SINGAPORE'S RESPONSE TO U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SINGAPORE 001795

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NEA/IR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IR SN
SUBJECT: SINGAPORE'S RESPONSE TO U.S. STATEMENT ON IRAN

REF: A. STATE 87682

B. STATE 89325

Classified By: Economic/Political Counselor Laurent D. Charbonnet for r
easons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: On June 1, the Economic and Political
Counselor called on Tan Yee Woan, Director of the
International Organisations Directorate of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, to discuss Secretary Rice's May 31 statement
on Iran. Tan expressed interest in the United States' new
approach, and asked for further details on the benefits the
United States is offering Iran. She also offered insight
into the dynamics of the recent NAM conference and urged the
EU and the United States to strengthen their outreach to
non-aligned countries. End summary.


2. (C) Per reftel, EPCouns outlined the United States' offer
to join the EU3's negotiations with Iran if Iran verifiably
ceases its enrichment activities, emphasizing that the
benefits of these negotiations could go beyond civil nuclear
energy and include greater economic cooperation; he urged
Singapore to publicly support this initiative. Tan welcomed
this new approach, but asked what specific benefits the
United States was offering, particularly with regard to the
EU3's earlier offer of a light water reactor. Tan urged the
United States to be as specific as possible with regard to
the technology we are offering, as it was not nuclear energy
per se, but access to technology that is at issue in the NAM.
She said that Iran's tactic in the NAM has been to convince
developing countries that the United States and the EU are
treating them as "second class citizens" by denying them
access to the nuclear technology that is their "right."
Being clear about the technology we are offering, Tan said,
could allay some of these concerns.


3. (C) Tan, who had attended the NAM conference in Putrajaya,
Malaysia as a part of the Singapore delegation headed by MFA
Second Permanent Secretary Bilahari Kausikan, noted that
Iran's efforts to emphasize the right to nuclear technology
without reference to related obligations had been clearly
reflected in the NAM statement. She noted that Singapore had
been surprised that the many countries who expressed
dissatisfaction with the statement in the corridors had
failed to speak up during the meeting, despite the fact that
several had voted for the February 4th IAEA Board of
Governors (BOG) resolution on Iran or were aligned with the
United States. Specifically, she mentioned:

-- Egypt: despite having voted for the BOG resolution, Egypt
made several comments in favor of Iran and stated that any
country trying to inject balance into the statement was "not
helpful."

-- Indonesia: the Indonesian delegation was largely silent,
except for encouraging the NAM to not deviate from the Vienna
position.

-- Zambia: argued that any proposal made by only one country
(e.g., Singapore) should be excised.

-- South Africa: stated that any delegation trying to change
or "balance" the NAM statement in Vienna was "negotiating in
bad faith."

-- India and Pakistan: only made statements emphasizing that
any obligations under the NPT apply only to states parties.

-- Ghana: while Ghana privately acknowledged difficulties
with the text, their delegation told the Singaporeans they
were unwilling to argue publicly with South Africa, but would
speak with them in private. However, Tan noted, if they did
privately try to convince South Africa, it had little effect.

-- Chile and Peru: showed up only to declare that they did
not support a NAM statement on Iran, then left.

-- Jamaica: was initially helpful, but seemed to change their
position mid-stream. Tan said it was not clear if they had
gotten new instructions from their capital, or if they had
just noted the lack of support for Singapore's position and
decided to back off. When Singapore told Jamaica of their
intention to issue an explanation of vote, Jamaica initially
indicated they would do the same, but ultimately did not.

-- Malaysia: Tan said that the Malaysians had been somewhat
helpful during the negotiation of the text, but seemed
unwilling to check or contradict the Iranians. For example,
the Malaysians had told the Singapore delegation that Iran
had asked them and the NAM troika to initiate the statement,
but did not contradict the Iranian delegation in the meeting
when it stated that the statement was not Iran's idea. Also,
the Malaysian chair had agreed to give Singapore the floor to
make a statement explaining their vote after the adoption of
the statement, but when the time came, pointedly ignored the
Singapore delegation until it vociferously demanded the
floor.


4. (C) Tan expressed frustration that NAM countries had
allowed such a statement, which implies consensus within the
NAM -- except for Singapore -- when this is far from the
case. Such a statement also bolsters Iran's efforts to make
this about the West's supposed efforts to deny the developing
world access to technology, which will make progress on our
nonproliferation goals harder. The European Union and the
United States need to make a more sustained and concerted
effort to talk to the members of the NAM, she argued. Most
members of the NAM do not care about legal obligations, she
noted -- these countries sign onto all sorts of treaties and
agreements with no real intention of implementing them. Many
also do not want to be seen as not supporting another NAM
member. Despite this, she said, many NAM members are not
supportive of Iran, and could have been persuaded to do the
right thing, had they been pushed. Tan noted, for example,
that she had received our demarche on the NAM statement only
two or three days prior to the NAM meeting in Malaysia, which
is far too little notice, particularly given that some NAM
delegations would have already left their capitals for
Malaysia at that time. She urged the United States and the
EU to be more active in working this issue with the
developing world.


HERBOLD