Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL900
2006-03-21 06:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMB BRIEFS CONSERVATIVE LAWMAKERS ON ALLIANCE AND

Tags:  PREL PNUC KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0900/01 0800640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210640Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6709
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0309
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7182
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0391
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP//
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000900 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: AMB BRIEFS CONSERVATIVE LAWMAKERS ON ALLIANCE AND
DPRK STRATEGY


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
-------
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000900

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PNUC KS KN
SUBJECT: AMB BRIEFS CONSERVATIVE LAWMAKERS ON ALLIANCE AND
DPRK STRATEGY


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
--------------

1. (C) Addressing a study group of Grand National Party
lawmakers on March 17, the Ambassador said that growing
military, economic and people-to-people ties indicated that,
contrary to press reports, the state of the U.S.-ROK alliance
was "confident and strong." The Ambassador said that with
regard to North Korea, while our tactics may sometimes
differ, we shared a common commitment to the Six Party
Process and the goal of a peaceful transition toward a
unified peninsula. Apparently skeptical of this positive
outcome, questions from these opposition party lawmakers
focused on contingency planning for the sudden collapse of
the DPRK. END SUMMARY.

U.S.-ROK RELATIONS
--------------


2. (U) On March 17, Ambassador Vershbow met for 90 minutes
with the "Institute of National Strategy Studies," a study
group comprised of 33 GNP National Assembly members. Rep.
Kim Moon-soo, who is presently the leading gubernatorial
candidate for Gyeonggi Province, founded this Institute.
Other prominent members include GNP Floor Leader Rep. Lee
Jae-oh.


3. (U) Evaluating the state of the U.S.-ROK relationship as
"strong and confident," the Ambassador pointed to the
alliance's record of achievements. For example, as a result
of the Future of the Alliance talks, the U.S. and the ROK
agreed to redeploy 12,500 U.S. troops out of Korea by the end
of 2008, relocate U.S. troops out of downtown Seoul and
return Yongsan Garrison to the ROKG; consolidate the
remaining 25,000 troops into two hubs south of Seoul by the
end of 2009; and transfer several military missions to the
ROK military.


4. (U) Moving to the economic relationship, the Ambassador
underscored the strength of the economic and trade
relationship and spoke of the compelling benefits to be
gained by both sides should agreement on an FTA be achieved.
He praised the ROKG for its seriousness of purpose in
addressing these issues and said the FTA would represent an
historic achievement in our economic relationship. The
Ambassador also cited the importance of human ties between
the two nations and shared his hope that, just as the FTA

agreement would form the basis for the U.S.-ROK economic
relationship in the 21st century, the roadmap toward the Visa
Waiver Program would lay the basis for expanded
people-to-people ties.


5. (U) North Korea, said the Ambassador, presented the
greatest challenge. He emphasized that while the ROK and the
U.S. might differ on some details and tactics, there was no
gap in basic objectives. He said that both countries agreed
that the Six Party Talks were the best way to denuclearize
North Korea and open the way to a normal relationship with
the DPRK. The governments remained committed to the Six
Party Talks and both wanted to see the commitments contained
in the September 19 Joint Statement implemented soon. The
Ambassador also briefed the lawmakers on the March 7 meeting
in New York, stating that the "constructive and
business-like" meeting with the North Koreans was a useful
opportunity to reiterate our desire for an early resumption
of the Six Party Talks without preconditions. The Ambassador
said that we would continue to advance policies that demanded
that all governments, including Pyongyang, respect the
universal rights that belong to every human being.

LAWMAKERS PROBE FOR DPRK COLLAPSE SCENARIOS
--------------


6. (C) Questions following the Ambassador's address focused
on how the United States would handle the sudden collapse of
the DPRK regime. The Ambassador repeatedly stressed that
internal reform of the DPRK was needed in order to avoid some
of the darker scenarios of a collapse. He said the U.S. and
ROK should focus their efforts on persuading the North Korean
government to change, introduce market reforms, and
ultimately open up politically. He expressed hope that the
Six Party Talks would soon resume and that North Korea would
show that it was serious about getting rid of nuclear
weapons. The parties would then be able to engage more
directly with North Korea and encourage policy changes in the

DPRK that would help the North Korean people. The ROK and
the U.S. must plan for more difficult scenarios, he
acknowledged, but the best approach was to encourage reform
so that a peaceful transition could take place.


7. (C) Pressed on what the U.S. role would be in a collapse
scenario, the Ambassador said that the U.S. would work as
closely as possible with the ROK to bring about stability and
the establishment of democratic institutions. South Korea
would be in the lead and probably bear more of the burden
than the U.S., but the U.S would be right by the ROK's side.
Rep. Lee Jae-oh, Floor Leader (number two) of the GNP,
questioned whether the U.S. would assert military control
over North Korea like it did over the South following World
War II. The Ambassador replied that because the ROK now had
a capable military, strong political institutions, and a
stable administrative structure, the situation was totally
different. Although there might be some good reasons to work
jointly with the ROK, such as working together to eliminate
any remaining risks from the DPRK military or weapons of mass
destruction, the United States would generally view South
Korea as being in the lead.


8. (C) Rep. Ahn Myong-ok asked what plans were in place for
refugees. The Ambassador said that although the ROK would be
the lead actor, the international community would likely
provide assistance if there were any major flow of refugees.
The international community would likely move quickly to
deliver aid to North Korea to prevent people from panicking
and feeling the need to flee.

MORE CHINA AND RUSSIA ASSISTANCE WOULD BE USEFUL
-------------- ---


9. (C) The Ambassador said that prospects for change in the
DPRK would be increased if China were in closer alignment
with U.S. and ROK policy. Rep. Kim Sook-joon asked whether
U.S. and China positions were in conflict. Although China
had been helpful in the Six Party process, the Ambassador
replied, its long-term objective might be different than that
of the U.S. and the ROK. Rather than unification, China
might prefer to have a separate North Korean state as a
buffer between itself and a U.S.-allied ROK.


10. (C) Responding to Rep. Kim's follow-up question on
whether Russia or other countries could provide more
assistance, the Ambassador suggested that Russia could play a
more active role in promoting change in the DPRK, including
in the Six Party Talks. Russia could be a source for energy
assistance and could contribute to regional economic
projects. An oil or gas pipeline stretching from Russia
through the two Koreas could show the DPRK that it was better
to become integrated than remain isolated. Russia could also
serve as a positive example for the DPRK as a country that
had greatly improved the living standards of its people
through a process of structural reform.

THE U.S.-ROK MILITARY PARTNERSHIP
--------------


11. (C) Rep. Shim Jae-chul asked whether the U.S. was
satisfied with the ROK's role in the military relationship.
The Ambassador said that the U.S. was pleased with state of
ROK military modernization and that bilateral agreements to
transfer certain key missions, such as counterfire, to the
ROK had been achieved. These transfers of major
responsibilities did not diminish the U.S. commitment to
assist with the defense of the ROK; rather, they spoke well
of the health of the alliance.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) The questions posed by this particular group of GNP
lawmakers illustrate that skepticism about the health of the
U.S.-ROK relationship is persistent. Opposition legislators
are also concerned about ROKG policy toward the DPRK,
questioning the lack of reciprocity in Seoul's economic
assistance to North Korea. We expect that these misgivings
will only grow louder in the run-up to presidential elections
next year. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW