NEW ROK NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SEEKS CLOSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 004331

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2026
TAGS: PREL PREF PGOV KS KN
SUBJECT: NEW ROK NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SEEKS CLOSE
COOPERATION ON ALLIANCE ISSUES

REF: SEOUL 4073

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) During a call on newly appointed National Security
Advisor Baek Jong-chun, the Ambassador and NSA Baek agreed to
cooperate closely in resolving alliance issues, such as OPCON
transfer and base relocation, and to continue coordination
with regard to the Six Party Talks. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) The Ambassador on December 19 paid an initial call on
National Security Advisor Baek Jong-chun. As set forth more
fully reftel, Baek was most recently President of the
government-supported Sejong Institute and is known as a
military and security expert. Though Baek's English is quite
good, he chose to speak through an interpreter.

NSA BAEK SEEKS CLOSE COORDINATION
--------------


3. (C) Baek said that he wanted to continue the close
working relationship that the Ambassador enjoyed with his
predecessor, current Foreign Minister Song Min-soon.
Commenting that the Korean-American relationship had improved
over the past year, Baek said he wanted to work with the
Ambassador to resolve any pending issues. The Ambassador
replied that he was pleased that the two countries had
coordinated well in anticipation of the resumption of the Six
Party Talks. The two would have to work especially hard to
prevent election-year politics from detracting from the
accomplishments of the alliance. Agreeing, Baek said that he
was committed to depoliticizing alliance issues and resolving
them without misunderstandings.


4. (C) Baek noted that when he traveled to the U.S. as
President of the Sejong Institute, he would often meet with
academics in Washington who would tell him that there were
many problems with the alliance. He would then meet with USG
officials who would deny the problems. Similarly, back in
Korea, academics would tell him there were problems and,
again, ROKG officials would deny the problems. While such
differences in opinion could be expected in a democracy, Baek
suspected that part of the problem was public diplomacy. The
Ambassador replied that although sometimes there have been
problems, the alliance had also been successful in resolving
them -- although the path has been somewhat rocky at times.
The recently-concluded Special Measures Agreement was a good
example, the Ambassador said.


5. (C) Baek said that in the past, issues that arose between
the U.S. and ROK were never disclosed to the public. Now,
because Korea has a political system that embodies freedom of
speech and an active media, alliance issues readily become
fodder for public debate. He agreed with the Ambassador that
the USG and ROKG would have to pay close attention to this in
the coming election year and attempt to resolve pending
issues in advance through better communication.

RESOLVING OPCON, BASE RELOCATION
--------------


6. (C) To start, the Ambassador said that the USG and ROKG
should within the first months of 2007 agree on a specific
date for the transfer of operational control (OPCON) and
clear up any misunderstanding regarding the timing of USFK's
move from Yongsan to Pyongtaek. The Ambassador hoped also
that Baek would use his authority as chair of the cabinet to
resolve outstanding environmental issues regarding the bases
that had already been returned. The Ambassador pointed out
that the USG had complied with the SOFA and had voluntarily
taken additional steps to ensure that the land was
transferable, so the issue was settled from our point of
view. Remaining legal technicalities on the ROK side should
be resolved without delay in order to prevent this issue from
becoming a political issue in 2007.


7. (C) Baek concurred that the OPCON transfer date should be
settled as soon as possible. Blaming the misunderstanding
regarding the Yongsan move on poorly informed reporting, Baek
said that MND was working on a final draft of the Master Plan
(MP) which would include a mutually agreed date. Meanwhile,

Baek said that plans to relocate individual buildings and
facilities could proceed without problem on the basis of
working-level consultations.


8. (C) The Ambassador suggested that the next SPI meeting
would be an opportunity for senior policy representatives to
clear up any misunderstandings. It was important to keep the
transfer on track to avoid giving the Korean public the
impression that the U.S. was reluctant to move, which was not
true. It was the U.S. position that USFK should move as soon
as possible. Thus, it was important soon to agree to the
smoothest and swiftest possible timetable, taking into
account the difficulties that had been encountered in
acquiring land and facilitating the departure of the local
residents. The Ambassador added that it would be important
to make clear to the public that there was no linkage between
the transfer of OPCON and the move from Yongsan to Pyongtaek,
although the events would happen in the same timeframe. Baek
agreed that these were entirely different matters and that he
also did not want them misunderstood by the public.

GRATITUDE FOR IRAQ SUPPORT
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador conveyed appreciation for the ROKG's
efforts to convince the National Assembly to extend the
Zaytun deployment in Iraq, which was a welcome demonstration
of the ROK's global activities. Baek said that the ROK was
making utmost efforts to contribute to global peace and
security.

NSA URGES PATIENCE WITH NORTH KOREA
--------------


10. (C) Turning to the Six Party Talks, the Ambassador said
that the latest reports from Beijing indicated that the North
Koreans, in the first meetings on December 18, had taken a
maximalist approach, as many had expected. Still, as a
result of close coordination among the other five parties in
recent weeks, we were able to reach an understanding on the
steps we expect the DPRK to take as part of an "early
harvest." The key to progress toward implementation of the
2005 Joint Statement would be for the U.S. and ROK, along
with China, to remain united and to coordinate and consult
closely. President Roh's clear message to North Korea that
rice and fertilizer assistance would remain suspended until
there were concrete results was helpful, the Ambassador said.


11. (C) Baek said that he wanted to see the North Korean
nuclear issue resolved as soon as possible, but based on the
DPRK's attitudes as seen on December 18 in Beijing, a
resolution would likely take time and patience. Baek said
that cooperation between the U.S. and ROK would be very
important.


12. (C) Asked about public sentiment toward the ROKG's
engagement policy in the current environment, Baek said that
public sentiment would likely depend on the situation that
unfolds in Beijing. The Ambassador emphasized again that
calibrating implementation of the engagement policy to
support progress in the Six Party Talks would be the best
approach. True, said Baek, but the ROK's absolute goal was
to resolve the North Korea nuclear issue in a peaceful and
diplomatic way.
VERSHBOW