Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06SEOUL498
2006-02-14 05:02:00
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Embassy Seoul
Cable title:  

FORMER KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR SAYS

Tags:  PREL SOCI MNUC PINR EAID ECON KN KS 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5982
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0073
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7104
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0156
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1061
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RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHMFIUU/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
UNCLAS SEOUL 000498 

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TAGS: PREL SOCI MNUC PINR EAID ECON KN KS
SUBJECT: FORMER KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR SAYS
DISCONTENT EXISTS AMONG ALL NORTH KOREANS

SUMMARY
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UNCLAS SEOUL 000498

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E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL SOCI MNUC PINR EAID ECON KN KS
SUBJECT: FORMER KIM IL SUNG UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR SAYS
DISCONTENT EXISTS AMONG ALL NORTH KOREANS

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (SBU) Dr. Cho Myungchul, a think tank researcher who
defected to South Korea in 1994 after years of living among
the DPRK elite, told poloff on February 8 that social
discontent among the DPRK's working class was kept in check
through propaganda and periodic acts of decency by the state,
rather than the threat of force as commonly believed by
outsiders. Social discontent existed among all North
Koreans, and the elite was more open to change than was
commonly believed. Cho opined that building trust between
Pyongyang and Washington was crucial for any progress in the
Six Party Talks, and that the combination of North Korea's
fear of the United States and the importance it placed in
having direct contact with the USG was key to understanding
its negotiating strategy. He criticized the ROK for
indulging the DPRK on its demands while receiving little in
return, stressing the need for North-South engagement to
focus on reducing tensions rather than on secondary matters.
He supported former President Kim Dae-jung's proposed visit
to North Korea, as well as the idea of having a second
inter-Korean summit, since both events would allow Kim
Jong-il to hear about the outside world from "equals" who
could present more accurate information than North Korean
officials. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) On February 8, poloff met with Dr. Cho Myungchul of
the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIIEP)
to discuss his perspectives on North Korean society, the Six
Party Talks, and inter-Korean engagement. (BIOGRAPHIC NOTE:
Cho is a former professor of economics at Kim Il Sung
University in North Korea and the son of former DPRK
Construction Minister Cho Chul Jun. He attended the Namsan
School, a prestigious primary and secondary institution
attended by all of Kim's offspring including Kim Jong-il, and
graduated from Kim Il Sung University. He defected to South
Korea in 1994 and has since been researching inter-Korean

economic cooperation at KIIEP. His entire family, including
his wife, who also taugtht at KIS University, continues to
reside in North Korea. END BIOGRAPHIC NOTE.)
.
WORKING CLASS DISCONTENT HELD BACK BY "ONE FAMILY" CONCEPT
-------------- --------------


3. (SBU) Cho said reports of harsh living conditions in
North Korea, especially those of more remote provinces, were
largely accurate. Social discontent existed at all levels of
North Korean society, but was controlled through effective
propaganda among the working class and the threat of loss of
privileges among the elite. He disputed some observers'
assumption that repression or the threat of force by the
government prevented the public from voicing their
displeasure over the state's chronic and systemic failure to
provide necessities like food and fuel. Rather, Cho argued,
the government effectively used state propaganda and periodic
acts of "generosity" to stem people's anger before public
unruliness could spread. The state propaganda machine
emphasized the concept of the state and the people being "one
family." At the same time, Pyongyang appealed to the
public's sympathies by staging events, such as winter quilt
distributions, while doing little to hide the fact that the
government had problems with foreign debt. Such tactics,
which portrayed the government as undergoing hard times along
with the people, "pulled at people's heartstrings" enough to
make it unthinkable for working-class North Koreans to
complain about their own hardship.


4. (SBU) Cho dismissed the idea that increased hardship
alone could make the DPRK's working class revolt against the
regime. The public would continue to sympathize with the
plight of the government so long as it believed the state was
making a bona fide effort to provide for the people. Cho
recalled from his days living in North Korea that local
officials would visibly scramble to procure emergency food
supplies for their districts in times of shortage. No
average North Korean would think that the state intentionally
deprived the population of food under such circumstances.
Rather, most would have been touched that the government
worked so hard to provide for the people. Reports by outside

visitors -- and even North Korean refugees in the ROK --
failed to take this factor into account, Cho argued. The
poorest members of the working class have learned to cope
with the government's inability to provide for its people,
partly through illegal economic activities. If the people of
North Korea believed that the state did not care about them,
as commonly depicted by Western media, there would have been
a number of violent uprisings in the DPRK, Cho said.
.
ELITE'S DESIRE FOR STATUS QUO A MYTH
--------------


