Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL901
2006-03-21 07:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 17 MEETING WITH URI CHAIRMAN

Tags:  PREL PHUM EINV KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0311
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7184
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0393
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1121
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000901 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM EINV KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 17 MEETING WITH URI CHAIRMAN
CHUNG DONG-YOUNG

REF: SEOUL 827

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000901

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM EINV KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 17 MEETING WITH URI CHAIRMAN
CHUNG DONG-YOUNG

REF: SEOUL 827

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a March 17 meeting, Uri Party Chairman Chung
Dong-young pressed the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) for South
Korea and for the inclusion of Kaesong-made goods in the
U.S.-ROK FTA. On North Korea, Chung recommended de-linking
illicit DPRK activities from the Six Party Talks. The
Ambassador said he supported Korea's inclusion in the VWP and
negotiation of an FTA. The Kaesong Industrial Complex,
however, raised questions about North Korean labor
conditions, which made it hard to envision an easy solution
to its inclusion in a U.S.-ROK FTA. END SUMMARY.
.
VWP, FTA, and the Alliance
--------------


2. (C) After exchanging pleasantries, Uri Chairman Chung
Dong-young asked the Ambassador to consider South Korea for
the Visa Waiver Program. The Ambassador responded that this
was something that he wanted to see accomplished. South
Korean admission to the VWP along with a U.S.-ROK Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) would demonstrate that bilateral relations
had advanced to the next level. South Korea was close to
meeting the VWP refusal rate requirement and other technical
issues were being worked out. The Ambassador was optimistic
about possible South Korean VWP inclusion. He commented that
on the FTA issue, various representatives from industry were
supportive, and he was optimistic about its prospects.
Washington and Seoul shared very similar views about the
potential benefits of the FTA. The Ambassador said that he
and his ROK counterpart, Ambassador Lee Tae-shik, planned to
go on a joint speaking tour in May in the United States to
promote the FTA and the overall U.S.-ROK bilateral
relationship.


3. (C) Chung noted that there were many difficult issues in
the bilateral relationship, but South Korea was moving
forward to resolve them. Washington and Seoul had made
progress on issues such as USFK realignment, the ROK dispatch
of troops to Iraq, FTA discussions, and the strategic
flexibility concept because there was a certain level of

trust between Seoul and Washington. For the past 53 years,
the Mutual Defense Treaty was the main pillar of the
bilateral relationship. Once the FTA was accomplished, there
would be a second major pillar that would support the
relationship for the next 50 years.


4. (C) The Ambassador said that resolution of the strategic
flexibility issue was good news, despite some negative
publicity in the ROK based on a misunderstanding of the
impact of the agreement. USFK was continuing to work with
ROKG counterparts to resolve the environmental aspects
related to the return of some USG military facilities to the
Korean side. The Ambassador said he hoped press reports
would not be too sensationalized. Regarding the discussion
on the transfer of wartime operational command, Washington
and Seoul needed to work as privately as possible to avoid
allowing the press to negotiate for us. USFK Commander
General Bell had some good ideas for arriving at a mutually
beneficial result, the Ambassador noted.
.
NORTH KOREA
--------------


5. (C) The North Korean issue involved more than just the
alliance because we also needed to convince the DPRK side.
The Ambassador stressed that the USG sought an early DPRK
return to the Six Party Talks (6PT). The 6PT forum could
achieve more than just resolution of the nuclear issue, since
the agenda included the issues of a peace regime and the
normalization of relations with the North.


6. (C) Chung interjected that we needed to keep the 6PT
separate from other issues including illicit activities, and
this was why the recent U.S.-DPRK meeting in New York carried
a great significance. Chung said that at the inter-Korean
ministerial meetings in December, his last as Unification

Minister, he had made three points to his North Korean
counterpart: (1) the DPRK should not link the 6PT with other
issues; (2) illegal DPRK activities were unacceptable and
must be resolved; and (3) human rights should be addressed.
Chung elaborated that there had been an EU-DPRK dialogue on
human rights, and perhaps this could be restarted. Chung
stressed that his North Korean interlocutors did not walk out
of the talks and instead indicated they would report his
points to their superiors, which Chung believed was a
promising sign.


