YONGSAN RELOCATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 004328

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2016
TAGS: MARR MCAP PARM PREL KS
SUBJECT: YONGSAN RELOCATION: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE
COST OF ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d).

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) SUMMARY: Unhelpful reports in the South Korean media
that completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) will be
delayed by another five years to 2013 appear designed to
placate objections within the National Assembly to the high
projected cost of the project. The reports are misleading in
that the completion dates depend on which portions of the
transformation -- YRP, or the Land Partnership Plan to
relocate the 2nd Infantry Division to a consolidated area in
Pyongtaek -- are carried out first. This attempt by the ROKG
to renegotiate its YRP and LPP commitments through the media,
rather than via appropriate consultations with the USG, is
troubling. More troubling still, it appears emphasis on the
new completion year of 2013 is intended to support the ROK
preference for a later conclusion of the transfer of wartime
operational control (OPCON) by 2012. That runs counter to
the USG position that the two issues remain separate. The
ROKG has urged USFK to agree to release the information
contained in the Master Plan as soon as possible, arguing
that once the figures are explained to the National Assembly,
the project can get underway, but the USG cannot sign up to
final cost figures, or completion dates, until the Program
Management Consortium has determined what those numbers will
be.


2. (C) The Embassy is concerned that domestic politics
arising from the 2007 ROK presidential race will only make
matters worse, while further delaying the much needed
transformation of the Alliance. It appears that completion
of the YRP will be determined first and foremost by ROK
politics and ROK money, and that both are working against us.
South Korean leadership attitudes, coupled with competing
budget demands, have caused the ROKG to make this attempt to
spread out the cost of relocation, and to force the project
into line with its goals for OPCON transfer. To minimize the
fallout, we will continue to stress the importance of YRP to
the Alliance, U.S. readiness to move out of Seoul as soon as
possible, the separation of YRP from the OPCON transfer
issue, and the need for continuous consultations and
transparent actions throughout the Alliance transformation
process. END SUMMARY

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OFFICIAL DENIAL
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3. (C) On December 13, 2006, the South Korean media began
reporting that the relocation of Yongsan Garrison, the
movement of the main military base for U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK) from the center of Seoul to a promised new facility on
the western seashore, near the city at Pyongtaek, would be
delayed. Yonhap reported that the Yongsan Relocation Plan
(YRP) would not be completed by 2008 (the agreed completion
year),but would take at least five years longer, resulting
in a new estimated completion year of 2013. Those estimates,
based on figures from the as yet unreleased Master Plan, are
misleading in that the completion dates depend in large part
on which portions of Alliance transformation -- YRP, or the
Land Partnership Plan to relocate the 2nd Infantry Division
to a consolidated area in Pyongtaek -- are carried out first.


4. (C) Embassy and USFK sources point to the U.S. bases
relocation office within the Ministry of National Defense
(MND) as the likely source of the leak. Both MND and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) deny the ROK
government had anything to do with it. Lee Jeong-kyu,
Director of MOFAT's North America III Division, contends that
the MND-USFK project management team has known since October
that the completion year estimated by the USFK-selected and
MND endorsed contractor, Thomas J. Davis, Inc. (TJD),is

2013. Director Lee claimed the delay became known to local
government officials in the Pyongtaek area during the course
of the engineering assessment conducted by TJD, and that the
story originated in Pyongtaek. Another possible source would
be National Assembly members to whom MND has delivered a
preliminary briefing on the Master Plan (MP).

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PUTTING THE CART BEFORE THE HORSE
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5. (C) Whatever the source of the leak, the Embassy believes
the move was meant to placate National Assembly members who
are objecting to the high projected cost of the project.
While a pre-final MP was completed in August, the final plan
has yet to be formally presented to the National Assembly.
To move the process forward, MOFAT urges USFK and MND agree
to release the information contained in the MP as soon as
possible. Once MND has explained the MP to the National
Assembly, the Program Management Consortium (PMC) can be
hired, and the request for proposals (RFP) process can get
underway, Lee explained. However, that approach is
fundamentally at odds with USFK's desire to first hire the
PMC, which would do the work necessary to develop a
construction timeline and cost estimate. Importantly, USFK
engineers advise, and have repeatedly pointed out to MND,
that a realistic completion date cannot, in fact, be
determined at this stage in the planning process. The PMC
will first need to develop a construction timeline based on
assumptions that are yet to be worked out, such as funding
levels per year and building priorities (YRP vs. LPP). Given
that the draft MP, upon which the leaks are based, relied
upon a number of outdated and invalid plan assumptions, it
appears the ROK's agenda is to nail the USG down to the
lowest possible cost figures and a later completion date.


