ROK OFFICIALS DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN SUPPORT OF WMD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000990

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

OSD/ISP FOR COOPER AND JEFFERSON, JCS FOR MCCARTHY AND
DOYLE, DIA FOR HEIL, NSC FOR CHA AND STEPHENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC KNNP KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK OFFICIALS DISCUSS NEXT STEPS IN SUPPORT OF WMD
INTERDICTION IN MARCH 8 MEETING WITH PSI OPERATIONAL EXPERTS

Classified By: POL M/C JOSEPH Y. YUN. REASONS 1.4 (B, D).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) In a March 8 meeting with ROKG counterparts in Seoul,
a U.S. inter-agency Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
team briefed South Korean officials on the operational
aspects of PSI and recent trends in proliferation. The ROK
delegation summarized the factors that led Seoul to accept
five elements from Washington's eight-point proposal for
cooperating in PSI activities and briefed the U.S. delegation
on South Korea's enhanced export control regime. During the
Q and A session, the ROK officials raised questions on the
compatibility of PSI activities with existing international
law, global support for PSI, and details related to
interdiction operations and exercises. They stated firmly
that Seoul would incorporate WMD-related interdiction
components into existing U.S.-ROK military exercises only
within the context of wartime scenarios. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On March 8, OSD Director for Nonproliferation Policy
David Cooper and a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
inter-agency team met with counterparts from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and a broad range of other
relevant ROKG ministries (list of U.S. and ROK participants
at para 13). The plenary session lasted nearly four hours,
with two briefings from key members of the U.S. team, one
briefing from the ROK side, and an active question and answer
session. Director Kwon Hee-seog of MOFAT's Disarmament and
Nonproliferation Division headed the ROK team.

U.S./UN INITIATIVES CONSIDERED IN REACHING PSI DECISION
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3. (C) Kwon welcomed the U.S. delegation and opened by
summarizing the chain of events since 2003 that directly
influenced the ROK's decision to accept five elements among
the eight-point proposal for ROK cooperation in PSI
activities, which U/S Robert Joseph delivered in August 2005.
The ROKG noted that the March 2005 report by UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan and the December 2004 report by the UN
SecGen's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
both encouraged states' participation in PSI. Following U/S
Joseph's visit, the ROKG had also taken into consideration
the recent amendments to the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation
(SUA Convention),the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540, and
PSI participation by neighboring countries in the
Asia-Pacific region. Subsequently, Deputy Minister for
Policy Planning Chun Yung-woo (recently named ROK lead
negotiator for the Six Party Talks),during his January visit
to Washington, conveyed to U/S Joseph Seoul's decision to
accept five elements from the U.S. August proposal.

ROK'S CAUTIOUS APPROACH DUE TO N-S RELATIONS
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4. (C) Kwon, underscoring that the ROK shared Washington's
objective of combating illicit WMD trade, stated that the ROK
was cognizant of the growing need for an enforcement
mechanism for international norms on disarmament,
nonproliferation, and arms control beyond effective export
controls and recognized interdiction and PSI as the
preeminent tool in this area. As such, the ROK would examine
each invitation for its participation in specific PSI
interdiction operations and exercises on a case-by-case basis
and cooperate within possible parameters. Kwon stressed,
however, that the ROK had to be cautious in its PSI
participation in light of sensitivities in inter-Korean
relations. Moreover, Kwon stressed, the ROK would continue
to contribute to various international efforts to halt the
spread of WMD regardless of its position on PSI.

PSI COMPLEMENTS NATIONAL COUNTERPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS
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5. (C) Dr. Cooper noted that the ROK's decision to accept
elements from the eight-point proposal was a positive
development and a move welcomed by the USG. He pointed out

that PSI complemented existing national and multilateral
measures for curbing the spread of WMD. Rather than
replacing existing national programs, PSI provided a
framework for individual countries to make a contribution
with their national programs to the larger global effort.
This was consistent with UNSC Resolution 1540, which stated
that combating the illicit trafficking of WMD was a
responsibility for all UN members.

MOFAT FOCUSES ON PSI LEGALITY
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6. (C) MOFAT officials began the Q and A session by
directing questions to the relationship between PSI and
existing international law. Director Kwon asked how PSI
participants would handle flag vessels from countries, such
as North Korea, that are not party to the SUA Convention.
Deputy Director Yu Ki-jun of MOFAT's Treaties Division II
inquired about the legality of conducting air interdictions
in international airspace and maritime interdiction on the
high seas. Dr. Cooper, responding to Kwon's question on air
interdictions international airspace, noted that in practice,
aircraft involved in proliferation-related trafficking
usually had to overfly national airspace, which afforded
opportunities for countries being overflown to exercise their
sovereignty. He also underscored that an important strategy
of PSI was to limit routes for aircraft carrying WMD-related
cargoes by denying overflight permission, thus making
proliferation more costly. Cooper added that in addition to
available legal authorities, individual airlines or freight
companies could facilitate interdiction by cooperating with
national governments.


7. (C) On the issue of boarding authority for North Korean
and other foreign flagged vessels where the flag state was
not party to SUA, Cooper noted that while SUA provided an
important new international legal authority, it was not the
only basis for conducting boardings on the high seas. For
example, international law already contemplated ship
boardings in various contexts. Cooper noted that PSI
bilateral boarding agreements and the boarding cooperation
aspects of the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
(SOP),which were based on existing international law,
already afforded access opportunities to a majority of
maritime tonnage, and these opportunities were expanding as
new boarding agreements were concluded and additional
countries endorsed the PSI SOPs. Therefore, while the
example of a North Korean flagged, owned and operated ship --
traveling point-to-point on the high seas with no stops along
the way -- represented an especially challenging case, this
was not how most WMD-related transfers occurred in reality.
For potential proliferators, the cost of navigating solely
through the high seas and on ships that they flagged, owned,
and operated would be higher than other means.


