NGO PROJECT TARGETS FAMILY REUNION FOR

UNCLAS SEOUL 000609

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL SOCI EAID KN KS
SUBJECT: NGO PROJECT TARGETS FAMILY REUNION FOR
KOREAN-AMERICANS WITH FAMILY TIES TO DPRK

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) On February 22, Stephen W. Linton, Chair of the
Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF),an NGO with a long history of
providing humanitarian assistance to DPRK medical
institutions, told the Ambassador about his organization's
new project to help Korean-Americans locate relatives in the
DPRK. Linton and project leader Alice Suh said the project
had received initially positive responses from contacts in
both the ROKG and the DPRK. Linton urged USG endorsement of
the project, as it could help improve Washington's image in
South Korea and curb Pyongyang's practice of charging
exorbitant fees to Korean-Americans desiring reunion with
their North Korean family members. Linton expressed
frustration at the DPRK's gradual restriction of site visits
for EBF's tuberculosis assistance programs, adding that
without site visits, the programs would collapse in less than
four years. He did not believe that even large-scale health
crises could force the DPRK to allow better access for
foreign aid workers. Linton asserted that the DPRK was as
shocked by the shift in U.S. policy toward North Korea with
the election of the Bush Administration in 2000 as the United
States was by the events of 9/11, and that the resultant fear
of Washington prevented it from accepting any security
assurances from the USG absent high-level contact. END
SUMMARY.


2. (U) In a February 22 office call, Stephen W. Linton,
Chair of the Eugene Bell Foundation (EBF),briefed the
Ambassador on "Saemsori" -- his organization's new project
for assisting Korean-Americans locate relatives in the DPRK
-- and shared his thoughts on working with DPRK officials on
humanitarian projects in general. EBF Korea Representative
James Lim and Washington Office Director Alice Jean Suh
accompanied Dr. Linton. DCM and emboffs also attended.
(NOTE: EBF is an NGO that has been serving since 1995 as
liaison between North Korean medical facilities and
international donors. The organization helps facilitate the
delivery of medicine, equipment and supplies to tuberculosis
centers in North Korea. END NOTE.)
.
FAMILY REUNION FOR AMCITS WITH DPRK FAMILY TIES
-------------- --


3. (SBU) According to Linton and Suh, EBF launched Saemsori
to address the concerns of Amcits with close family ties to
the DPRK. Korean-Americans could not participate in either
the inter-Korean family reunion events at Mt. Geumgang or the
digital video reunions launched by the ROK's Ministry of
Unification (MOU) due to their U.S. citizenship. As a
result, these individuals had to go through private channels
and pay exorbitant fees to DPRK officials in order to arrange
individual family reunions. Suh estimated that ten percent
of the two million people of Korean descent in the United
States either traced their roots to North Korea or had family
members who had relocated to the DPRK and could not return
after the Korean War.
.
NO OFFICIAL RESPONSE FROM DPRK YET
--------------


4. (SBU) The Saemsori project would conduct a nationwide
survey in the United States for an accurate estimate of the
number of Amcits with family ties to North Korea; create a
central database of specific cases of divided Korean-American
families; maintain an archive of letters, photographs and
oral histories of first-generation Korean-Americans to share
with surviving generations and families in North Korea; and
engage DPRK officials to negotiate agreement on actual
reunions and hometown visits. Linton said EBF's contacts in
both Koreas responded positively to the Saemsori initiative,
although to date the DPRK had not delivered an official
response to the proposal.


5. (SBU) MOU, in particular, showed interest in Saemsori
because additional arrangements for family reunions could
potentially bring the cost down for the ROK and relieve some
of its own burdens in arranging family reunions. Linton
added, however, that even if the DPRK rejected EBF's

proposal, the project would at least allow aging
first-generation Korean-Americans to be registered in a
database that could be used at some point in the future,
after North Korea became more open.
.
USG INTEREST: IMPROVED IMAGE IN ROK, CURB CASH FLOW TO DPRK
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) Linton underscored that the project also had
implications for the USG and urged Washington's endorsement.
First, a proactive role by the USG in arranging reunions by
separated Korean families, regardless of their nationality,
could have a positive effect on both U.S.-ROK relations as
well as the South Korean public's opinion of the United
States. Considering that no other country with Korean
immigrants had a program like Saemsori, the image of
Washington taking the initiative before others could counter
anti-American sentiments among some South Koreans.


7. (SBU) Second, USG endorsement for the project could
potentially reduce the enormous price tag (up to USD 90,000
in some instances, according to Linton) for individual family
visits by Korean-Americans, which was also a potential a
source of questionable funds for the DPRK. If the DPRK
viewed the project as an avenue of dialogue with the United
States, it could also make it easier for Korean-American
staff to participate in EBF visits to project sites,
currently forbidden by North Korea.