6. (C) Only after a realistic construction schedule is
developed can USFK begin to work out the many details
regarding the resulting movement of its units. Further time
will of course be required to move those units and close out
their old camps.

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DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION
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7. (C) USFK estimates that the total cost to the ROK for YRP
will be $6-8 billion, a figure that includes the cost of
purchasing the land, constructing the needed facilities and
moving the various USFK components into the new buildings.
It does not include the ROK portion of the LPP, a shared
project that will allow for further consolidation of USFK
bases in the ROK. It is expected that the more sizable $8
billion figure would generate serious opposition in ROK
domestic political circles, coming, as it does, in addition
to MND's request to the National Assembly to fund its
ambitious 2020 Defense Reform Plan, and on top of a new
Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that will obligate the ROKG
to make modest increases in its share of USFK defense
burdensharing costs. Ruling Uri Party members, by and large,
favor funding a significant amount of aid to North Korea and
a wide variety of South Korean social programs over approving
large increases in defense-related expenditures.

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LACK OF LEADERSHIP
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8. (C) While project delays and opposition to the cost of
such a major undertaking are to be expected, the apparent
lack of commitment on the part of the Roh Administration to
fulfill its YRP obligations is troubling. The problem
appears to be in part of the ROK's own making, because it had
earlier told the National Assembly that the total YRP bill
would be only $5.5 billion. Although the ROK is aware of the
much higher cost estimate, a December 6, 2006 letter from
Major General Park Kyung-seo, Chief Director of the USFK
Relocation Office at MND, to USFK restates the ROK belief
that its responsibility will total "approximately $1 billion
for land purchase and $4.5 billion for the facilities." The
difference between that total and the truer cost of $8
billion will no doubt be difficult for the ministry to
explain to their elected officials. Of further concern to us
is that attempts by the ROK to renegotiate its commitments
through the media, rather than via close consultations with
its ally, have become an all too common pattern by the South
Korea government in recent years.

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OPCON TRANSFER A SEPARATE ISSUE
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9. (C) While both MOFAT and MND deny it, it appears to many
observers that the 2013 date for completion of YRP is
intended to buttress the ROK position for completing the
transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) by as late as

2012. This runs counter to the clearly articulated USG
position that OPCON transfer and Yongsan relocation are
separate issues, and should remain so.

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EMBASSY COMMENT
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10. (C) We are concerned that domestic politics arising from
the 2007 ROK presidential race will only make matters worse,
while further delaying the much needed transformation of this
Alliance. Our greatest concern involves the transfer of
wartime OPCON to the ROK, and the concurrent lowering of
USFK's profile on the Peninsula through the movement of its
headquarters out of the center of Seoul to a newly-equipped
facility from which it will be better able to carry out its
continuing responsibilities in support of this important
strategic partnership. We believe that both will result in a
healthier U.S.-ROK Alliance.


11. (C) Realistically, however, completion of the YRP Master
Plan will be determined first and foremost by ROK politics
and ROK money, and both are working against us. South Korean
leadership attitudes, coupled with competing budget demands,
have caused the ROKG to make this attempt to spread out the
cost of relocation, and to force the project into line with
its goals for OPCON transfer. In response to this show of
bad faith by the Roh Administration, the Embassy intends to
stress the following points to South Korean officials:

1) Our governments agreed to undertake YRP and LPP because
they are win-win scenarios for the strength and well-being of
the Alliance. The United States is ready and willing to move
out of Yongsan as soon as possible.

2) Unilateral actions that delay the implementation process
without proper consultations, and political attempts to link
OPCON transfer to YRP, are a disservice to the Alliance.

3) We understand the complexities, difficulties and costs
associated with such a large scale transformation, but it is
vital we work through these challenges together, via
continuous consultations and transparent actions throughout
the implementation process. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW