Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL930
2006-03-22 08:44:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

GERMAN DCM IN PYONGYANG: NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK

Tags:  PREL PGOV SOCI ECON PHUM KN 
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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0930/01 0810844
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 220844Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6770
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0325
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7193
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0408
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1126
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000930 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI ECON PHUM KN
SUBJECT: GERMAN DCM IN PYONGYANG: NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK
AS THE REGIME MOVES TO REASSERT "PERFECT CONTROL"

REF: A. SEOUL 749

B. SEOUL 657

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000930

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI ECON PHUM KN
SUBJECT: GERMAN DCM IN PYONGYANG: NO INSTABILITY IN DPRK
AS THE REGIME MOVES TO REASSERT "PERFECT CONTROL"

REF: A. SEOUL 749

B. SEOUL 657

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Klaus Wendelberger, DCM at the German Embassy in
Pyongyang, told poloff that the DPRK had moved aggressively
in recent months to reassert control of the North Korean
population, taking steps ranging from resuming control of the
rice supply to tighter limits on the flow of information,
including increased seizures of DVDs and CDs. There were no
signs of instability in North Korea but it was clear the
regime was unpopular, said Wendelberger, who echoed other
reports that North Korea's exhausted soil required increasing
inputs for a diminishing rate of return. Wendelberger
described extensive Chinese penetration of the North Korean
economy and supported the notion of funding overseas study by
young North Koreans as a way to promote positive change in
the regime. END SUMMARY.

REGIME MOVES TO REASSERT CONTROL OF THE POPULATION
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Poloff met on March 15 with Klaus Wendelberger,
Deputy Head of Mission at the German Embassy in Pyongyang, to
hear Wendelberger's impressions of his two years in the DPRK.
Wendelberger noted that in recent months the regime had
taken numerous steps to assert greater control of the
population. Security forces were significantly more visible
around Pyongyang and the reinstitution of the Public
Distribution System for rice had also increased the regime's
ability to control the people's daily lives.


3. (C) Wendelberger assessed that the decision to expel
international aid organizations was a component of this
larger effort to increase the regime's control. By
successfully addressing the population's needs when the
government was unable to do so, he reasoned, NGOs tended to
undermine the regime's authority. Moreover, many NGOs
operated in the provinces, which gave foreigners unique
insight into conditions outside Pyongyang, and gave

provincial North Koreans a rare opportunity to interact with
foreigners. The regime found both of these situations
unsettling.


4. (C) Security forces were also instituting tighter
restrictions on what travelers were allowed to bring into the
country, said Wendelberger. The police were now much more
aggressive about confiscating DVDs, CDs and other media from
outside of the DPRK. The regime had also reinstituted limits
on driving as part of an effort to curb the mobility of the
population and hinder the spread of information.

NO INSTABILITY IN A REGIME WITH PERFECT CONTROL . . .
-------------- --------------


5. (C) There were no signs of instability in North Korea,
said Wendelberger, adding that neither his Embassy nor German
NGOs had been able to substantiate press reports of
anti-regime graffiti or the desecration of photographs of Kim
Jong-il. On the contrary, the security apparatus "controlled
virtually everything" and there was "not a hint" of
opposition to the regime. The combination of the regime's
"almost perfect" control and the knowledge of any would-be
oppositionists that they would be endangering not merely
their own lives, but those of their entire families,
effectively deterred any attempt at organized opposition.

. . . BUT CONTROL DOES NOT EQUAL POPULARITY
--------------


6. (C) Nevertheless, Wendelberger said, he was convinced
that the regime was unpopular. Although North Koreans were
generally terrified at the prospect of being seen talking to
foreigners, Wendelberger described a couple of occasions when
North Koreans had quietly said to him that "we have a very,
very bad government." Wendelberger noted that he had twice
attended last fall's huge Arirang festival, held to
commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the
Korean Workers Party. At first, it had appeared that the
people were "crazy with adoration" at the appearance of Kim

Jong-il, but then Wendelberger realized that most people were
stonefaced, clapping quietly; the deafening cheers were
coming not from the crowd, but was taped applause coming
though the public address system. He added that his
interpreter had been punched by security personnel who were
enraged that Wendelberger had failed to applaud the Great
Leader.

ITS SOIL EXHAUSTED, DPRK CONSUMES ITSELF
--------------


7. (C) Wendelberger was pessimistic about the DPRK's
economic prospects. The DPRK was "consuming itself."
Seasoned aid workers who returned from the northeastern part
of the country would weep as they described the heart-rending
conditions; Wendelberger recounted personally seeing filthy
children with bloated bellies running behind a train begging
for food. He echoed ref A comment of Lindsay Skoll, British
DCM in Pyongyang, that North Korea's soil was exhausted. The
DPRK was putting "huge inputs" into agriculture for
diminishing returns. An increasing number of privileged
people were being ordered to work in the fields, said
Wendelberger, describing the Foreign Ministry as "half-empty"
during last fall's harvest season. He noted that when he had
arrived in Pyongyang in 2004, he had received frequent
inquiries from German businessmen interested in investing in
North Korea. Such queries were now virtually nonexistent.

AVERAGE INDOOR WINTER TEMPERATURE IN PYONGYANG: 50 DEGREES
-------------- --------------


8. (C) There was little evidence of serious hunger in
Pyongyang, said Wendelberger, but even there conditions were
grim. Many people would go for days without access to water;
Wendelberger described long lines of people at the local
swimming pool waiting for a chance to take a shower. Noting
that December had been the coldest on the Korean Peninsula in
decades, Wendelberger said average temperatures inside
Pyongyang apartments that month had reportedly been 8-10
degrees Celsius (46-50 degrees Fahrenheit).

CHINESE "ROLLING UP THE MARKET"
--------------


9. (C) Wendelberger concurred with reports of growing
Chinese economic penetration of North Korea, saying the PRC
was "rolling up the market," particularly in extractive
industries. Pyongyang's international trade fair in May had
been dominated by Chinese firms, which had far outnumbered
North Korean companies.

NORTH KOREANS WOULD ACCEPT U.S. SCHOLARSHIP OFFERS
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Asked about Russian academic Andrei Lankov's ref B
recommendation that the United States fund scholarships for
children of the DPRK elite, Wendelberger responded that the
DPRK would be likely to accept such a proposal, provided it
was properly packaged. He noted that Germany provided
scholarships to North Koreans; these scholarships were
typically for three to eight months, but a group of ten
architecture students were in Germany on a four-year program.
He added that the North Koreans were never permitted to
travel alone; typically a pair would be assigned to a
scholarship, although sometimes groups were larger.

VERSHBOW