ROK SCHOLARS BELIEVE DPRK "CLAMPING DOWN" IN

UNCLAS SEOUL 000076

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL MNUC MARR KN KS
SUBJECT: ROK SCHOLARS BELIEVE DPRK "CLAMPING DOWN" IN
ANTICIPATION OF STRONGER U.S. MEASURES IN 2006

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Two ROK scholars believed the DPRK'S New Year's
message for 2006 showed Pyongyang planned to brace itself for
hostile action from the United States and focused its
attention to psychologically and ideologically prepare its
citizens to maintain strong support for the Kim Jong-il
regime. Although North Korea would likely remain engaged in
the Six Party process, negotiations would not yield
substantial progress. The scholars argued, however, that the
DPRK would not take actions sufficiently bold to scuttle
negotiations, such as a nuclear test. They predicted
moderate progress in inter-Korean relations, as well as the
possibility of North Korea agreeing to a second North-South
summit. The scholars noted that, despite the emphasis on the
military-first policy, the New Year's message also
potentially foretold more authority being given to the DPRK
cabinet, as well as the rejuvenation of the Korean Workers
Party's functions. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) In separate meetings on January 3, poloff discussed
the DPRK's New Year's message, which was featured in a joint
editorial in three major North Korean state-run media
outlets, with Dr. Choi Jin-wook, Senior Research Fellow at
the Korea Institute of National Unification (KINU),and Dr.
Koh Yoo-hwan, Professor of North Korea Studies at Dongguk
University. Both are respected scholars of North Korean
policies and society. The scholars agreed that the message
for 2006, as a whole, did not allude to substantial policy
changes but reflected a number of notable differences from
the previous year on Pyongyang's priorities for foreign
policy, inter-Korean relations, military affairs, and
domestic agenda.
.
STRONG FOCUS ON MILITARY, NOTABLE MENTION OF PARTY, CABINET
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Both Choi and Koh stressed that repeated emphasis
on North Korea's military-first policy was the most prominent
aspect of the New Year's message. The text underscored the
military-first policy's important role in maintaining the
regime and called upon the masses to "fight to protect the
'Dear Leader.'" This meant that Pyongyang put regime
stability above all goals, Choi asserted. The emphasis on
the military, particularly the passage reading, "no matter
how the political situation should change, the party and the
state's position to place importance on military affairs
remains unchanged," indicated the regime's readiness to take
stronger measures against outside subversion, especially the
perceived U.S. hostile policy. It was also a way for Kim
Jong-il to stifle dissent by flaunting his "absolute"
authority as Chairman of the National Defense Commission.


4. (SBU) Koh pointed out, however, that while the joint
editorial strongly emphasized the military, it also mentioned
the transfer of some economic authority to the cabinet and
the prominent role of the Korean Workers Party (KWP). This
indicated a new sense of pragmatism on the part of Kim
Jong-il and his desire to minimize the military's role in
managing the economy. Koh added that the expanded role of
the cabinet could also signal the normalization of the KWP's
political functions after being marginalized since Kim
Jong-il spearheaded the military-first movement in 1995.
Choi agreed, believing it was possible that Kim Jong-il might
allow the KWP Central Committee to convene a plenary session
in 2006 -- the first time since December 1993. The party's
Central Military Affairs Committee might also resume normal
operation, Choi said.
.
FOREIGN POLICY: INCREASED VIGILANCE ON U.S. INTENT
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Both academics noted that the editorial gave
minimal hints on foreign policy objectives for the year, but
instead focused largely on the military-first policy and
measures to rally the public's allegiance to Kim Jong-il.
The text repeatedly called for increased vigilance against
"U.S. imperialism," possibly hinting at the sole foreign
policy priority for 2006. The message made no mention of

either the Six Party Talks or specific plans to improve
relations with China, Russia, or EU countries. (NOTE: The
DPRK released several specific messages on the Six Party
Talks in subsequent press statements. ROK analyses of those
statements will be reported septel. END NOTE.)


