AMBASSADOR'S FARWELL CALL ON OUTGOING ROK DEFENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 004040

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PARM PREL MNUC KNNP KN KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FARWELL CALL ON OUTGOING ROK DEFENSE
MINISTER YOON

REF: SEOUL 03768

Classified By: AMB. ALEXANDER VERSHBOW. REASONS 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: During the Ambassador's November 22 office
call on outgoing ROK Defense Minister Yoon, Kwang-ung:

-- The Ambassador thanked Yoon for his leadership,
enhancement of South Korea's global role, and support for the
alliance and its transformation.

-- Yoon acknowledged the importance of renewing the ROK troop
dispatch to Iraq, but expressed concern a battle is looming
in the National Assembly.

-- He also informed the Ambassador the ROKG will recommend
dispatching 450 troops to Lebanon (a number calculated to be
on par with, but not exceed, China's contribution).

-- Yoon described his successor, Kim, Jang-soo, as
well-versed in security policy issues.

-- He agreed on the importance of designating a specific date
for the transfer of wartime OPCON, but urged the USG to show
more "leniency" on the issue.

-- Yoon announced he had signed off on 14 camp returns, but
cautioned that the Ministry of Environment sought further
information from USFK on the remaining camps.

-- The Ambassador thanked Yoon for his efforts to construct a
training range on Jikdo, but learned weather conditions would
likely delay completion until February 2007.

-- Both agreed that, in time, the ROKG could be convinced to
fully endorse PSI.

-- They agreed the road ahead on Six-Party Talks would be
extremely difficult. Yoon predicted the DPRK would likely
oppose real progress toward peace because Kim Jong-il needed
to maintain the image of the United States as the enemy in
order to justify his regime.

The Ambassador was the last foreign dignitary, and only
foreign ambassador, to pay a farewell call on Minister Yoon,
who will be replaced by General Kim Jang-soo at an 11:00
handover ceremony on November 24 (Seoul Time). END SUMMARY


2. (C) On November 22, the Ambassador paid an office call on
outgoing ROK Minister of National Defense Yoon, Kwang-ung.
He thanked Minister Yoon for his leadership, his contribution
to enhancing South Korea's global role, particularly in Iraq
and Afghanistan, and his support for the alliance, and for
the significant transformation that had taken place on Yoon's
watch. The Ambassador commented that troop contributions by
the Republic of Korea (ROK) in Iraq, Afghanistan, and perhaps
soon in Lebanon as well, serve to counter the pessimism too
often on display by the media. Yoon said he appreciated the
Ambassador's efforts as well, during what he termed a
"complicated time" in the history of the Alliance.

Iraq Renewal
--------------


3. (C) On Iraq, the Ambassador pointed out that the work of
the ROK's Zaytun unit in Irbil was seen as a model by U.S.
military commanders. He said he hoped the ROK troops would
not be departing too soon, as there was still a need for the
good work they are performing in support of reconstruction in
the north. Yoon replied that President Roh faced a difficult
time and would have to make a great effort to get the renewal
legislation approved by the National Assembly. He told the
Ambassador his ministry had taken great pains not to say
anything to the media about the prospects for renewal until
President Bush and President Roh had discussed the matter at
their November 18 meeting in Hanoi. "The final decision will

be entirely up to our President," Yoon said.

UNIFIL
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador cited the expected ROK decision to
send troops to Lebanon as yet another example of South
Korea's increasingly active role in the world. Yoon informed
him that the ROK government had recently reached a
coordinated inter-agency agreement to recommend to the
National Assembly that the ROK send 450 troops to Lebanon.
The number, he said, would be no higher than that because
that was roughly the number of troops China was currently
contributing to UNIFIL. It would be awkward for the ROK to
send more troops than China, Yoon explained.

New Defense Minister
--------------


5. (C) Minister Yoon described his successor, Kim Jang-soo
(bio information in reftel),as very familiar with security
policy issues. Cryptically, Yoon said it was important to
respect the fact that each individual brought a different
approach to their ministerial duties. He advised the
Ambassador to extend the same level of professional courtesy
to Minister-designate Kim that he had shown all along. The
Ambassador noted that USFK Commander General Bell had spoken
highly of General Kim. He said he looked forward to having a
constructive partnership with him.

