MACEDONIA: EUR DAS DICARLO'S OCT 23-24 MEETINGS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 SKOPJE 001037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EUR/SCE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MK
SUBJECT: MACEDONIA: EUR DAS DICARLO'S OCT 23-24 MEETINGS
WITH GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION


Classified By: P/E CHIEF SHUBLER, REASONS 1.4(B) & (D).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (SBU) During meetings with high-level GOM officials in
Skopje October 23-24, EUR DAS DiCarlo underscored the need
for the government to build consensus with the opposition to
gain buy-in for key legislative and reform initiatives, for
redoubled efforts to implement the reforms required for NATO
membership, and for a low-key approach on resolving the issue
of demarcation of the Macedonia-Kosovo border. She urged
continued Macedonian flexibility on the name issue, and asked
opposition parties to be more pragmatic and prepared to
compromise with the GOM in order to advance Macedonia's
Euro-Atlantic integration agenda.


2. (C) Government officials expressed a willingness to
continue efforts to engage the opposition, including
discussing legislative or other initiatives with opposition
eAlbanian DUI before they are discussed in the parliament.
DUI's Ahmeti said he was ready to discuss with GOM leaders
how to move forward on a "package" of issues of concern to
his party, while DPA's Xhaferi called for a private meeting
of key government and opposition parties.


3. (C) On NATO and EU membership, GOM leaders said they would
redouble reform efforts, including Framework Agreement (FWA)
implementation, passing a liberal religious freedom law, and
combating trafficking in persons and corruption in a
non-partisan manner. The government said it would work
toward resolving the issue of demarcation of the border with
Kosovo in the context of a final status settlement and would
continue UN talks on the name dispute. DAS DiCarlo's
meetings highlighted the willingness of the major parties to
engage in consensus-building dialogue as a precondition for
advancing Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic integration prospects.
We are working with our IC partners to facilitate that
dialogue. End Summary.

MEETINGS IN SKOPJE WITH GOVERNMENT & OPPOSITION LEADERS
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4. (SBU) EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Rosemary DiCarlo met
with senior GOM officials, major opposition party leaders,
local mayors, business leaders, political analysts, civil
society representatives, international community (IC)
principals and ambassadors, and university students in Skopje
October 22-24. Ambassador, DCM and P/E officers accompanied
DAS DiCarlo. In her meetings with PM Gruevski, FM Milososki,
President Crvenkovski and other senior GOM officials, DAS
DiCarlo made the following key points:

--The GOM must work with the opposition, eAlbanian opposition
DUI especially, to build the widest possible consensus and
buy-in for legislative initiatives that will enhance the
legitimacy of those initiatives and facilitate their
implementation.

--For Macedonia to be the strongest possible candidate for
NATO membership at the next enlargement round, the GOM must
redouble efforts to pass and implement needed reforms,
including judicial and economic reforms; combat corruption
and trafficking in persons (TIP); pass a liberal reliQ{[SzNQQ2QLQ-Resolving Kosovo's final status sooner rather than later
will help bolster stability in the region. The issue of
border demarcation with Kosovo is a technical issue that
should be resolved in a final status settlement; in the
meantime, keep the matter out of the press headlines.

--Continue talks under UN auspices on the name issue, be
flexible, and keep the issue out of the press.


5. (SBU) In meetings with opposition leaders Sekerinska and
Mitreva (SDSM) and Ahmeti (DUI),DiCarlo called for each
party to work pragmatically and to demonstrate willingness to
compromise on key reforms of broad national interest.


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WORKING WITH THE OPPOSITION -- STRIVE FOR CONSENSUS
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6. (C) PM Gruevski said current political tensions between
DUI and governing coalition partner DPA were "emotional and
high," and that he wanted to work with both parties to lower
them. He was willing to discuss with DUI all issues, even
those unrelated to FWA implementation. He said his goal was
to strengthen the political stability of the country "at any
cost."


7. (C) Deputy PM for Euro-Integration Konevska agreed with
DAS DiCarlo on the need for dialogue, consensus, and
political compromise between the government and opposition.
Implementation of reforms required political party buy-in.
Her office would try to consult with the opposition on
legislation before/before it reached parliament.


8. (C) Asked what might make DUI, and DPA, act more
pragmatically and constructively, opposition SDSM Vice
President Sekerinska said only pressure from the IC would
work. Both parties had crossed a red line that made it hard
for them to behave pragmatically without external pressure.
FM Milososki told DAS DiCarlo that DUI could, if it desired,
enjoy a "privileged partnership" with the GOM through its
control of the mayorships of all but one eAlbanian-dominated
municipality.