7. (C) The Ambassador agreed that this could be seen as a
good sign. The 6PT should not be linked with other issues,
but the forum provided an opportunity to talk about other
topics in addition to the nuclear issue, based on the
September 19 Joint Statement. Washington was prepared for an
early resumption of the 6PT and was thinking of ways to move
forward with a peace regime, normalization, and measures to
promote economic reform in North Korea. The North should
realize that delaying the 6PT was not in its interests.


8. (C) Chung assessed that Kim Jong-il knew that time was
not on his side, and barring changes, the DPRK economy would
fall further behind its neighbors. He cited Kim's recent
visit to China as significant because it reflected the
North's interest in reforming its agricultural and
information technology sectors. We should continue to use
various channels to convince Kim Jong-il of the need to make
a bold decision to reform. In response to a question about
contacts between the Uri Party and the North, Chung said the
dialogue was good. The North Koreans felt comfortable that
the Uri Party was not trying to cause the DPRK to collapse,
so they sought to build trust with Uri officials. Chung
stressed that the Uri Party would endeavor to convince the
North to make the decision to reform.
.
Human Rights and the KIC
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador remarked that the Kaesong Industrial
Complex (KIC) was receiving more international attention, but
this might be a mixed blessing for the ROKG. Some were
asking questions about labor conditions and whether the DPRK
workers were receiving their full wages. Washington and
Seoul needed to maintain close contact on this issue to
ensure that North Korea received the right message.
Hopefully, Kim Jong-il's visit to China would have a positive
effect on his decisions. It seemed, however, that Kim's
priority remained political control rather than the economic
reforms that were needed to improve the lives of the North
Korean people.


10. (C) Chung said that as we entered discussions on an FTA,
he hoped we could address rules of origin issues to allow ROK
companies that used South Korean inputs to build products in
the KIC for export to the United States. Chung said that
during his visit to Washington, he had discussed with U.S.
Commerce officials his desire for U.S. companies to open KIC
operations and that the Deputy Secretary of Commerce had
responded that there were no obstacles for U.S. investment in
the KIC, although firms would need to comply with limits on
technological transfers. Chung also claimed that senior
Chinese party officials had expressed a desire to visit KIC
and perhaps support PRC business operations in the KIC.


11. (C) The Ambassador responded that inclusion of the KIC
in the FTA was complicated. Technical solutions to rules of
origin might exist, but questions over human rights and
whether the KIC served to support the Kim Jong-il regime were
also significant. The Ambassador was not optimistic that
there would be an easy solution. It would be better if ROK
companies could provide wages directly to their North Korean
workers. Acknowledging that the ROKG was already trying to
address the issue of providing wages to the workers directly
(reftel),the Ambassador said that until there was progress
on such issues, the KIC would continue to have critics as
well as supporters in the United States.


12. (C) Chung said that the 6,200 North Korean workers in
the KIC received about $57.50 dollars a month, so the North
was receiving around $400,000 a month. In comparison, for
the Kumgang tourism project, the North received $50 per

tourist for a three-day, two-night trip. Chung concluded
that for the same amount of money, the South got more bang
for its buck with the KIC project. Chung claimed that there
were two or three children of high-ranking DPRK military
officers working at the KIC. He understood that some
students at the elite Kim Il-sung University viewed KIC
employment as a good opportunity. As operations at the KIC
expanded, the number of North Korean workers could reach as
high as 700,000 by the year 2012, alongside with tens of
thousands of ROK workers, so the ripple effect in the North
would be great.


13. (C) The Ambassador expressed appreciation that the ROKG
brought up human rights with North Korean counterparts. We
needed to remind North Korea of international values and why
human rights were important. The North should agree to
receive a visit from the UN Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights in the DPRK. The DPRK had signed the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights and should behave as a member of
the international community. The Ambassador said he hoped
that the Korean Government would find it easier to talk
publicly about human rights in North Korea.
VERSHBOW