EAP DAS JOHN'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SINGAPORE 000554

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON PTER SN
SUBJECT: EAP DAS JOHN'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE

REF: SINGAPORE 553

Classified By: EP Counselor Laurent Charbonnet, Reasons 1.4(b)(d)


1. (C) Summary: EAP Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric John
briefed GOS interlocutors on U.S. engagement with Southeast
Asia and the resumption of military ties with the Indonesian
Armed Forces (TNI) during his February 8-11 visit. Ministry
of Defence Permanent Secretary Chiang Chie Foo said President
Yudhoyono, his Ministry of Defense, and TNI were slowly
working to place the TNI under civilian control. Indonesia
was the key strategic player in Southeast Asia and Singapore
could not afford instability there, he argued. DAS John and
MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari had a full and frank
exchange of views on China's and the United States' level and
quality of involvement with Southeast Asia. Singapore's
security agencies told DAS John they believed Indonesia was
stepping up its counterterrorism efforts, but was still the
main source of terrorist threat to Singapore. They argued,
however, that the Philippines, with its poor governance,
constituted a more serious terrorist threat for the region at
large. End Summary.


2. (U) Visiting Singapore February 8-11, EAP Deputy Assistant
Secretary Eric John met with Ministry of Defence Permanent

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Secretary Chiang Chie Foo, MFA Second Permanent Secretary

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Bilahari Kausikan, Internal Security Department (ISD)
Director Pang Kin Keong, Security and Intelligence Division
(SID) Director BG Chee Wee Kiong, and the American Chamber of
Commerce. He also conducted a roundtable discussion with
researchers at the Institute for Defence and Strategic
Studies, a government-linked think tank. DAS John's meeting
with Foreign Minister George Yeo is reported reftel.

Indonesia and TNI Reform
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3. (C) EAP DAS John briefed Ministry of Defence Permanent
Secretary Chiang on U.S. policy toward Indonesia and the

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resumption of military ties with the Indonesian Armed Forces
(TNI). Chiang said Singapore had considerable interaction
with the TNI and welcomed the decision by the United States
to rebuild its links with the Indonesian military. As an
institution, the TNI could hold the country together, just as
former President Suharto used it to keep Indonesia in one
piece, Chiang argued. Asked about efforts to place the TNI
under the civilian control of the Ministry of Defense, Chiang
said it would not be easy to do. The TNI had its own clout,
but President Yudhoyono, the Ministry, and TNI were working
slowly to resolve this. Chiang noted that the TNI had played
a positive role in the Aceh peace process by "restraining the
actions" of its local units. Due to strong nationalist
sentiments, it would be difficult to make progress with the
TNI if the discussions were public. The TNI could not afford
to be seen as pro-West or pro-Singapore. DAS John commented
that we wanted to work quietly with the TNI, but members of
Congress wanted more public statements.


4. (C) The GOS viewed Indonesia as the key strategic player
in Southeast Asia, according to Chiang. For the region to
move forward, Indonesia had to be a part of the effort.
Singapore could not afford instability or anarchy in such an
important neighbor. If the provinces broke away from the
central government, Singapore would have to contend with many
more power centers. Chiang cautioned that the United States
should be patient with its push for Indonesia's
democratization. Opening up a political system too quickly
can lead to unintended consequences, such as Hamas' victory
in the Palestinian Territories, he asserted.

Amb. Chan's Speech and U.S. Engagement
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5. (C) DAS John told MFA Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari
that Ambassador Chan Heng Chee's February 3 speech in Houston
on China and ASEAN had stirred a negative reaction in
Washington. (Note: Amb. Chan is Singapore's ambassador to
the United States. End Note.) The speech was inaccurate and
portrayed U.S. involvement with ASEAN in a negative light.
If Singapore had concerns about our policy toward Southeast
Asia, the GOS should raise them with us directly, DAS John
said. The normally loquacious Bilahari was momentarily
stunned and finally admitted that he had not read the speech

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and couldn't comment on it directly but he took DAS John's
point. Neither the Americas Directorate Director nor the
North American Affairs Deputy Director, who were also in the
meeting, had apparently read or even seen the speech.