DUI'S DILEMMA -- FINDING A MODUS OPERANDI
--------------

9. (C) DUI President Ahmeti told DiCarlo that the government
coalition was putting pressure on his party through a range
of actions, including refusal to accept DUI amendments to a
draft police law; firing or transferring civil servants
connected to DUI; cold-bloodedly "assassinating" the cousin
of DUI mayor Lika in Tetovo; and trying to shut down Tetovo
State University, which was closely identified with his
party. He said he had tried to contact DPA leader Xhaferi to
discuss these matters, but there had been no willingness on
that side to meet. It was unclear to him who controlled DPA
(Xhaferi or VP Menduh Thaci).


10. (C) Asked if there was a specific approach he would favor
for dealing with DUI concerns in the future, Ahmeti replied
that he wanted to reach agreement with the GOM to tackle a
package of issues, including the law on police, law on
languages, election of future governments with a qualified
majority, and a law on compensation for victims of the 2001
conflict. A political commitment from the government to
resolve those issues would help the country begin tackling
its economic challenges.


11. (C) DPA President Xhaferi called the current antagonism
between DPA and DUI "irrational," and said it could not be
resolved by the two parties only. He added that relations
with coalition partner VMRO-DPMNE were going through a rough
spell caused by differences over a draft language law. As a
result, he said, a private, serious discussion between
government and opposition party leaders, perhaps hosted by
the US Embassy, would be useful in "building bridges between
the parties."

FRAMEWORK IMPLEMENTATION -- STRENGTHENING THE STATE
-------------- --------------

12. (C) Deputy PM Selmani said the government wanted the FWA
to be accepted by all/all citizens as an instrument of
positive development that would strengthen the state as it
enhanced inter-ethnic relations. Selmani said his office was
working on an action plan to improve ethnic minority
representation in government, for which he would need
eAlbanian and eMacedonian support. He also noted the need
for continued work on decentralization and said mayors were
using his office as a channel of communication to the
government on decentralization needs. SDSM's Sekerinska said
the GOM needed to remind the EU that decentralization and the
parliamentary elections had been Macedonia's recent
successes. She warned that any attempt to politicize the
allocation of state resources to the local governments would
backfire, and would provoke DUI, which controls nearly all
eAlbanian mayorships.

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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM -- CHALLENGING FAITH MONOPOLIES
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13. (C) Crvenkovski said passing a draft law on religious
communities and groups that expanded religious freedom in
Macedonia would erode the monopoly positions of both the
Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC) and the Islamic Community of
Macedonia. That would cause a strong political backlash from
parties enjoying the support of those institutions. FM
Milososki said the MOC and Macedonian public would oppose a
more liberal law, since they do not want the Serb Orthodox
Church to operate freely here, given its refusal to recognize
the MOC's ecclesiastic independence. The Ambassador stressed
the importance of passing a law that would open the widest
possible window for others to practice their faiths freely.

COMBATING CORRUPTION -- NEED FOR A SYSTEMIC APPROACH
-------------- --------------

14. (C) Crvenkovski agreed with DAS DiCarlo's message
regarding the need to demonstrate results in combating
corruption to demonstrate Macedonia's readiness for NATO
membership. He pessimistically noted that past governments
mistakenly had tried to tackle corruption as a limited
campaign, with a limited timeframe and a focus on short-term
efforts. What was needed was a more systemic, long-term
effort that built on judicial reforms. He concurred, as did
Deputy PM Konevska, with DAS DiCarlo's warning that
anti-corruption efforts would not be effective if they were
based on political "revanchisme," since that would undermine
the credibility of those efforts and the institutions
undertaking them.

DUI AS "OPPOSITION PLUS"
--------------

15. (C) SDSM's Sekerinska said the lack of consultation
between the GOM and the major opposition parties on the
police law was costing the country in terms of time lost and
the negative external impression the dispute had caused.
SDSM had told the government they wanted discussion on key
laws before/before the drafts were sent to the parliament.
(NOTE: SDSM, as lead party in the previous government,
offered no such advance consultation to the opposition when
it was in power. END NOTE.) SDSM would support key reforms,
but did not want the GOM to abuse that goodwill or to take
shortcuts in the legislative process. President of
Parliament Georgievski agreed that the government needed
"carrots and sticks" to use in working with governing
coalition ally DPA and the DUI opposition. He agreed with
the Ambassador's suggestion that the GOM must treat DUI as an
"opposition plus," given its majority share of the eAlbanian
vote, but was not confident the current government could
master that challenge.

NATO MEMBERSHIP - "ADDED VALUE"
--------------

16. (C) PM Gruevski said the government was beginning to
implement NATO membership-related reforms. Macedonia wanted
the message from the upcoming Riga Summit to offer hope for
aspirants for membership invitations in 2008. He pledged
that the government would work harder in the meantime to
strengthen the judiciary, fight corruption, boost economic
growth, and continue defense reforms, among other tasks.
Gruevski also pledged continuing support for the war on
terror. FM Milososki said Macedonia's integration into NATO
would "add value" to the organization, as would the
memberships of Croatia and Albania.

