Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL862
2006-03-16 08:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

ROK-JAPAN MAR 7 STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN TOKYO: LONG

Tags:  PREL PARM MNUC JA KN KS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUL #0862/01 0750842
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160842Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6648
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0277
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7175
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0364
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1116
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000862 

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NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC JA KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK-JAPAN MAR 7 STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN TOKYO: LONG
MEETINGS WITH NO PROGRESS


Classified By: POL M/C JOSEPH Y. YUN. REASONS 1.4 (B, D).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000862

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NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC JA KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK-JAPAN MAR 7 STRATEGIC DIALOGUE IN TOKYO: LONG
MEETINGS WITH NO PROGRESS


Classified By: POL M/C JOSEPH Y. YUN. REASONS 1.4 (B, D).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In March 13-14 meetings with poloff, MOFAT and
Japanese Embassy contacts said South Korean VFM Yu
Myung-hwan's exhaustive meetings with Japanese VFM Yachi
during the March 7 ROK-Japan strategic dialogue in Tokyo
failed to result in progress on a number of bilateral and
regional issues. Yachi called on the ROK to pay greater heed
to the human rights situation in the DPRK and to exercise
caution in its economic cooperation with North Korea. He
expressed concern that Beijing and Seoul had increasingly
politicized history issues despite Japan's peaceful post-war
history, regretting that Japan had not received a fair
assessment of its peaceful intentions 60 years since World
War II. Yu responded that inter-Korean engagement was a
critical component to resolving the nuclear issue and that
the ROK's economic assistance was a humanitarian gesture
aimed at addressing famine in North Korea. Japan needed to
re-examine its understanding of history more seriously if it
were committed to improving bilateral relations with the ROK.
Continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine by PM Koizumi's
successor could seriously hinder progress in bilateral
relations, Yu cautioned.


2. (C) Both sides agreed to cooperate on expanding bilateral
cultural exchanges, working toward early resumption of the
Six Party Talks, addressing the situation in Iraq and Iran,
and examining the future of the East Asia Summit. They also
agreed to work toward a foreign ministers meeting at the May
Asia Cooperative Dialogue in Qatar. On FM Ban Ki-moon's
candidacy as UN Secretary General, Yachi directly linked
Japan's support to the ROK's support for Japan's desire for a
seat at the UN Security Council, calling for further
bilateral consultation on the issue. In a separate March 15
meeting with the Ambassador, Yu said Yachi believed Japanese
PM Koizumi would make one more visit to the Yasukuni shrine

before stepping down in September. Yu opined that Japan
would not oppose FM Ban's UNSYG candidacy for fear of
damaging bilateral relations, although his Japanese
interlocutors were non-cmmittal. END SUMMARY.
.
GRUELING ONE-DAY SCHEDULE, LENGTHY ENGAGEMENT...
-------------- ---


3. (U) On March 13, Deputy Director Kim Yong-kil of
Northeast Asia Division I, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
Trade (MOFAT),gave poloff a read-out of VFM Yu Myung-hwan's
March 6-8 visit to Tokyo. Japanese Embassy political officer
Shugo Tanaka discussed the meeting separately with poloff on
March 15. According to Kim, VFM Yu arrived the evening of
March 6 and had meetings "from sunrise to sunset" on March 7.
In the morning, he met briefly with Former Chief Cabinet
Secretary Yasuo Fukuda of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),

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Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Abe, and former Prime Minister
Yoshiro Mori. After a brief courtesy call on Foreign
Minister Taro Aso, he and Japanese VFM Shotaro Yachi held
seven hours of ROK-Japan strategic dialogue (the second since
October 2005).
.
...BUT NO SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS ON STICKY ISSUES
-------------- --


4. (C) Kim stated the two sides discussed the DPRK nuclear
program, inter-Korea relations, North Korea human rights, and
history issues, but were unable to narrow differences on
long-standing bilateral issues or on dealing with the DPRK.
Kim lamented that, consequently, they did not have sufficient
time to discuss China's growing economic and political
influence in the region, a subject that would have to await
the next round of strategic dialogue.
.
YACHI: ROK SHOULD BE PRUDENT IN APPROACH TO N-S ENGAGEMENT
-------------- --------------


5. (C) On North Korea, said Kim, Yachi conveyed Japan's
concern that the ROK received little in return for its level
of economic cooperation with Pyongyang. Absent visible and
effective reforms in North Korea, the Kaesong Industrial