8. (SBU) Moreover, potential donors could support EBF's
projects with less concern about tensions between the USG and
the DPRK. This was particularly true with the
Korean-American community, which tended to work quietly for
fear of rousing suspicions in the United States for showing
interest in North Korea, even though this group was one of
the biggest and most steadfast donors of humanitarian aid to
North Korea, Linton said.
.
GRADUAL DECREASE IN SITE VISITS FOR TB PROGRAMS
-------------- --


9. (BU) Linton noted that EBF took a big risk in
undertaking Saemsori, as DPRK officials could impose
roadblocks on EBF's existing tuberculosis assistance programs
out of suspicion. Linton and his delegation could only visit
15 out of 19 sites during the fall site visits, which
reflected a gradual decrease in the number of site visits
permitted. The problem, Linton asserted, was that DPRK
authorities looked upon EBF's site visits as monitoring
activities even though they involved merely routine
maintenance of medical equipment.


10. (SBU) This, said Linton, was likely part of the overall
trend of the DPRK reducing the number of foreign aid
organizations operating in the country. If the trend
continued, EBF would not be able to sustain its tuberculosis
programs. Donors mandated site visits, without which they
would not provide funding. Linton predicted that, without
site visits and equipment maintenance, existing programs
would fail in increments of 30 percent per year due to
equipment failure. Unfortunately, the DPRK Ministry of
Public Health did not wield sufficient influence to counter
the competing interests of the State Security Department and
other government agencies that sought to minimize foreign
monitoring, particularly in rural sites.


11. (SBU) Linton opined that little could be done to address
the difficulty in getting access to the DPRK, especially
since Pyongyang was in the business of selling access to
foreigners. The ROK, in particular, continued to pay
generously for access. Until that market dried up, the DPRK
would have no motivation to conduct business differently.
Linton noted, however, that his ROKG interlocutors were
increasingly frustrated with the DPRK and predicted that
Seoul, at some point, would drive a harder bargain in its
dealings with Pyongyang. He believed that Seoul was, for the
time being, willing to tolerate the DPRK's rigid, old-school
officials until they made way for younger leaders who had no
memory of the Kim Il Sung era, and might be flexible on
liberalizing North Korea's society and economy. Allowing

changes gradually with a generational shift was more
characteristic of Korean culture than a large-scale
revolution, Linton added.
.
HEALTH CRISES WOULD NOT INCREASE ACCESS TO DPRK
-------------- --


12. (SBU) In response to the DCM's question about how the
DPRK would act in the event of a large-scale health crisis,
such as an avian flu pandemic, Linton responded that
Pyongyang would fear a large influx of outsiders more than
the outbreak. The DPRK would likely contact UN agencies,
pretend to allow increased access for international aid
workers, but pre-select them from those who spoke no Korean,
as it did in 1995, when it reached out for emergency food
assistance. Linton did not believe the DPRK elite would have
any problems getting access to medicine or treatment, unlike
ordinary citizens. He also noted that Pyongyang had learned
from its experience in 1995 when international donors took
more than two months to respond to its call for emergency
food assistance. DPRK authorities would instead reach out to
China and the ROK.


13. (SBU) Econoff asked whether ordinary citizens would
accept vaccinations or other assistance from foreign
organizations. Linton responded that ordinary citizens would
not resist, but local authorities and elites could be
obstructionist if outsiders did not fully consider existing
practices or protocol. He cited the contrast between the
DPRK's receptivity to EBF's programs and its rejection of
Doctors Without Borders (MSF),stressing that MSF was forced
to leave because it criticized medical practices by North
Korean doctors and staff, and existing facilities, thus
causing many local elites to lose face and many health
authorities to lose their jobs.
.
LACK OF ACCESS TO RURAL DPRK PARTLY DUE TO EMBARRASSMENT
-------------- --------------


14. (SBU) Linton stressed that the DPRK was as paranoid
about what foreigners saw in North Korea as it was about
their activities. It restricted outsiders from most rural
areas out of concern that they would see just how miserably
it has failed to provide basic necessities to its citizens,
which was a source of great embarrassment for the regime. In
contrast, access to the relatively more prosperous Pyongyang
was now relatively easy, especially during the annual Arirang
Festival, during which the regime sought to have as many
foreigners as possible see the reenactment of its national
myth.
.
PYONGYANG WON'T ACCEPT ASSURANCES ABSENT HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT
-------------- --------------


15. (SBU) On U.S.-DPRK relations, Linton asserted that North
Korea awaited direct contact with the USG at the highest
level, adding that the DPRK had been "waiting for Kissinger
for years." After years of believing that the U.S. electoral
process was just an act, Pyongyang found to its surprise in
2000 that the USG could indeed pursue radically different
policies toward it with the election of a new administration
every four or eight years. The DPRK was, Linton opined, as
shocked by the 2000 elections as the United States was by the
events of 9/11. Given the level of fear in Pyongyang, no
amount of security guarantees or assurances would suffice
until Pyongyang felt that its "Kissinger" had arrived.
VERSHBOW