EU ACCESSION -- A TWO-WAY PROCESS
--------------

17. (SBU) Deputy PM Konevska noted that the EU accession
process was a "two-way" process reflecting both Macedonia's
accomplishments and the mood among EU members. She said the
GOM was hoping to begin EU accession negotiations in 2007,
but acknowledged that would require concrete results on
political EU membership criteria. Her office was planning to
complete by March 2007 a list of laws that needed to be
harmonized with EU laws and implemented by 2010. DAS DiCarlo
noted that the USG would continue to remind the EU of its
commitment to Macedonia and the Western Balkans, but that the

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government would have to demonstrate progress in fighting
corruption, trafficking in persons, and in strengthening the
judiciary to make its case for membership.

KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- BORDER DEMARCATION
--------------

18. (C) PM Gruevski reiterated GOM support for Special Envoy
Ahtisaari's efforts. He said the government wanted the
Macedonia-Kosovo border demarcation issue to be resolved
either before or during the status talks. Gruevski proposed
final status language calling on Kosovo authorities to work
with other parties to actually demarcate the border "in some
defined period of time," but not long after the final status
decision took effect. Resolving the demarcation issue as
part of final status would make it easier for Macedonia to be
among the first countries to recognize Kosovo.


19. (C) FM Milososki was more precise in his formulation --
he asked that Pristina be urged to recognize the border not
later than three months after Kosovo final status, with
completion of demarcation to occur not later than three
months after that. President Crvenkovski agreed that
resolution of the demarcation issue had to be a part of a
final status package. If left unresolved, he warned, the
issue would create problems later on.

KOSOVO FINAL STATUS -- REGIONAL STABILITY
--------------

20. (C) Deputy PM Selmani told DAS DiCarlo that the GOM would
tighten cooperation with Kosovo security forces and would
offer authorities in Pristina lessons learned from
Macedonia's decentralization experience. Crvenkovski agreed
that the only realistic scenario for a Kosovo settlement was
some form of independence. He added that, if parliamentary
elections were held in December, it would be advisable to
delay a final status decision for a short period. That would
reduce the chances of the Radicals entering the government,
which Macedonia would view as a threatening development. If
the elections took place later, however, there should be no
delay. FM Milososki agreed that independence was the only
viable option. He stressed that delay was in no one's
interest and that the process should move forward.


21. (C) DAS DiCarlo noted that resolving Kosovo's final
status sooner rather than later would help bring stability to
the region. Crvenkovski agreed. At the same time, he said,
it would be better for the final status process to be
completed in an atmosphere in which Macedonia was free of
intra-ethnic tensions within its eAlbanian community. Hence
there was a need to work toward greater inter-party consensus
in Macedonia on legislative initiatives.

NO GREATER ALBANIA
--------------

22. (C) Crvenkovski agreed with DAS DiCarlo's reiteration of
the Contact Group position that there would be "no greater
Albania" after Kosovo final status. He believed the IC and
other countries in the region would respect those parameters,
but was concerned that radical ethnic Albanian forces in the
region would not. He suggested preventive action would be
needed -- coordinated between Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania
-- to keep such forces under control.

NAME ISSUE -- AVOIDING TIT-FOR-TAT
--------------

23. (C) On the name issue, PM Gruevski said he had sensed a
recent growing inflexibility in Athens, as reflected in
"inappropriate statements" by high-level Greek officials. He
was concerned about Greek threats to prevent Macedonia
entering the EU or NATO, even as FYROM, if it did not change
its constitutional name. Seeking to explain Macedonia's
two-name approach, FM Milososki noted the 1995 Interim
Agreement between Macedonia and Greece cited a commitment by
the two sides to work on differences over the name. Since
Macedonia is recognized by more than 100 countries by its
constitutional name, it is clear that the difference referred
to is only a difference with Greece, hence the Macedonia
offer of a second name for the Greeks to use in bilateral
relations. He expected Athens to try to engage in more

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aggressive tactics to pressure Skopje, now that the Greek
local elections were over. He stressed that the GOM would
try to limit its response and would continue to take part in
the UN negotiations on the matter, but would have to respond
to any provocative statements by Athens.

COMMENT: A CALL FOR DIALOGUE
--------------

24. (C) The common thread running through nearly all of DAS
DiCarlo's meetings was the implicit or explicit call for
dialogue from both government and opposition leaders. The
political leadership in Macedonia has recognized that the
current situation, with legislation bogged down in parliament
and little action on the reform implementation front, is
untenable and ultimately will damage Macedonia's EU and NATO
membership prospects. We and our EUSR partners will work
with the leaders of VMRO-DPMNE, DPA, DUI, and SDSM to convene
a series of private meetings at which a modus operandi can be
reached for future consultations and consensus-building on
legislative and policy initiatives of key importance to each
party.


25. This cable was cleared by DAS DiCarlo.
MILOVANOVIC