6. (SBU) Professor Koh of Dongguk University asserted that
the lack of stated foreign policy goals reflected Pyongyang's
sense of uncertainty regarding U.S. intent toward the DPRK
and the Six Party process. As such, the Kim Jong-il
government likely redirected its focus in the joint editorial
to raising the profile of its military and warning its
citizens to "brace themselves" for increased pressure from
the United States. The timing of U.S. law enforcement
actions against North Korea's financial crimes, various
negative recent remarks from senior U.S. officials, and the
U.S. focus on North Korean human rights conditions all
contributed to the sense of uneasiness in Pyongyang, Koh said.
.
MISSILE TEST PREP POSSIBLE, BUT NUCLEAR TEST UNLIKELY
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) The two scholars predicted that the DPRK would
remain engaged in the Six Party process but would seek to
bolster its negotiating position by taking bolder steps,
including preparing for -- but not actually conducting --
missile launch tests. Koh dismissed the possibility of a
nuclear test, noting that the DPRK knew well that conducting
a nuclear test would "seal its coffin." Dr. Choi of KINU
agreed, arguing that North Korea continued to believe that
brinkmanship would place Pyongyang in a stronger bargaining
position while simultaneously making it possible for North
Korea to augment its anti-American propaganda.
.
LIKELY TO RETURN TO 6PT, LITTLE POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT
-------------- --------------


8. (SBU) Choi added that excessive belligerence from the
DPRK would undermine its strategy to shift the blame for
heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula to the United
States. As such, the DPRK would probably return to the Six
Party Talks but would not exercise any flexibility in the
negotiations during the first half of the year. If the
United States took stronger action in response to the lack of
movement in the Six Party process, Choi argued, Pyongyang
could argue in the latter half of the year that Washington
was at fault for raising tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
.
N-S RELATIONS: "OUR PEOPLE," ASSISTANCE FROM ROK
-------------- ---


9. (SBU) Choi observed that the joint editorial was
generally upbeat on inter-Korean relations. The text was
positive toward contact and exchanges between the two Koreas
and emphasized solidarity among the Korean people. Choi
noted, however, that the central theme of North-South
relations appeared to be 1) honoring the spirit of the June
15 North-South Joint Declaration and 2) countering American
imperialism through efforts "just between our people." He
pointed out that the expression "just between our people" was
repeated in several paragraphs, culminating in the
recommendation for designating June 15 as "Our People's Day"
-- a national holiday during which Koreans from the two
Koreas and abroad would rally against U.S. imperialism. The
editorial also stressed the need for increased collaboration
among pro-unification organizations in both Koreas to counter
efforts by conservative South Koreans to delay progress in
inter-Korean relations. Choi predicted that the DPRK would
begin making preparations in the second half of 2006 for the
2007 festivities honoring the 95th anniversary of Kim
Il-sung's birth. North Korea might also agree to a second
inter-Korean summit in the latter part of the year to begin
influencing the ROK's 2007 presidential elections.

"PROGRESS" IN N-S RELATIONS LIKELY
--------------


10. (SBU) Professor Koh of Dongguk University believed the
joint editorial's focus on solidarity among all Korean people
meant two things: first, the DPRK would attempt to solicit

increased economic assistance from the ROK and would plan a
variety of cultural events to attract larger numbers of South
Korean visitors, thereby increasing the influx of cash into
North Korea. This would necessitate more frequent
inter-Korean working-level talks and generally more
agreements resulting from cabinet-level talks. The ROKG
would certainly oblige, given its desire for progress in
inter-Korean relations. Second, given that calls for unity
among all Koreans were North Korea's time-tested propaganda
tool for consolidating the public's allegiance to the regime,
Pyongyang was signaling more public rallies honoring Kim
Jong-il, the revolution, and the superiority of DPRK-style
socialism. This also meant there would be a rise in
anti-American propaganda.
.
A HINT OF THE SUCCESSION ISSUE? NOT QUITE
--------------


11. (SBU) Choi thought it was interesting that the joint
editorial had also made multiple references to the need to
uphold and maintain the DPRK's version of socialism,
specifically targeting members of the military and the youth.
The text warned against the corrupting and subverting
influences of outside media and emphasized the need to
cultivate a new generation of "ideologically pure heroes of
the revolution." More importantly, however, the message
emphasized preparing "the third and fourth generations of the
revolution" ideologically and politically, possibly signaling
Kim Jong-il's thinking that his successor must be one of his
offspring. Choi nevertheless thought it was premature for
Kim to discuss the successor issue publicly, arguing instead
that the message suggested weakened psychological and
ideological cohesion among younger citizens and members of
the military. To promote socialism and absolute loyalty to
the regime, the DPRK leadership would likely mobilize
available government resources to crack down on any criticism
of Kim Jong-il using a variety of suppression tactics.
Sensitive to U.S.-led international criticism of human rights
abuses, however, the DPRK would likely minimize extreme
methods, such as public executions, Choi said.
VERSHBOW