Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SHANGHAI7044
2006-11-13 09:17:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Consulate Shanghai
Cable title:  

SHANGHAI SCHOLARS ON CROSS-STRAITS RELATIONS

Tags:  PGOV PREL CH TW 
pdf how-to read a cable
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RR RUEHCN RUEHGH
DE RUEHGH #7044/01 3170917
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 130917Z NOV 06
FM AMCONSUL SHANGHAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5247
INFO RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 5554
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0302
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 0284
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0388
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 0305
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 0289
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 007044 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS ON CROSS-STRAITS RELATIONS

REF: SHANGHAI 7043

CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Tarnowka, Section Chief, Political/Economic
Section, U.S. Consulate Shanghai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SHANGHAI 007044

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/CM
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL CH TW
SUBJECT: SHANGHAI SCHOLARS ON CROSS-STRAITS RELATIONS

REF: SHANGHAI 7043

CLASSIFIED BY: Mary Tarnowka, Section Chief, Political/Economic
Section, U.S. Consulate Shanghai.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) Summary: Several prominent Shanghai-based cross-Straits
scholars told visiting EAP Political Officers during meetings on
November 1-3 that domestic political turmoil in Taiwan would
continue and would prevent any breakthroughs on cross-Straits
issues for the foreseeable future. The scholars expected
President Chen Shui-Bian to use constitutional reform to push
independence and provoke the mainland. They expected Beijing to
react strongly only if the constitutional reform process touched
on territorial issues, but acknowledged that Beijing would view
with suspicion any proposal initiated by the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP). Scholars expressed skepticism about Ma
Ying-jeou's chances for the 2008 Presidential election, with
some noting that even if Ma did win the Presidency, it would be
difficult for him to overcome DPP opposition and improve
cross-Straits relations. End Summary.



--------------

DPP Constitutional Reforms

--------------




2. (C) During a November 1 meeting with visiting EAP Political
Officers Chernawsky and Longenecker, Shanghai Institute for East
Asian Studies (SIEAS) Director Zhang Nianchi predicted that
Taiwan domestic politics would continue to be polarized in the
next two years. He said that neither the DPP nor the KMT were
united and that party infighting had led to a more combative and
unpredictable political environment. The DPP was pushing issues
such as constitutional reform and UN membership to provoke a
reaction from Beijing and gain more support from voters. Zhang
anticipated the DPP would press for referenda on these topics
and thought the high Taiwan public support for returning to the
UN would make this a particular flash point for Beijing.
Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences (SASS) Vice President Huang
Renwei, during his meeting with EAP Political Officers on
November 2, shared similar views. Huang said President Chen
Shui-bian had realized after the demonstrations against him that

his time was extremely limited. He needed to find a way to
catch up and was using the "extreme" independence issue to
appeal to deep Green voters and reorganize his power base. Only
by provoking a crisis, could President Chen regain political
support. Huang expected President Chen would continue to push
independence and trigger a crisis with the mainland in the next
two years.




3. (C) Shanghai's Taiwan scholars were concerned about DPP
efforts to reform the constitution and believed that these
efforts were aimed not at improving the government but
establishing independence. SIEAS Zhang said he had reviewed
many of the reform proposals. While some were innocuous, others
touched on sensitive issues. Furthermore, the process of
constitutional reform itself was dangerous. Zhang said 130 of
the 175 articles of the constitution were under consideration
for revision. If the Taiwan government revised 130 articles, it
would be difficult to claim that the revised constitution was
the same as the old constitution. In addition, the existing
constitution represented Chinese people on the mainland and
Taiwan. With such revisions approved only by the population of
Taiwan, one could not say such a revised constitution
represented all of China. Finally, Taiwan could argue that only
an independent country could change its constitution and by
changing its constitution it was de facto independent. Both
Zhang and Huang were worried that Chen would be able to force
changes by using a "two step forward, one step back" method.
The DPP could propose a compromise which would appear acceptable
when contrasted with President Chen's radical proposals, but
which would still include major steps toward Taiwan
independence. Huang noted that while a moderate proposal might
be more acceptable, any proposal that touched on territorial
issues, no matter how moderate, was still dangerous.