Complex (KIC) and other forms of economic engagement only
served to prop up the Kim Jong-il regime. This, together
with China's assistance to the DPRK, rendered any measure to
apply pressure on Pyongyang ineffective. From Japan's point
of view, the DPRK would approach the Six Party Talks more
seriously if it no longer received assistance from the PRC
and the ROK. Economic assistance was best reserved for
discussion in the framework of the Six Party Talks.
.
N-S COOPERATION IMPORTANT FOR RESOLVING NUCLEAR ISSUE
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Yu responded that the ROK believed consistent
progress in inter-Korea relations was a crucial factor in
successfully resolving the DPRK nuclear issue. Improved
Seoul-Pyongyang ties ultimately reduced military tension on
both sides and would allow the DPRK to be more cooperative at
the Six Party Talks. The importance of the Six Party Talks
notwithstanding, easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula was
a more pressing issue for Seoul. While visible and immediate
reforms in the DPRK were desirable, the ROK believed
continued engagement with the North would eventually steer
the DPRK toward becoming a responsible state. The ROK also
based its policy of providing economic assistance to North
Korea partly out of humanitarian concerns, as alleviating
food shortages was a practical step in improving the lives
and welfare of the North Korean people. Moreover, South
Korea did not believe pressure against North Korea would be
effective in changing Pyongyang's behavior.


7. (C) According to Tanaka from the Japanese Embassy, Yu
added that North Korean citizens were increasingly aware of
the ROK's relative affluence over the DPRK, as well as South
Korean food assistance. Over time, continued contact with
visiting South Koreans and exposure to inter-Korean economic
projects like the KIC would inevitably lead to changes in
North Korean society. As such, visible reminders of South
Korea's economic superiority, such as infrastructure projects
and factories bearing South Korean identification, could act
as a catalyst for the DPRK's eventual transformation. Noting
that the ROK accounted for 60 percent of all humanitarian
assistance to North Korea and 20 percent of the DPRK's
foreign trade, Yu asserted that Seoul had clearly linked any
increase in economic cooperation to progress in the Six Party
Talks. It was, however, noteworthy that China accounted for
40 percent of North Korea's foreign trade -- twice as much as
the ROK.
.
ROK NOT IGNORING DPRK HUMAN RIGHTS, HAS A UNIQUE ROLE
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Tanaka reported that VFM Yachi cautioned the ROK not
to fall behind the international community in efforts to
improve human rights conditions in the DPRK. Japan hoped
that the ROK -- which, like Japan, had difficulties
persuading the DPRK to resolve long-standing abductee issues
-- would be more proactive on North Korea human rights. VFM
Yu stated that Seoul fully understood Tokyo's position on the
issue, stressing that the international community greatly
misunderstood the ROK's position on North Korea human rights.
The ROK did not view the human rights issue as a diplomatic
issue, but as an internal matter. Seoul therefore supported
the international community's diplomatic efforts to urge the
DPRK to improve its human rights conditions, but viewed its
own role as a provider of necessities to relieve the
suffering of the people of North Korea. By providing food
assistance and accepting North Korean refugees, the ROK
played its own part in the greater effort to address the
human rights situation without endangering progress in
inter-Korean reconciliation.
.
SIX PARTY TALKS
--------------


9. (C) MOFAT's Kim said both vice ministers agreed to
cooperate closely to work toward resumption of the stalled
Six Party Talks and implementation of the September 19 joint
statement of principles. Yachi expressed Japan's desire to
host a U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral coordination meeting in the
near future. He welcomed the ROK's decision to accept five
elements out of the U.S. eight-point proposal for South

Korea's participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI) and urged Seoul to consider participating in
interdiction exercises in the region. Yu said ROK
policymakers thought Japan's three-track approach to
implementing the September 19 joint statement was a good
idea. The ROK hoped the Six Party Talks would resume before
Hu Jintao's visit to Washington in late April. It was
unrealistic, however, to rely exclusively on China's efforts
to restart the talks. The ROK therefore had urged the DPRK
at every opportunity to return to the Six Party Talks.
.
HISTORY ISSUES SHOULD BE RESOLVED BEFORE NEXT PM, SAYS YU
-------------- --------------


10. (C) Yachi regretted that President Roh Moo-hyun's speech
commemorating the March 1 independence movement against
Japanese occupation had criticized Japan's supposed desires
for conquest and hegemony. It was unfortunate that Japan had
not received a fair assessment of its efforts toward global
peace 60 years since the end of World War II. Yachi also
expressed concern that Beijing and Seoul appeared to be
taking a united front on the history issues. Increasing
politicization by China and the ROK on history issues was
unhelpful. While Japan took in the sentiments of the Korean
people "with heavy heart," it was important for Japan and
Korea to develop a future-oriented relationship.


