Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL875
2006-03-17 08:19:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 14 LUNCH WITH KIM GEUN-TAE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KS KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0875/01 0760819
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170819Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6673
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0288
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 5126
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0376
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD/ISA/EAP// PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000875 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 14 LUNCH WITH KIM GEUN-TAE


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000875

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MARCH 14 LUNCH WITH KIM GEUN-TAE


Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Rep. Kim Geun-tae, a senior member of the
Uri Party and a presidentiaQhopeful, told the Ambassador
March 14 that U.S. and ROK officials needed to manage more
effectively public portrayals of differences in Seoul's and
Washington's approaches to the North Korea nuclear issue. He
stressed the symbolic and tangible impact of the Kaesong
Industrial Complex (KIC) and called for the U.S.-ROK FTA to
classify KIC-made products as "made in the ROK," as was the
case under the ROK-Singapore FTA. Turning to recent
instances of rash behavior by Pyongyang, Kim believed that
the DPRK would choose to be difficult on any number of issues
in order to leverage each act into a card to be played at the
negotiating table. Finally, Kim strongly urged that
Washington play a more active role to rein in Japan on
Yasukuni and history issues. END SUMMARY.

SIX PARTY TALKS
--------------


2. (C) During a lunch hosted by the Ambassador March 14,
Rep. Kim Geun-tae warmly welcomed the Ambassador's arrival in
Seoul, saying that the Korean people hoped that the
Ambassador's previous experience in Russia and at NATO would
prove useful in the effort to end the Cold War on the Korean
Peninsula. The Ambassador observed that it was time of
transformation in the U.S.-ROK alliance and expressed hope
that transformation would also be possible U.S.-DPRK
relations.


3. (C) Kim noted that Washington and Seoul shared the same
ultimate goal for the Six Party Talks, but "obviously" had
different approaches. Diplomats on both sides must work
harder to minimize the appearance of these differences, for
public confidence was being shaken by the proliferation of
reports of differences between the two allies. Moreover, we
needed to be mindful that, while the United States and the
ROK disagreed with each other on tactics and North-South
relations were at a standstill, China was increasing its
economic influence. North-South engagement and, ultimately,
North-South reunification would enable Korea and the United
States to check China, Kim suggested.

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

--------------


4. (C) Alluding to the phased reunification process
prescribed by the Sunshine Policy, Kim said the two Koreas
were currently aspiring to recreate a Korean identity as one
people ("han minjok"),albeit living in two countries. He
asserted that reunification was the overriding ambition of
the Korean people, who, Kim remarked, had been divided not of
their own volition but by fiat of the Great Powers. The wish
for reunification thus made it difficult for the ROK to agree
with certain U.S. policies and actions regarding North Korea,
including President Bush's inclusion of North Korea in the
"axis of evil."


5. (C) The Ambassador reminded Kim that the 38th parallel
had been drawn in response to the situation on the groQ at
that time, after Stalin's expansionist moves at the end of
World War II. Turning to the current situation, the
Ambassador observed that Washington and Seoul might differ on
tactics for promoting change on the Korean Peninsula, but not
on the need for change itself. He underscored that the
United States shared the ROK's desire for a reunified Korean
Peninsula, but observed that by pursuing its nuclear
ambitions and engaging in other illicit activities, North
Korea posed a threat not to just to the ROK but to the
international community. That said, the United States
recognized that peace and stability was in its interest and
therefore wanted to see the Six Party Talks lead to greater
North-South exchanges, greater opening up in the North,
establishment of a peace regime, and normalization of
U.S.-DPRK relations. We hoped for an early resumption of the
Six Party Talks, the Ambassador said.


6. (C) Kim acknowledged that Pyongyang's behavior was often
exasperating. For instance, it had earlier in the week
unexpectedly and inexplicably canceled a long-planned
North-South ministerial. But, Kim assessed, the North
Koreans behaved in this manner because they were desperate to
turn any issue into a possible point of negotiating leverage,
beginning with their attendance at a given meeting. This
type of behavior was infuriating but, Kim said, a great
country like the United States should try to be magnanimous
in dealing with a small, desperate country like North Korea.
The Ambassador responded by emphasizing the importance of
reciprocity in North-South relations and elsewhere.


7. (C) Rep. Kim Hyeong-joo, who accompanied Kim Geun-tae,
pointed out that North Korea was caught in a dilemma because
it wanted to improve its economy while retaining its
ideology. China's solution had been to accept the argument
advanced by certain Chinese scholars that early socialism
allowed some capitalist traits. The existence of different
schools of thought had provided Chinese leaders with a create
solution. Unfortunately, Kim Hyeong-joo continued, the DPRK
was mono-ideological, making it difficult for Pyongyang to
change itself from within. Moreover, the North Korean
leadership probably feared that opening up the country would
lead to the type of crisis of legitimacy that ensued after
Gorbachev ushered in glasnost and perestroika.

KAESONG INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX
--------------


8. (C) Turning to the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC),Kim
Geun-tae made a case for allowing KIC-made products to be
classified as "Made in the ROK" for the purposes of the
U.S.-ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA). If Washington were to
agree to this, as Singapore had, it would send a positive
signal to North Korea, Kim said. He stressed that the KIC
was symbolic in that, when completed, it would house a
massive exercise in capitalism just over the DMZ, in North
Korea's second- or third-largest city. As the KIC expanded,
the North Koreans would inevitably begin to compare
themselves to their South Korean colleagues.


9. (C) The Ambassador noted that in addition to challenges
related to meeting technical standards of South Korean
content, the classification of KIC-made goods was made more
difficult by growing concerns over wage and labor practices
at the KIC.

JAPAN
--------------


10. (C) Kim raised with the Ambassador the damaging effect
wrought repeated visits to Yasukuni Shrine by PM Koizumi and
other Japanese Cabinet officials. He urged that Washington
take a more active and responsible role in censuring Japan's
behavior in this regard. Some seemed to believe that
Washington was not involved in the Yasukuni issue, but, Kim
asserted, "you are involved." The Japanese prime minister's
decision to pay homage to the 11 war criminals at Yasukuni
was an act that challenged the legitimacy of the U.S.-backed
war crimes tribunal that had convicted them, he observed.
The Ambassador pointed out that Washington could not be held
responsible for the actions of others, although we were not
indifferent to the historical issues raised by Yasukuni.
Nevertheless, we were concerned about the state of the
ROK-Japan relationship and were seeking ways to help improve
relations between our two allies.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Kim Geun-tae is one of the National Assembly's most
respected members and a perennial presidential hopeful. A
former dissident, he remains today a leader of Korea's
progressive politicians and commands intense loyalty from his
supporters. Although he has been unable thus far to extend
his voter appeal beyond his core base -- is struggling
internally and externally to compete against Chung Dong-young
-- he is widely acknowledged as a serious, thoughtful, and
consistent voice on policy issues, especially unification.
On this occasion, he was reluctant to engage on internal
politics, joking that it would give him "indigestion" so soon
after his loss to Chung in the election for Uri Party leader.
END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW