USAID OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DPRK FOOD SITUATION WITH

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 000551

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

PASS USAID FOR AA/DCHA/MHESS AND DCHA/FFP
STATE FOR EAP/K AND IO
ROME FOR FODAG
NSC FOR CHA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREL KS KN
SUBJECT: USAID OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DPRK FOOD SITUATION WITH
ROK GOVERNMENT AND NGO'S


SUMMARY
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1. (SBU) Visiting USAID official Jon Brause met with a range
of ROKG officials and NGO and other agency leaders involved
in assistance to the DPRK, February 12-16. Brause
articulated the USG position on the upcoming WFP proposal
for Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) in the
DPRK, and sought information on the current humanitarian
situation in North Korea. ROKG officials understood our
concerns about the WFP proposal and agreed that a
cooperative effort during next week's Executive Board
meeting would be best. The consensus among those consulted
is that the worst of the food crisis is indeed over, but
there are still areas of food insecurity that would benefit
from a well targeted WFP activity. End Summary.

ROKG: DONOR COORDINATION WELCOME, BUT NOT BINDING
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2. (SBU) USAID DCHA/PPM Office Director Jon Brause met with
South Korean officials at the director general level from
the Ministry of Unification (MOU) and Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT). While it is MOFAT who represents
the ROK government on issues dealing with WFP, South Korea's
delivery of food to the North is controlled by the MOU.


3. (SBU) Brause explained to each of his interlocutors that
while the USG supported the presence of international
organizations in North Korea, the proposed WFP Protracted
Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) plan for the DPRK
lacked critical operational details related to access and
monitoring, which will prevent the USG from supporting the
activity at the Executive Board meeting next week. Brause
stressed, however, that we were not rejecting the proposal,
and that we hoped to coordinate a response for the Executive
Board meeting that would encourage WFP to work with the DPRK
to add detail to the proposal, strengthen it and ultimately
resubmit it to the Board. The ROKG officials took this on
board, but said that the South Korean government had not yet
formally decided what stance to take at the Executive Board
meeting. They expected, however, that the ROK would take a
very low profile in interventions, so as not to anger the
DPRK.


4. (SBU) More generally, Brause also discussed with ministry
officials the detrimental impact ROK bilateral assistance
could have on the humanitarian efforts of other donors and
international organizations, if it is perceived by the North
as obviating any role for other donor organizations. While
recognizing the South Korean government's significant
ability to provide large-scale economic assistance to the
DPRK, Brause stressed that the ROKG must make a greater
effort to ensure that this bilateral assistance does not
impede the ability of the donor community to support
activities with a strong humanitarian focus.


5. (SBU) In response, the ROKG officials made no specific
commitments, but assured Brause that they wanted to work
with the United States to develop a common humanitarian
approach. They added that the South Korean government also
valued the continued presence of international organizations
in the DPRK. In the final analysis, the ministry officials
did not seem prepared to consider any significant
modifications to their bilateral assistance to the DPRK.
They did, however, concede that a broader humanitarian
presence in the DPRK was to South Korea's advantage, and
that more visible support to multilateral humanitarian
activities was necessary.

NGO's: MOVING TO "DEVELOP" ASSISTANCE, STUCK NEAR PYONGYANG
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6. (SBU) Brause also met with several NGO's that currently
have projects in North Korea. Among that sample, the
consensus seemed to be that a large majority of the North
Korean populace is no longer experiencing a food crisis
situation. At the same time, areas further away from
Pyongyang -- in particular mountainous areas and the
Northeast -- probably receive significantly less food,

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resulting in continued pockets of food insecurity in these
regions. Most NGO's agreed that even if WFP were to begin a
new program, access to the vulnerable areas could not be
expected.


7. (U) While some NGO's continue to operate some variant of
a feeding program, it is clear that most are moving to a
model that could be more accurately described as
"development-oriented." For instance, one South Korean NGO
working in the North is providing raw materials for the
manufacture of tillers and automated rice-planting machines,
which are then distributed to farming cooperatives. Another
NGO that has identified basic childhood diseases as a
critical problem is refurbishing the Pyongyang Children's
Hospital and building a manufacturing plant for intravenous
solutions.


8. (SBU) Most of the NGO activities are grass-root
interventions that are too small to have a systemic impact.
It is also clear that most of the NGO activities described
are carried out in and around Pyongyang. Little if any NGO
work seems to be allowed in the central and northeastern
sections of the country, which are universally recognized as
the most in need of assistance.

COMMENT
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9. (SBU) Brause's consultations with the ROKG on the
humanitarian situation in the DPRK highlighted the need to
develop a shared approach to assistance in the DPRK. The
willingness of the USG to discuss our planned position on
the new WFP PRRO for the DPRK in advance of the Executive
Board meeting helped ensure that the ROKG understood that
our actions were an effort to strengthen humanitarian
response in the DPRK, rather than end it. Additional,
regular consultations with the ROKG on humanitarian and
developmental activities in the DPRK could further our
mutual goals in that area.


10. (U) USAID Brause cleared this message.

VERSHBOW