Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SKOPJE1120
2006-11-28 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Skopje
Cable title:  

MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER

Tags:  PREL PGOV MK 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0302
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHSQ #1120/01 3321510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281510Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SKOPJE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5463
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSQ/USDAO SKOPJE MK
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 001120 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER
FOR SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE

REF: A. SKOPJE 880

B. SKOPJE 983

C. SKOPJE 1017

D. SKOPJE 1037

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SKOPJE 001120

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/28/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: US-EU EFFORT BRINGS PARTIES TOGETHER
FOR SUBSTANTIVE POLITICAL DIALOGUE

REF: A. SKOPJE 880

B. SKOPJE 983

C. SKOPJE 1017

D. SKOPJE 1037

Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY


1. (C) After weeks of U.S. and EU coaxing, the leaders of the
four main parties in Macedonia met on November 27 for their
first substantive talks on legislative and policy priorities
since the new government took office in late August. The
party leaders outlined some of their key priorities and
agreed to meet again in early December to discuss a process
for moving forward on Macedonia's NATO and EU membership
reform agenda. The talks represent a small step forward
toward more consensus-building engagement among the parties,
especially between the government and opposition DUI. The
chances for success in future discussions will be enhanced if
DUI can be convinced in the meantime to accept its role as a
constructive opposition party, and the government is
persuaded to give DUI the political space it needs and
deserves (as the biggest eAlbanian party) to influence
positively Macedonia's reform agenda.

GOVERNMENT-OPPOSITION FINALLY AGREE TO TALKS ON NATO AND EU
INTEGRATION


2. (SBU) After weeks of U.S. and EU coaxing, leaders of
Macedonia's four main parties finally met November 27 in
Skopje for their first substantive talks on legislative and
policy priorities since the VMRO-DPMNE-led inter-ethnic
coalition government was sworn-in on August 26. PM Gruevski
and MOI Jankulovska headed the VMRO-DPMNE team, followed by
eAlbanian governing coalition partner DPA's President Xhaferi
and VP Thaci. The opposition side was represented by
eAlbanian opposition DUI's Ali Ahmeti and VP Arifi.
Newly-elected leader of the opposition SDSM Sekerinska and VP
Makraduli also participated. The Ambassador moderated the 2.5
hour meeting, for which we prepared the agenda; EUSR Fouere
was co-moderator.

TIME TO OVERCOME PARTY DIFFERENCES TO FOCUS ON NATO AND EU
REFORMS


3. (SBU) The Ambassador outlined the goals of the meeting and
welcomed the participation of the key party leaders. She

congratulated the parties for constructive compromises the
previous week that had avoided creating inter-ethnic tensions
over the unveiling of a statue of the 15th century Albanian
hero Skenderbeg in a predominantly eAlbanian suburb of
Skopje. PM Gruevski stressed that it was "time to overcome
party differences" and to work on implementing NATO and EU
reforms. He asked the opposition to work with the GOM to
pass and implement key legislative priorities, including
draft laws on a public prosecutor, and on religious
communities.

BADINTER VOTING KEY FOR DUI


4. (C) DUI's Ahmeti underscored that constructive dialogue
was the only way to advance Macedonia's EU and NATO
aspirations; lack thereof would only "deepen the political
crisis" in the country. He called on the government to
respect Badinter (qualified majority) voting on Framework
Agreement-related laws, and recited a list of legislative and
policy priorities for DUI, including a language law and law
on the status of former NLA (insurgent group) members. He
also challenged the composition of the parliamentary
committee charged with determining whether laws require a
Badinter vote and called for it to be disbanded. If the
parties did not resolve that issue, DUI would not support
constructive action on other legislative priorities.

SDSM: RESULTS-ORIENTED APPROACH COULD WORK


5. (C) SDSM underscored the importance of using the talks to
achieve concrete results, and to build confidence and trust
among the four parties. Sekerinska said she believed there
was political will to achieve results. In the spirit of
constructive opposition, she said SDSM would support the

SKOPJE 00001120 002 OF 003


government's reform efforts that focused on FWA
implementation, combating corruption, and improved political
relations.


6. (C) Sekerinska warned the government, however, against
trying to build an artificial legislative minority by
"shopping" for smaller parties that currently were a part of
the opposition. She also cautioned against manipulating the
draft parliamentary rulebook to limit the opposition's
ability to participate in plenary debates. It would be easy
for the opposition to oppose draft legislation if the
government did not allow adequate debate time.