5. (SBU) Social discontent among members of the upper and
middle classes was a bigger issue for North Korea's stability
than among the working class, Cho asserted. Contrary to most
outside observers' analysis, the DPRK's privileged class did
not desire to maintain the status quo. After years of being
beaten down by the regime and its system, however, members of
the DPRK elite had all but given up their dreams of pursuing
reform and were resigned to pleasing Kim Jong-il and the
members of his inner circle. They hesitated to make clear
recommendations as Kim Jong-il gave less guidance and
increasingly displayed signs of uncertainty on both economic
and security policy since the new millennium. This was
particularly true of officials involved in economic policy.
Cho, who said he had personal knowledge of officials who had
"disappeared" after making novel policy recommendations to
Kim Jong-il, believed DPRK officials would welcome change in
the regime and liberalization of North Korean society if Kim
Jong-il allowed it. He dismissed the notion that the North
Korean military would object to large-scale economic reforms
and social liberalization, asserting that Kim Jong-il alone
made economic decisions.
.
MIDDLE CLASS SMALL, BUT ALSO THE MOST ANTI-REGIME
-------------- --------------


6. (SBU) According to Cho, no group in North Korea had
greater levels of social discontent than the tiny middle
class. This group, while subject to far less government
scrutiny and monitoring than either the lower or the upper
class, had aspirations for improving on the status quo
commensurate with their education and mental capacity. They
tended to be jealous of others' accomplishments and rewards
and, as such, resented the DPRK's system, which made upward
mobility impossible.
.
FOR DPRK, SIX PARTY TALKS A CONDUIT FOR CONTACT WITH U.S.
-------------- --------------


7. (SBU) On the DPRK nuclear issue, Cho lamented that the
United States and North Korea had wholly different objectives
for the Six Party Talks. Whereas Washington sought
denuclearization as the ultimate goal of the talks, the DPRK
used the forum solely as an avenue for direct contact with
the USG. With Pyongyang playing the nuclear card to persuade
Washington to ease economic sanctions and improve bilateral
relations -- a risky gamble from Cho's calculus -- and the
United States continuing to assert that denuclearization
could not be a side issue to the talks, it was uncertain what
could break the deadlock in negotiations.


8. (SBU) Cho added, however, that improving ties with the
United States was unquestionably the number one priority for
North Korea. The fact that the DPRK was willing to endure
the awkward dialogue structure of the Six Party Talks
indicated just how important contact with the United States
was to North Korea. The greatest difficulty to overcome,
however, was the fundamental lack of trust between Washington
and Pyongyang. Cho noted that the DPRK's fear of the
relative size and firepower of the United States alone made
it difficult for Pyongyang to trust Washington, even without
statements from U.S. officials hinting at regime change. It
was easier to understand North Korea's cautious approach in
negotiations by remembering that whereas one mistake in the
nuclear issue could be costly for the United States, the DPRK
believed that one slip-up would bring catastrophic results.
.
INTER-KOREAN TALKS NOT FOCUSED ON REDUCING TENSIONS
-------------- --------------



9. (SBU) On inter-Korean talks, Cho sharply criticized the
ROKG for missing the central point of North-South engagement
-- reducing tension on both sides to lay the foundation for
eventual reunification. With little to no progress on
holding regular military talks, while emphasizing
"accomplishments" on economic projects of questionable
immediate utility, such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex,
the ROKG undermined the long-term viability of its own
engagement policy by exacerbating political division in South
Korea between those who supported vigorous engagement versus
those who preferred a more cautious approach. For a more
successful approach, the ROK had to ensure there was
measurable progress on military dialogue and cooperation,
real improvements in living conditions for average North
Koreans, and improved cross-border access. Everything else
was secondary. Noting that he had just left a late-evening
strategy session on the next round of inter-Korean talks at
the Ministry of Unification, Cho told poloff that he had
strongly urged that at the March round of inter-Korean
ministerial talks, the ROKG should raise human rights, demand
the resumption of general officer-level military talks, and
generally insist on greater reciprocity in North-South
relations. (NOTE: Cho regularly consults for the ROKG on
North-South dialogue. END NOTE.)


10. (SBU) Cho, stressing that he agreed with the fundamental
strategy of engaging North Korea, complained that the ROKG
indulged the DPRK's demands excessively and failed to
negotiate more reciprocal treatment in cabinet-level talks.
He acknowledged that the level of N-S engagement could be
viewed as in its infancy and that Seoul could see some
advantages to compromising with the DPRK in order to gain
long-term cooperation and trust. This ought not continue too
long, however, as the DPRK would be spoiled by ROK
indulgence. Having visible, measurable markers on
reciprocity was crucial, if only for the sake of having broad
support for the engagement policy.
.
KJI NEEDS MORE CONTACT WITH OUTSIDE LEADERS
--------------


11. (SBU) Cho was positive about plans for former ROK
President Kim Dae-jung to visit the DPRK and seek a second
inter-Korean summit. Producing a breakthrough or having a
set of deliverables from a second summit was less important
than for President Roh Moo-hyun to have a chance to engage
Kim Jong-il, Cho noted. Both KDJ's visit and a second summit
were important ways for Kim Jong-il to discuss the world at
large with outside leaders who could explain regional issues
to him more candidly than would his lieutenants. The DPRK's
culture of "hyper-allegiance" to KJI prevented senior North
Korean officials from presenting accurate reports. This
phenomenon, coupled with the fact that Chinese and Russian
leaders were the only foreigners with genuine access to KJI,
exacerbated the North Korean leader's already distorted
worldview, Cho said.
VERSHBOW