OPCON Transfer
--------------


6. (C) Pointing to important work that remains to be done,
the Ambassador stressed the need for both governments to
designate a specific date -- within the window agreed to at
the Security Consultative Meeting in October -- to get the
process for transferring wartime operational control (OPCON)
underway in 2007. Yoon agreed that a specific timetable must
be set during the first half of 2007. He predicted there
would be disagreement between the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff
and USFK on the issue, but expressed optimism that over 50
years of good Alliance relations "will aid us well" to reach
an agreement. "It would be very helpful for the stronger
partner (USG) to show more leniency," Yoon advised.

Camp Returns
--------------


7. (C) In response to a warning by the Ambassador that if
the camp return issue continues to drag on, it could get
mixed up in the 2007 Korean national election, Yoon announced
that he had put his signature to 14 of the camp returns the
previous day. He said he did so with a feeling of "great
responsibility" and the philosophy that resolving the issue
as quickly as possible was the best solution for the sake of
the Alliance. Yoon cautioned that the Ministry of the
Environment (MOE) sought further information from USFK on the
remaining camp returns. Yoon blamed these delays on the
younger generation who did not understand all the United
States had done for Korea. The Ambassador replied that there
was also an insufficient understanding among the broader
Korean populace about the U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement
(SOFA),which provided the basis for our position on
environmental issues. He pointed out that USFK is, in fact,
doing more than the SOFA requires.

Jikdo Range
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador thanked Minister Yoon for his efforts
to complete the WISS (electronic scoring) installation on the
Jikdo air-to-surface training range. Yoon lamented the fact
that weather conditions had now slowed construction, saying
he received a report the day before that the project would
"realistically" not be completed until February 2007. He

said he had attended his last cabinet meeting the previous
day where he had thanked Prime Minister Han Myung-sook for
her valuable assistance in bringing along local authorities
in both Jikdo and the relocation of Yongsan Garrison to
Pyongtaek.

PSI
---


9. (C) Noting that MND had taken a more positive view of the
ROK's role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
than some other parts of the Korean government, the
Ambassador urged the ministry to continue to make the case
for full participation in PSI. The political debate over
that issue has been too emotional, the Ambassador commented,
adding that if Korean officials focused on the facts, they
would realize they could have endorsed PSI while doing only
what they are already committed to do to support it. Both
agreed that, in time, the ROKG could perhaps be convinced of
that.

North Korean Nuclear Test
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador similarly praised MND's strong voice
against the North Korean nuclear test. He pointed out that
while it appears the Six-Party Talks will resume shortly,
there is no certainty the DPRK will voluntarily give up its
nuclear weapons. U.S.-ROK teamwork is therefore very
important, the Ambassador urged, adding he was glad President
Bush and President Roh had been able to meet at APEC on
November 18 to bring our approaches together. Describing the
road ahead as a very difficult one, Yoon provided what he
called the "simple thought" that the DPRK would in fact
oppose progress toward a peace regime because Kim Jong-il
used North Korean fear of the United States as a primary
justification for the continuation of his own
military-centered dictatorship.


11. (C) The Ambassador agreed the Six-Party negotiations
would be a difficult journey. He pointed out that while we
will seek early, concrete steps by North Korea to
denuclearize, the DPRK will want to postpone having to take
those steps for as long as possible. Yoon expressed the
belief that peace was nonetheless possible in the long run,
as it would be the natural course of events for Kim Jong-il's
hold on power to weaken over time.

Time For A Rest
--------------


12. (C) Minister Yoon concluded by noting the Ambassador
would be the final foreign dignitary with whom he would be
meeting as Defense Minister. (NOTE: His staff informed us
the U.S. Ambassador was the only foreign ambassador to ask
for a farewell call on Minister Yoon. END NOTE). Yoon noted
the Ambassador had come to Seoul during a particularly
tumultuous period of time, within South Korea as well as in
the North. "You have had to do so much, I hope it hasn't
affected your health," he said. The Ambassador replied that
events of the past year had made it an interesting time, but
that he thought the important trends were now moving in a
positive direction, and that a sense of solidarity seemed to
be building up between the U.S. and South Korean people. He
asked Yoon what was the first thing he planned to do after
handing over his responsibilities to Kim Jang-soon on
November 24. "My wife and I will be going into the
countryside for a rest," Yoon replied with a broad smile.
VERSHBOW