DPA: THE BLAME FALLS SQUARELY ON DUI


7. (C) Placing the blame squarely on DUI for the lack of
legislative and policy progress in the government's first 100
days, DPA leader Xhaferi said DUI had treated the lack of
constructive dialogue until now "as an abstract issue." The
current crisis had sprung, he said, from DUI's resentment
over its exclusion from the government. Calling the Badinter
principle a "pillar of DPA policy," Xhaferi urged consensual
democracy as the way to move ahead on Macedonia's reform
agenda.


8. (C) DPA VP Thaci defined Badinter, according to strict
intepretation of the FWA, as requiring a vote of a majority
of non-Macedonian MPs. He stressed that a valid Badinter
vote did not require a majority of eAlbanian MPs, if other
minority MPs (Turks, Serbs, Vlachs) were sufficient to form a
majority with other eAlbanian MPs in the Parliament.
(Comment: Although Thaci's interpretation is correct if one
adheres only to the letter of the FWA, it clearly is at odds
with the spirit of that agreement. The FWA was developed to
ensure that eAlbanians and/and other ethnic minority groups
would have a decisive voice in matters affecting them. End
Comment.)

NEXT STEPS -- A PROCESS FOR MOVING FORWARD ON LEGISLATIVE AND
POLICY PRIORITIES


9. (SBU) Summarizing the meeting, the Ambassador called for a
second meeting in early December with a clear agenda compiled
by the four parties. The parties would discuss directly how
to move forward on that agenda, with a view to formalizing a
process for consultation and consensus-building. The agenda
would consist of two or three priority issues, with a
follow-on meeting later in the month or the month following
to discuss additional items. The participants agreed.


10. (C) PM Gruevski asked if the parties would consider
meeting without US and EU participation. DUI's Ahmeti
objected, stressing that there were no prospects for success
without International Community (IC) engagement. The
Ambassador suggested, as a compromise, meeting once more with
IC participation, and then deciding whether to continue
subsequent meetings in that format. Participants agreed.
They also approved a joint press statement, drafted by the
U.S. and EU, that outlined in general terms the purpose of
the meeting.

GENESIS OF DIALOGUE -- ON THE PATH TO CONSENSUS


11. (SBU) We have been pressing the government and opposition
to show greater flexibility in opening and maintaining
channels of dialogue, with the goal of achieving consensus on
the reform agenda required for Macedonia's NATO and EU
aspirations, since the government took office in late August.
The Ambassador raised with PM Gruevski and FM Milososki in
early September the need for redoubled efforts to engage in
constructive dialogue with DUI (ref A). Both assured her
they would "work to build bridges" with the opposition.
Those initial efforts led to a U.S.-brokered private meeting
October 5 between Gruevski and Ahmeti on the draft law on
police (ref B),their first-ever face-to-face meeting, in
which they gauged each other's intentions and agreed to
continue efforts to build dialogue.


12. (C) We followed the Gruevski-Ahmeti encounter a few days
afterwards with an informal lunch with the VMRO-DPMNE and DUI
VPs to press for further leadership talks, a message
reinforced in mid-October by EUR/SCE Director Hoh (ref C) and

SKOPJE 00001120 003 OF 003


by DAS DiCarlo during her late October visit (ref D.) When
several attempts, including one co-sponsored by the local
NATO and EU missions, failed to bring the political
leadership together for constructive talks in a public forum,
it became evident that a successful dialogue would require
U.S. and EU initiative to bring them together in a private
meeting.

COMMENT


13. (C) The November 27 meeting marks a small but significant
step forward in moving the parties toward more
consensus-building engagement. After the failed public
attempts of the parties to come together to demonstrate,
albeit superficially, that there was a political will for
dialogue, it took the US and EU coaxing, together with
careful spadework to ensure the event would not become a
glaring media event, to get the leaders to engage in
substantive discussions.


14. (C) The tone of the discussion was civil. No heated
exchanges took place and both Ahmeti and Xhaferi were
uncharacteristically silent through much of the meeting.
After the meeting ended, Ahmeti and Thaci, sworn enemies in
the public eye, engaged in a 30-minute private discussion in
a corner of the room. If the two main ethnic Albanian
parties can continue talking constructively, 50 percent of
the battle will have been won. The other 50 percent will
consist of getting DUI to accept its role as constructive
opposition, and in getting Gruevski to recognize that he must
rein in DPA's efforts to cripple DUI as a political force,
and must give DUI political space in which to have its
concerns heard, if he hopes to advance Macedonia's NATO and
EU reform agenda.
MILOVANOVIC