Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SINGAPORE3591
2006-11-10 09:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Singapore
Cable title:  

LEE KUAN YEW DISCUSSES THAILAND'S FUTURE

Tags:  PREL PGOV SN TH 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 100904Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
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INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 2349
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 3985
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 5515
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 003591 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SN TH
SUBJECT: LEE KUAN YEW DISCUSSES THAILAND'S FUTURE

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SINGAPORE 003591

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV SN TH
SUBJECT: LEE KUAN YEW DISCUSSES THAILAND'S FUTURE

Classified By: Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold; reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

1.(C) SUMMARY: Singapore Minister Mentor (MM) Lee Kuan Yew
told visiting Ambassador Boyce November 6 of his concern that
the Thai King's deteriorating health might undermine
Thailand's political stability. The Crown Prince was a
"disaster" and not ready to lead, he added. Former PM
Thaksin should have been more patient and heeded the
monarchy's prestige before attempting to consolidate power.
Fearing a Thaksin political revival, the Bangkok elite and
military might now promote a return to the pre-1997
Constitution with its weak political parties. Ambassador
Boyce responded that democratic institutions were now too
well-established for Thailand to revert completely. He and
MM Lee agreed that the international community should remain
engaged with Thailand and help it back to democracy. END
SUMMARY.

2.(U) During his November 6 visit to Singapore, U.S.
Ambassador to Thailand, Ralph L."Skip" Boyce, accompanied by
Ambassador Patricia L. Herbold and poloff (notetaker),met
privately with Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew.

--------------
The King is the Key
--------------


3. (C) MM Lee said he understood King Bhumiphol's health to
be poor, despite the Palace's public statements that he was
well and would reign for many more years. If the King's
health deteriorated further, he would not be able to
stabilize the political situation, MM Lee said. The King had
not "eased the mantle of succession" onto Crown Prince Maha
Vajiralongkorn because the Crown Prince was "a disaster" and
not capable of leading Thai society.


4. (C) MM Lee argued that the King's popularity undermined
the ability of Thais to adopt "culturally and mentally" the
democratic principle of "one man one vote"; the obeisance
paid to the Royal Family by elite civil servants,
politicians, and the military fostered an attitude of "first
among equals" and allowed the elite to feel justified in
marginalizing the common Thai. According to MM Lee, former
PM Thaksin was a threat to the monarchy and, by extension, to
the Bangkok elite because he sought to concentrate power in

his own hands. Thaksin's downfall was a result of a "lack of
patience"; he should have just "waited the King out" and
allowed the monarchy to fade away. The Crown Price would not
have had the moral authority to counter Thaksin.

--------------
Return of Thaksin?
--------------


5. (C) The Bangkok elite should have found a different way to
disqualify Thaksin from office, MM Lee said. While Prime
Minister Surayud and the military council may not intend to
hold on to political power, Thaksin's continued presence in
the region and his popularity in Northern Thailand made his
political return a real possibility after civilian government
was reinstated. MM Lee observed that a fear of Thaksin's
return might prompt the Bangkok elite to scrap the 1997
constitution in order to prevent Thaksin's return to power.
Lee believed that, given the chance, Thaksin could still
reassemble his political machine, because "money talks" in
Thailand, and the main opposition Democrat Party had failed
to capitalize on Thaksin's downfall.


6. (C) MM Lee asked about rumors that Thaksin was behind
underground movements in the North, where his strongest
supporters were. Ambassador Boyce said the USG had little
information to support that. He suspected the junta was
imagining stronger pro-Thaksin undercurrents in the North
than what might really exist. The Ambassador noted that
corruption investigations into Thaksin's activities while he
was still PM had as yet revealed little.

--------------
Engagement, Not Alienation
--------------


7. (C) MM Lee believed it was important for the
international community, especially the United States, to
engage with rather than alienate PM Surayud and the Thai
junta. "Black-ball" tactics with Surayud would not bring

SINGAPORE 00003591 002 OF 002


democracy back to Thailand. He supported the EU boycott of
the installation of the interim assembly as a strong message
to neighboring countries that such coups would not be met
with complacency. He expressed concern that some in
Indonesia would use Thailand as an excuse to subvert that
country's democratic institutions just when it had a real
chance to establish a lasting democracy.

--------------
Back to Square One
--------------


8. (C) MM Lee lamented that Thailand was now "back to square
one." While Thaksin was corrupt, he was "competent," and
major projects were completed under his leadership. The new
Bangkok International Airport "would never have gotten off
ground" without Thaksin. Pointing to Exxon-Mobil's decision
to invest USD6 billion in Singapore rather then Thailand, MM
Lee said Singapore had a competitive advantage because of
corruption in neighboring countries. MM Lee believed the
Thai political elite would choose to go back to the pre-1997
constitution with its numerous small parties, rather than
"submerging" their personal interests to the greater good.

--------------
Economy to Remain Unchanged
--------------


9. (C) Ambassador Boyce expressed optimism that Thailand
would return to "business as usual" because it was a stable
society. The junta and Surayud did not have larger
ambitions, and the economy was doing fine. He believed that
a return to the pre-1997 constitution could potentially spark
demonstrations; democratic institutions had progressed too
far for Thailand to revert to the previous regime.


10. (C) Lee observed that Thailand had instituted enough
market economy reforms that it would not return to a
"sufficiency" economy (an economic model promoted by the
King). As an experienced businessman, Thaksin had brought
economic growth to Thailand, and the average Thai in Bangkok
(i.e. urbanites) would not want to go back to a "sufficiency"
economy. Unlike other coup-prone countries, Thailand had
cultivated a large educated middle class, Lee added. Many
among the middle class had studied in the United States and
thus helped promote an economy based on American practices.
HERBOLD