Kosovar acceptance of the border
delineation during his upcoming visit. President Crvenkovski
expressed doubts that either President Tadic or PM Kostunica
were ready to undertake steps to prepare the Serb public for
independence as a possible Kosovo status outcome, and said he
believed Belgrade would instead press for the Serbs to walk
out of the negotiations and would call for early elections or
a referendum on the matter. Ethnic Albanian DUI party leader
Ahmeti told Wisner he believed PM Ceku and President Sejdiu
were ready to implement confidence-building measures to
reassure Kosovo Serbs, and expressed concern about rumors in
Macedonia that the international community was discussing
partition as a way to address Belgrade's concerns about Serb
minority rights in Kosovo.


2. (C) Amb. Wisner affirmed USG support for Macedonia's
territorial integrity, stated that any final status outcome
would have to leave borders in the region intact, and said he
would urge the Kosovar leadership to be constructive on the
issue of demarcation. He asked his interlocutors to support
U.S. efforts to persuade Belgrade to be more forward looking
in preparing their citizens for independence as a possible
outcome, and for help in urging Pristina to take concrete
steps to enhance minority rights in Kosovo. He told Ahmeti
unequivocally that partition was not being considered as a
final status option. End Summary.

VISIT TO SKOPJE


3. (U) US Special Representative on Kosovo Talks Ambassador
Wisner visited Skopje April 13-14 for discussions with Prime
Minister Buckovski, FM Mitreva, President Crvenkovski, and
DUI leader Ali Ahmeti (septel reports on Ambassador Wisner's
tete-a-tete meeting with Crvenkovski). Ambassador Wisner was
accompanied by Special Assistant Stephen Gee. Ambassador and
P/E Chief (notetaker) attended the meetings.

MACEDONIANS FOCUS ON BORDER DEMARCATION


4. (C) Prime Minister Buckovski told Ambassador Wisner
Macedonia wants to play a constructive role in enhancing
stability in the region, in cooperation with its
international partners. The GOM enjoys good relations with
Pristina; the only remaining "open issue" between Skopje and
Pristina is demarcation of the border, which both Buckovski
and FM Mitreva described as a "technical rather than
political" matter.


5. (C) FM Mitreva said she recently had briefed EU and NATO
interlocturs in Brussels on Macedonia's "pragmatic approach"
to Kosovo status issues. She noted that delineation of the
border was clear; a public statement to that effect by the
Kosovar side would be welcome in Skopje. At the same time,
she called for a timeline for resolving the demarcation
issue, noting the Eide report statement (para 72) that the
demarcation of the border should be resolved before the
future process ends.


6. (C) Ambassador Wisner reaffirmed U.S. support for
Macedonia's territorial integrity and its Euro-Atlantic
integration goals. He said the USG was determined to reach a
final status settlement before the end of the year, and that
the outcome of that settlement almost certainly would be
independence, with international supervision. On border
demarcation, Wisner said the issue should be settled as part
of any final status solution. Wisner said he would urge PM
Ceku and President Sejdiu to be constructive on the matter.

PM CEKU STATEMENT ON BORDER?

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7. (C) Buckovski said he had met with PM Ceku recently and
would do so again, by the end of April. He said the
government wanted some form of a statement from Ceku, or
perhaps a declaration by the Kosovo parliament, affirming
Kosovar acceptance of the existing,
internationally-recognized border delineation. Amb. Wisner
asked Buckovski and Mitreva to give Ceku some room for
maneuver on the issue. Mitreva replied that, from a legal
point of view, a political statement from Ceku along those
lines was the best Macedonia could expect.

PERSUADING PRISTINA AND BELGRADE TO BE FLEXIBLE ON FINAL
STATUS TALKS


8. (C) Amb. Wisner noted the importance of persuading
Belgrade and Pristina to ensure the negotiation process went
smoothly, and that the outcome would be accepted by all
sides. He asked that the GOM work with Belgrade to persuade
them to be flexible, and to persuade Pristina to take more
concrete steps, emulating the Macedonian example, to enhance
inter-ethnic tolerance in Kosovo. Buckovski agreed to do so.


PREPARING SERB PUBLIC FOR INDEPENDENT KOSOVO


9. (C) President Crvenkovski acknowledged that the GOM's
influence in the future status process was limited, but that
Macedonia nevertheless wanted to be a constructive
contributor. Amb. Wisner asked for Crvenkovski's advice on
how best to pass the message to President Tadic and PM
Kostunica that they needed to prepare their citizens for
eventual independence. He added that future status had to be
determined in such a manner that borders in the region
remained intact. The U.S. recognized the existing border
delineation; it was not an open issue for us.


10. (C) Crvenkovski responded that, having visited Belgrade
the week before, his assessment was that Tadic would take a
"realistic, rational approach" to the status issue. However,
Tadic would not be willing to take responsibility for being
the "first to announce the outcome" of the status process to
the Serb public. Kostunica would be equally unwilling to do
so, or to accept the reality of independence for Kosovo
himself.


11. (C) Crvenkovski's impression was that Belgrade's reaction
to a status process moving inexorably toward independence for
Kosovo would be to ensure the Serbs walked out of the
negotiations, to call for early elections, or to call for a
referendum. It was unrealistic to expect that any Serb
politician would undertake action to prepare the public for
Kosovo's independence. The best that might be hoped for,
given the circumstances, would be preventing the Serb team
from walking out of the negotiations.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING STEPS FOR SERB MINORITIES IN KOSOVO


12. (C) Amb. Wisner outlined the U.S. approach on Kosovo to
DUI leader Ahmeti, reiterating that Serb leaders should be
prepared for independence as an outcome provided Kosovar
authorities took steps to guarantee Serb minority rights. He
asked Ahmeti how to get Kosovar leaders to take steps to
build confidence among Serb minorities.


13. (C) Ahmeti replied that PM Ceku and President Sejdiu
understood the importance of taking such confidence-building
measures, including steps to return Serb properties. They
wanted Serbs who had fled the conflict to return to Kosovo.
They were ready to do whatever was neccessary, whether
providing security or restitution to Serbs. Ahmeti
acknowledged there were Kosovar Albanian "counter forces" who
wanted confidence-building between Albanians and Serbs to
fail, but said such forces were of minimal consequence.

CUTTING KOSOVAR SERB TIES TO BELGRADE


14. (C) Ahmeti agreed that Kosovar institutions should take
steps to protect the Serb minority; in return, the Serbs

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should acknowledge Kosovo as their country and cut ties to
Belgrade, he said. Belgrade could not solve the problems of
Serbs in Kosovo anymore than Tirana or Pristina could address
ethnic Albanian problems in Macedonia, Ahmeti quipped. As
soon as Kosovo was free of the ties that bound it to Serbia,
a "positive process could begin to develop."
CONCERNS ABOUT PARTITION RUMORS


15. (C) Citing "rumors" that the international community was
discussing possible changes of borders to accommodate
Belgrade's concerns about Serb minority rights in Kosovo,
Ahmeti said such a development would have serious
consequences for the region. He welcomed Amb. Wisner's reply
that there was no substance to such rumors. Amb. Wisner
further assured him that the U.S. position regarding no
changes in borders was shared by Ahtisaari, the EU, and the
Russians, adding that he would urge PM Ceku to resolve the
Macedonia-Kosovo border demarcation issue.
MILOVANOVIC