ROK FOREIGN MINISTER THROWS HAT INTO UNSYG RING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 SEOUL 000509

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/18/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC KS
SUBJECT: ROK FOREIGN MINISTER THROWS HAT INTO UNSYG RING

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) On February 14, the ROK formally announced Foreign
Minister Ban Ki-moon's candidacy for UN Secretary General.
Ban, who has been actively campaigning for several weeks, has
apparently been encouraged by initial reactions to his
candidacy. MOFAT DG Kim Won-soo, who was recently tapped to
become special assistant to Minister Ban and coordinate
efforts for a UNSYG campaign, told POL M/C recently that one
of Ban's strengths is that he has no enemies. As the
representative of a democratic, market-oriented Asian
country, said Kim, Ban should be a strong candidate. Kim
also portrayed Ban as having engineered significant reforms
to the ROK Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Well-liked
by his staff, Ban Ki-moon is a diplomat's diplomat: urbane,
intelligent, and unfailingly polite. He is proof that "nice
guys" don't always finish last, but sometimes rise to the top
of their profession. These very qualities, however, could
cause some to wonder whether he would have the willingness to
fight the serious bureaucratic battles that UN reform would
require. END SUMMARY.

GENIE IS OUT OF THE BOTTLE
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2. (U) In a statement to the press on February 14, Vice
Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan announced that his boss,
Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon, will seek election to be
Secretary General of the United Nations. Foreign Minister Ban

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"brings to his candidacy nearly four decades of extensive
experience and an untarnished reputation as a diplomat and
administrator, much of it directly related to issues of peace
and security, development, and human rights and democracy,
the three pillars on which the United Nations stands," said
Yu. In a subsequent press conference, Ban highlighted the
need for reform of the UN and his own professional experience
with the organization.


3. (SBU) In a February 8 meeting with POL M/C, MOFAT
Director-General for Policy Planning Kim Won-soo explained
that Seoul has been trying to dampen South Korean media
speculation and coverage of Foreign Minister Ban's campaign
to be the next UNSYG candidate. The ROK had embargoed news
of Ban's candidacy, but would lift the embargo on February
14, primarily because it could not keep the silence any
longer, having already extended the embargo twice. The
embargo has allowed Minister Ban to campaign quietly without
having reporters clamor for initial foreign reactions and
thereby possibly limit flexibility in other capitals. Kim
said ROKG officials have told South Korean media that it
would be in Ban's, and thus Seoul's, interest if the press
did not get too carried away too soon in the game. In fact,
MOFAT would have preferred to keep the embargo, but that was
not possible, Kim said.


4. (SBU) Despite the uncertainty of when the official
campaign would formally start, Seoul has begun initial
preparations. For example, on the day the embargo was
lifted, ROKG officials distributed press backgrounders that
framed Seoul's view of what South Korea and Minister Ban
could do for the UN.
.
BAN USES TRAVEL TO DISCUSS UNSYG SCENARIO
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5. (SBU) Over the past several weeks, Minister Ban has also
moved to plant the seeds for his campaign. Ban last week
returned from a 14-day trip to Europe and Africa, including
stops in Davos for the World Economic Forum January 26-27;
Ghana, January 28-30; London, for the ministerial conference
on Afghanistan reconstruction January 31 to February 1;
Congo, February 2-3; and France, February 4-6, returning in
time to meet with the visiting Indian President in Seoul on
February 7. In Paris, Minister Ban delivered a speech in

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French to journalists and political science students and
answered questions in English, demonstrating his ability in
two working languages of the United Nations.


6. (C) In a February 9 conversation with the Ambassador,
Minister Ban said he was encouraged by the reaction he
received from his recent travels, especially that of the
French. Seoul, he said, had also sent a heads-up message to
Pyongyang and had thus far received no reply, indicating no
immediate objections. He added that he personally was
worried about East Timor's Foreign Minister Ramos-Horta
potentially emerging as an eleventh-hour compromise choice.


7. (C) On February 6, Minister Ban sent a letter to the
Secretary informing her of his candidacy. Ban argued that

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the next Secretary-General should come from the Asian region;
that as a vibrant market economy and emerging donor, as well
as a democracy fully committee to human rights, the rule of
law, peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts, South Korea
hoped to honor the contribution it has received from the UN;
and that Ban's experience on the global stage for more than
three decades, ten years with UN affairs, made him the right
man from Korea for the UN job.
.
INITIAL CAMPAIGN STRATEGY
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8. (SBU) During the February 8 meeting, DG Kim made the case
for Minister Ban, emphasizing that one of his biggest
strengths was that "no one dislikes" Ban. Kim claimed that
so far there were no negative responses from Beijing, Moscow,
or Paris. Noting that in the straw polls, capitals were not
limited to the number of candidates they supported, Kim
speculated that China probably would not vote against Asian
candidates because of its efforts to improve its image in the
region. Kim opined that the U.S. alliance need not block
Ban's candidacy in Beijing's view, at worst, China might
support several Asian candidates rather than veto his
candidacy. When asked about Tokyo, DG Kim responded that
Japanese leaders might be reluctant to vote against Seoul's
candidate, and thereby risk further inflaming anti-Japanese
sentiments in Korea. (NOTE: During a February 13 meeting
with POL M/C, however, Japanese Embassy Political Minister
Counselor Koji Tomita noted Seoul's strong opposition to
Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council and
predicted Tokyo would withhold a decision on the
Secretary-General race until the UN reform picture became

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clearer. END NOTE.)


9. (SBU) Acknowledging the importance of UN management
reform, DG Kim pointed to Ban's accomplishments in reforming
the Foreign Ministry. Minister Ban had essentially
strengthened term limits for South Korean ambassadors by
reducing the numbers of missions they could head to two from
three or four. Ban had mandated a retirement age of sixty.
And, he reduced the amount of time returning foreign service
officers could look for a job from a one-year paid period to
four months. These were controversial and tough decisions,
quite unpopular among MOFAT senior staff, Kim said.


10. (SBU) Kim said that another initiative was Ban's
decision to hold weekly press conferences. Minister Ban was
the only South Korean cabinet minister who did this, which
reflected his confidence and ability to handle and organize a
gamut of issues. Ban's ability to handle the tough Korean
press corps reportedly earned him a nickname akin to Mr.
Teflon.


11. (SBU) Kim asserted that the division of the Korean
Peninsula, rather than a negative for his candidacy, could be
turned into a strength because it might be argued that no one
knew more about the value of conflict management,
international cooperation, and the role of the United Nations
than the South Korean Foreign Minister. South Korea, for
example, represented the ideals of the United Nations and
understood the value of free markets, freedom, and democracy.
Minister Ban's December 2005 announcement that Seoul sought

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to double its official Development Assistance allocations by
2009, combined with Seoul's contributions to supporting
reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and experience
with peacekeeping operations, might be cited to demonstrate
South Korea's growing international role.
VERSHBOW