6. (C) Bilahari went on to argue that the United States was
falling behind China's multilateral diplomacy with ASEAN. He
acknowledged the intrinsic structural restraints limiting the
United States' ability to engage multilaterally -- the United
States was "always ambivalent" about regional diplomacy and,
as a global power, had limited time to devote to each region.
China had been engaged in a concerted effort over the last
decade to improve its ties with Southeast Asia. China had
been "spinning a web" with various meetings, forums, and
agreements. While many of these were "meaningless" in and of
themselves, they took on a different meaning in their
totality. China's goal was not to displace the United States
from Southeast Asia -- which it couldn't do -- but to shift
it aside. A number of countries in Southeast Asia, in
addition to Burma and Laos, were calculating their national
interests with China in mind, asserted Bilahari.


7. (C) DAS John stated that the United States was interested
in quality agreements with ASEAN that had substance. The
ASEAN-U.S. Enhanced Partnership would enable us to expand our
economic and political engagement. He added that there would
also be significant "visit diplomacy" this year, with the
President's trip to Hanoi in November for APEC and several
trips to the region by the Secretary. Our goal was not to
compete with China for influence, but to maintain a high
quality of involvement. Bilahari responded that Singapore
welcomed a positive competition for influence in the region.
An "imbalance of influence would cramp our style."

Regional Terrorism Threats
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8. (C) The Indonesian security forces had become more serious
about the terrorist threat, due to pressure from President
Yudhoyono and other countries as well as inter-service
rivalry, observed SID Director BG Chee. Inter-agency
coordination, however, remained a weak link in Indonesia's
counterterrorism (CT) efforts. Indonesia's legal framework
was also poor. Given President Yudhoyono's concerns about
maintaining his popular support, some Muslim groups had been
able to slow down attempts to strengthen Indonesia's CT laws.
BG Chee commented favorably on Vice President Kalla's
efforts to encourage moderate Muslim clerics in Indonesia to
get together and speak out against extremists and terrorism.
This was a more sophisticated strategy by the GOI to isolate
religious extremists and it seemed to enjoy high public
support.


9. (C) The terrorist threat remained very real in Indonesia,
cautioned BG Chee. The Jemaah Islamiya (JI) network in
Indonesia had "morphed" and had changed its operational
style. Instead of mass attacks that killed too many Muslims,
JI had turned to more targeted suicide bombings. ISD
Director Pang Kin Keong said the GOS was watching the
development of other militant groups in Indonesia, some of
which shared a similar ideology with JI but hadn't attacked
any international targets yet. Some of these groups had
provided assistance to JI, he claimed. Terrorists continued
to use the Sulawesi Sea area to move people and goods between
southern Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia, BG Chee said.
The GOS hoped to get a better understanding on what was
happening in this area. Stemming the terrorist traffic would
be difficult due to official corruption, the ease of evading
immigration controls, and geography.


10. (C) In the Philippines, the main obstacle to CT efforts
was poor governance, commented BG Chee. The GOS had found
people it could work with in the Philippine military and
security agencies, but the political situation in the country
didn't allow more systematic progress. Given its size and
proximity, Indonesia was Singapore's primary concern for
terrorism. For Southeast Asia in general, however, the
Philippines was a bigger problem, concluded BG Chee. The
government there was not pursuing terrorist groups as
aggressively as it should.


11. (C) The violence in southern Thailand was due to
historical separatist grievances, argued BG Chee. While

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there were no signs of foreign involvement or religious
ideology behind the violence, that could change, he warned.
Foreigners could join the fight with their own ideology; many
of the separatist leaders had religious backgrounds and could
become more sympathetic to the global jihadist movement.
Separatists hadn't shifted their attacks to foreign targets,
attacked outside the south, or used suicide bombers -- all
key indicators that hadn't been "breached" yet, noted BG
Chee.


12. (C) The Malaysian security agencies had a good grasp on
the terrorist threat, commented BG Chee. He cautioned,
however, that Islamic issues were more sensitive and
politicized in Malaysia than Indonesia. Both the ruling UMNO
and opposition PAS parties had put religious issues "front
and center."

CT in Singapore
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13. (C) ISD Director Pang told DAS John that he didn't deny
that some of "our own Muslims" in Singapore might be
"sympathetic" and "susceptible to terrorist ideology." The
GOS was confronting the terrorist threat on two fronts.
First, the GOS used a "low threshold" to take action. If an
individual embraced an extremist ideology, Pang said, "I will
bring him in and evaluate him." Instead of focusing on just
terrorist group members, the GOS would "go upstream" to
identify potential terrorist recruits and take action.
Second, the GOS had an active community education program to
encourage Muslim religious leaders to preach a moderate
ideology and say why the extremists were wrong. In the end,
to succeed, it would be necessary to "make the ideology die."


14. (U) DAS John has cleared this message.
HERBOLD