SCENESETTER FOR COMMERCE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

UNCLAS SINGAPORE 001530

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR A/S DARRYL JACKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ETTC PREL ETRD KSTC SN
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR COMMERCE ASSISTANT SECRETARY
DARRYL JACKSON'S VISIT TO SINGAPORE


1. (SBU) We look forward to your May 23-25 visit to
Singapore. Your meetings with key Singapore government
officials are an important opportunity to solidify our
deepening cooperative relationship on developing and
enforcing trade controls and combating proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their components. Your visit
should encourage Singapore to take further steps to expand
the scope of its trade control regime to ensure that
proliferators and terrorists do not misuse its port.

A Strong Partner
--------------


2. (SBU) Our bilateral ties with Singapore are at a
historical high point -- in particular our security
relationship. Counterterrorism cooperation has been
especially close. Singapore is also home to a U.S. military
logistics hub, and has strongly supported our actions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. In July 2005, President Bush and Prime
Minister Lee signed the Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA)
to expand our military and counterterrorism ties; the
agreement specifically notes the importance of enhanced
cooperation on nonproliferation and export controls.


3. (SBU) Counterproliferation and export controls are a new
and rapidly growing facet to our security relationship.
Singapore strongly supports the United States, global
nonproliferation agenda and trade security initiatives. It
was the first country in the region to join the Container
Security Initiative (CSI) (2002) and the Megaports Initiative
(2005),and it participates enthusiastically in the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Singapore has
worked with us in the IAEA Board of Governors to hold Iran
accountable for its violations of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. In 2003 it instituted a new
strategic goods control law that imposes controls on a range
of sensitive goods and technology, including transshipment
cargoes. Since then, our bilateral cooperation on countering
proliferation has grown substantially, and Singapore has
improved its own enforcement efforts through strengthened
regulations, extensive training for its customs and
checkpoints officials, and improved cooperation with other
countries, including the United States.

Next Steps
--------------


4. (SBU) While these measures are a vast improvement, the
legal framework provided by Singapore's strategic goods
control law still falls short of international best practices
and has hindered efforts to improve law enforcement
cooperation on proliferation matters. Singapore does not yet
adhere to key multilateral control regimes such as the
Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group,
and controls only a subset of the items controlled by these
regimes. Singapore also does not collect manifest data on
transshipment or transit shipments (80 percent of the
containers passing through the port) unless they are bound
for the United States (under CSI). Law enforcement
cooperation is good, but is hampered by the Singapore
government's resistance to sharing law enforcement
information and the absence of a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty. The United States and Singapore have been discussing
an MLAT for four years, but our approaches remain far apart.


5. (SBU) Singapore is interested in addressing these
shortfalls, and in October 2005 the United States and
Singapore held a bilateral dialogue on improving our
counterproliferation cooperation. Singapore has stated its
intention to improve its export controls and adhere to the
multilateral regimes, but has identified several areas where
it lacks the technical expertise, experience, or processes
necessary to effectively enforce its current -- and
eventually expanded -- export control laws. It has asked the
United States for assistance in addressing these gaps,
particularly in helping licensing enforcement officials
better understand nuclear and dual-use commodities, so they
can better identify products requiring a license and pursue
violations when they occur.


6. (SBU) The United States and Singapore have agreed to
pursue an aggressive training program -- including programs
run by the State Department, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Customs and Border Protection, the Department of
Defense, and the FBI -- for Singapore Customs and other
security agencies aimed to improve their ability to
understand, recognize, and control Strategic Goods.
Singapore officials have been enthusiastic participants in
all of the courses offered thus far, and they will be eager

to learn from you about how your organization balances the
need to control strategic goods with the need to facilitate
legitimate trade. They will also benefit from discussions
about the actual mechanisms of reviewing and approving
license applications.


7. (SBU) Themes for your meetings include:

-- Exchanging best practices on export control implementation;
-- Expanding the scope of Singapore's control laws;
-- Improving export control mechanisms; and
-- Exploring further areas of cooperation.
HERBOLD