8. (C) CDR Patrick McCarthy of the Office of the Legal
Counsel, JCS, stressed that each PSI participant had to honor
existing laws and regulations in the process of air
interdiction, adding that most air interdiction operations
would take place over sovereign airspace or on sovereign
land. The United States or other relevant parties would then
seek cooperation from the government of the territory in
question. McCarthy then expanded in detail on the numerous
legal authorities available to conduct both air and maritime
interdictions. ROK Deputy Director Yu (MOFAT Treaties
Division II) asserted that the new SUA provisions would not
be applicable to countries that were not party to the
convention (such as North Korea). ROK Coast Guard
Superintendent Youn Tae Ik pointed out that his agency, as
the lead for enforcement of ROK law in territorial waters,
did not currently have the legal authority to interdict
WMD-related shipments in its territorial waters (including
its Exclusive Economic Zone).

QUESTIONS ABOUT GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR PSI
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9. (C) Director Kwon asked for clarification on U.S.
assertions that "more than 70 countries supported PSI" and
Secretary Rice's May 2005 remarks that "in the last nine

SIPDIS

months alone, the United States and ten of our PSI partners
have quietly cooperated on 11 successful efforts." In
particular, he questioned whether the 70-plus countries have
all endorsed the PSI principles and noted that, based on a
non-paper received from the United States, he had concluded
that only 31 countries had actually endorsed PSI formally.
He also asserted that two of the 11 interdiction cases
referred to by Secretary Rice had supposedly involved ROK
cooperation, and that State officials had subsequently
acknowledged the veracity of ROKG assertions that those cases
had predated PSI.


10. (C) Cooper responded that the countries cited in the
non-paper were intended as illustrative. In regard to the
number of actual PSI interdictions to date, he said it was
impossible to provide a precise number because these were
often based on highly sensitive intelligence and therefore
could not be disclosed, or in some cases might not involve
the United States. The key point was that PSI was not only
about meetings and exercises, but real-world operations, and
that the direction of such operations was upward.

NEXT STEPS ON EXERCISES
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11. (C) Kwon clarified that Deputy Minister Chun, in his
January meeting with U/S Joseph had clearly stated that the
ROK would incorporate WMD-related interdiction components
into existing U.S.-ROK bilateral military exercises and
training only in wartime scenarios. Next steps on this
effort, therefore, warranted consultations between USFK and
the ROK Ministry of National Defense and ROK Army. The U.S.
delegation, which included two representatives from USFK,
pledged to begin these consultations at the earliest
opportunity. (COMMENT: This ROK restriction should not
greatly constrain bilateral exercise cooperation because
U.S.-ROK bilateral military exercises already focus on
wartime scenarios. END COMMENT.)


12. (C) Regarding ROK participation in PSI exercises as an
observer, Kwon clarified that Seoul would observe the April
air interdiction exercise in Australia and have received an
invitation to the May combined air, ground and maritime
exercise in Turkey. Kwon welcomed the U.S. delegation's
information about the upcoming April maritime exercise to be
hosted by the Netherlands, the June air exercise to be hosted
by France, and the October maritime exercise to be hosted by
the United States. Seoul had not yet decided on the other
exercises and would likely decide after observing the
exercise in Australia, but recognized the value in attending
a broad range of exercises.

PARTICIPATION
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13. (SBU)

U.S.:

Dr. David Cooper, Director for Nonproliferation Policy,
ISP/NP/NPP, OSD
Anthony Ruggiero, ISN/CPI, DOS
CDR Eugene Doyle, JCS, J-5, DDWOT
CDR Patrick McCarthy, Office of the Legal Counsel, JCS
Stephen Heil, Counterproliferation Office, DIA
Ian Jefferson, ISP/NP/NPP, OSD
COL Thomas DeVine, Deputy J-5, USFK
LTC Robert Stein, J-5, USFK
Barry Tang, ICE, DHS, Embassy Seoul
Sangmin Lee, Political Officer, Embassy Seoul

ROK:

Kwon Hee-seog, Director, Disarmament and Nonproliferation
Division, MOFAT
Shin Sung-won, Director, North America Division II, MOFAT
Youn Tae Ik, Superintendent, ROK Coast Guard
Woo Sung-kyu, Director, NSC
Yu Ki-jun, Deputy Director, Treaties Division II, MOFAT
CDR Kim Jong-Hoon, WMD Policy Division, MND

Yu Chang-ho, Deputy Director, North America Division I, MOFAT
Youn Jong Kwon, Assistant Director, Disarmament and
Nonproliferation Division, MOFAT
Ha Wie-young, Assistant Director, Task Force on the North
Korean Nuclear Issue, MOFAT
Oh Jinhee, Assistant Director, International Legal Affairs
Division, MOFAT
Jin Chang Un, Assistant Director, WMD Policy Division, MND
Kim Won-sook, Assistant Director, Immigration, Ministry of
Justice
Hur Sang Jin, Senior Inspector, ROK Coast Guard


14. (U) Dr. Cooper has cleared this message.
VERSHBOW