11. (C) Yu responded that Japan's political leadership
needed to re-examine its understanding of history if it was
committed to improving bilateral relations with the ROK. He
added that continued visits to the Yasukuni shrine by PM
Koizumi's successor could seriously hinder progress in
bilateral relations, stressing that history issues ought to
be resolved before Japan had a new Prime Minister.
.
POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS IN QATAR
-------------- --------------


12. (C) Yachi proposed, in the spirit of enhancing bilateral
ties, to double the number of ROK-Japan joint cultural events
from 1,800 to 3,600 in 2006. Both sides agreed to resume
another round of the ROK-Japan security dialogue with foreign
and defense ministry officials in mid-April. They also
agreed to cooperate on providing assistance to Koreans
forcibly relocated to the Sakhalin Islands at the turn of the
century and launching the second phase of the joint history
committee in April. In addition, both governments would try
to arrange a foreign ministers meeting on the sidelines of
the May Asia Cooperative Dialogue in Qatar.
.
IRAQ/IRAN
--------------


13. (C) Tanaka, from the Japanese Embassy, said VFM Yachi
explained that Tokyo was contemplating an early withdrawal of
its troops from Iraq. Although Japan had not yet made a
final decision, the timing of withdrawal by Australia and the
U.K. was key. Yu, expressing surprise at Japan's idea for
early withdrawal, said the ROK was considering recalling some
troops from the more secure parts of Iraq. It planned to
provide USD 220 million in assistance to the Iraqis.


14. (C) On Iran, both sides expressed concern at Tehran's
increasingly problematic behavior with its nuclear program.
Japan urged Iran through various channels to heed the
international community's warnings and to follow established
IAEA norms. Yu said Tehran had asked for the ROK's
cooperation at the IAEA, even threatening to place a trade
embargo on South Korean imports. Seoul would not, however,
cave into Tehran's demands.
.
EAS, FM BAN'S UN SECGEN CANDIDACY, UNSC LINKAGE
-------------- --


15. (C) According to MOFAT's Kim, Yachi briefed Yu on the
recent normalization talks between Japan and North Korea. Yu
gave a read-out of the recent inter-Korean general
officer-level military talks and former President Kim
Dae-jung's planned visit to North Korea. On the East Asia
Summit, both sides agreed it remained unclear what purpose
the body would serve and that it was important for the EAS to

develop its identity further. They also agreed new member
states should be democracies and that encouraging
participation by countries like India and Australia was
particularly important. Yachi stated that Japan opposed
participation by Russia and opined that the United States
appeared disinterested in the EAS. Yu said the ROK was open
to new participants, but saw no need for an early resumption
of EAS. On Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon's candidacy as UN
Secretary General, Yachi said Japan viewed Ban as a

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highly-qualified candidate and believed the next SecGen
should be someone from an Asian country. Given Japan's
interest in gaining a seat at the UN Security Council, he
hoped Tokyo and Seoul would continue discussions.
.
GOJ UNLIKELY TO OPPOSE BAN'S CANDIDACY, YU TELLS AMB
-------------- --------------


16. (C) In a separate March 15 meeting with the Ambassador,
VFM Yu (acting for FM Ban) said he had a frank, open exchange
with Yachi. Yachi informed Yu that in all likelihood PM
Koizumi would make one more visit to Yasukuni shrine before
he steps down in September. Yachi asked that the ROKG "not
to react too emotionally." Yachi assessed that if former
cabinet chief Fukuda or Finance Minister Tanegaki succeeded
Koizumi, chances were good that there would not be prime
ministerial visits to Yasukuni. However, if Chief Cabinet
Secretary Abe or FM Aso were to become prime minister, such

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visits could occur. Yachi was trying his best to improve
relations with South Korea. He suggested a visit by FM Aso
to Seoul, which Yu discouraged fearing that there would not
be a meeting with President Roh and that this would be
portrayed as a snub. Perhaps, Yu said, FM Ban could visit
Tokyo. Yu also noted that his Japanese interlocutors,
including senior LDP legislators, seemed very positive about
FM Ban, but were non-committal on whether they would support
Ban in the UNSYG race. Still, Yu assessed that Japan would
not openly opposed Ban because such a move would be very
damaging for relations.
VERSHBOW