4. (C) Taiwan Research Center Executive Vice President Yan
Anlin, in a discussion on November 1, was also wary of the DPP.
He said the DPP leaders were experts at "word games" and worried

SHANGHAI 00007044 002 OF 003


that the DPP would be able to trick the United States into
accepting dangerous constitutional reforms. For example, when
President Chen Shui-bian froze the National Unification Council
(NUC) and National Unification Guidelines (NUG),he used a
Chinese word that meant both "to freeze" and "to cancel." To
Chinese people, President Chen had cancelled the NUG, while to
Americans he had just frozen the process. Yan said the DPP was
attempting to do the same thing with the constitution. He heard
that it would change the preamble and replace any reference to
the Republic of China with "wo guo" (our country). While to
Americans, this might seem harmless, to Chinese people this was
a clear indication that Taiwan was different from the mainland.




5. (C) Zhang, Huang, and Yan all suggested that China would
accept constitutional reforms if it these reforms did not touch
on territorial or independence issues. SIEAS Zhang added that
KMT support for any constitutional changes was necessary for
passage. Zhang noted that the KMT also supported constitutional
reform but said that KMT goals were different from the DPP, and
were focused on good governance and supporting unification. A
KMT proposal would generally be viewed with an open mind,
whereas any proposal from the DPP would be treated with
suspicion.



--------------

KMT Internal Politics, Ma's Troubles

--------------




6. (C) Like Beijing scholars, Shanghai scholars were concerned
about KMT Chairman Ma's declining popularity and unsure Ma would
be able to win the Presidency in 2008. Zhang said Ma had failed
to come up with a "new direction" for Taiwan to distinguish his
party from the DPP. He had also lost support because of his
handling of the anti-Chen Shui-bian protests. Zhang predicted
that Ma would not be able to resolve his differences with
Legislative Yuan Speaker Wang Jin-pyng and People First Party
(PFP) Chairman James Soong and unite the Pan-Blue camp. SIIS
Department of American Studies Director Chen Dongxiao provided a
similar view during a meeting on November 1. According to Chen,
Ma's leadership was eroded by his hesitation and capriciousness.
His lack of resolution had led to suspicions within the
Pan-Blue faction and prevented Ma from uniting the camp. Chen
saw Soong as still an important challenge to Ma's leadership.
According to Huang, Ma was a good man, but did not have the
ability to lead in a crisis situation.




7. (C) Zhang said that even if Ma won the election, he would
face many difficulties and be largely ineffective. According to
Zhang, because Taiwan domestic politics had become extremely
polarized, the opposition party often had a lot of power. If Ma
became president, he would not be able to make any compromises
or begin negotiations on cross-Straits issues because of DPP
opposition. Huang had a similar view and added that while Ma
might be able to resolve the three links problem, he would not
be able to make any progress on significant political issues.
Huang also said that if DPP Premier Su Tseng-chang became
President, he would only be able to resolve some of the three
links issues, but similarly would not be able to make any
significant political progress.



--------------

Arms Procurement Bill Politics

--------------




8. (C) Shanghai scholars noted AIT Director Young's comments
urging Taiwan pass the arms procurement bill. Zhang said that
these comments were understandable since the United States was
in the middle of an election season, but warned that such

SHANGHAI 00007044 003 OF 003


comments had a negative effect on cross-Straits relations.
Huang asked whether Director Young's comments were aimed at
testing Ma's leadership and probed whether the United States had
lost its trust in Ma.



--------------

Beijing's Position Towards Taiwan

--------------




9. (C) Huang said that Beijing would continue its policy of
non-interference in Taiwan domestic politics. Beijing had
learned its lesson that threatening Taiwan was
counterproductive. Huang was worried, however, that if Beijing
maintained its silence and did not react, this could lead Chen
Shui-bian to become even more aggressive and radical.
Nonetheless, he stressed that Beijing was not interested in
military confrontation. Zhang said Beijing did not have a
timeline for reunification. It understood that unification
would take a long time and needed to be mutually agreed to by
both sides. Zhang also argued that the United States and China
should discuss what should count as pro-independence steps
within Taiwan's constitutional reform process and what should be
considered as the "status quo."




10. (C) EAP Political Officers cleared this report.
JARRETT