OPPOSITION CHAIRMAIN CLARIFIES OPCON REMARKS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003999

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL KS
SUBJECT: OPPOSITION CHAIRMAIN CLARIFIES OPCON REMARKS

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The Ambassador met with opposition GNP Chairman Kang
Jae-sup on November 16 to discuss Kang's November 8 address
to the National Assembly which was critical of the transfer
of Wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK. Although
Kang clarified that he remained supportive of the principle
behind the OPCON transfer, he asserted that the timing should
be further delayed until the North Korean threat had receded.
The Ambassador suggested that the GNP should distinguish
their reservations with the timing of OPCON transfer from the
general principle of the transfer itself. Representative
Chung Hyung-keun who was a member of a GNP delegation that
went to Washington to lobby against the OPCON transfer also
attended the meeting. END SUMMARY.

OPCON TRANSFER
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2. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern that the Korean
public may perceive a divide between the GNP's views and
those of the USG on the OPCON issue. Given the ROK's
military strength and the public opinion in favor of a more
balanced U.S.-ROK partnership, OPCON transfer was a natural
step in the progression of the U.S.-ROK alliance. Even
though North Korea was a legitimate concern to the South
Koreans, the strength of the ROK military and the guarantee
of U.S. military support in time of crisis allowed for the
issue of OPCON transfer to be seriously considered at this
time. In a nod to the Korean public who have been calling
for a slower pace for OPCON transfer, the U.S. was very
flexible at the recent SCM meetings, where the two Defense
Ministers agreed on the October 2009 to March 2012 timeframe.


3. (C) The Ambassador suggested that the GNP would cause
less confusion in the public and within the USG if it clearly
separated the principle of OPCON transfer from the timing of
the transfer. As the Korean public came closer to the
realization that OPCON transfer was indeed natural and
beneficial, the GNP's clarity on the issue would be useful
for the party's strength. The Ambassador suggested that GNP
legislators consider supporting clearly the principle of
OPCON transfer, even if there was lingering debate about the
exact timing.


4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concerns, Kang said
that he did not think there was a difference of opinion on
the matter. While supporting the principle of OPCON
transfer, Kang said he did not agree with President Roh's
efforts to mislead the people by saying OPCON was a
sovereignty issue. Kang further clarified his position with
two points. First, that OPCON should not be transferred
until peace had again taken root on the Peninsula. Second,
following the DPRK nuclear test, peace in Korea must be
reestablished through consensus-building. He cited polling
statistics from early October 2006 in which 60 percent of the
Korean people were in favor of OPCON transfer and 30 percent
were opposed. The latest poll statistics, in which support
for OPCON transfer was only 30 percent, showed that the
public had further lost faith in Roh and their sense of
insecurity had risen following the DPRK nuclear test.


5. (C) Kang suggested that he would first like to see North
Korea dismantle its nuclear facilities before considering the
OPCON issue again. If the North heard that the Combined
Forces Command (CFC) was dismantled, as called for under
OPCON transfer, it would be perceived as a win for the North.
In today's environment, it was necessary to speak in very
simple terms for the Korean people to get the message, Kang
said. If the U.S. were to withdraw its troops from Korea,
China's influence in the region would be unchecked and North
Korea would continue to push the boundaries of unacceptable
behavior.


6. (C) Kang explained that he was not speaking out against
OPCON transfer for political gain. Rather, he was concerned
with national security and regional stability, which was why
he participated in a demonstration against OPCON transfer at
City Hall and told Koreans they should not travel to Kumgang
Mountain. GNP colleague Chung Hyung-keun inquired as to the
motivation behind OPCON transfer and whether there was truly
a military justification for the move or whether it was
political price for the perceived anti-Americanism in Korea.


7. (C) The Ambassador said that political concerns played
only a small part in the decision; military rationale
provided the overarching justification. General Bell and
other U.S. military leaders strongly believed that it was
unnatural for Korea not to assume wartime control of its
troops. To guarantee that U.S. troops would be welcomed in
Korea in the long term, OPCON transfer was a positive
development, the Ambassador said. The structures put in
place to replace CFC could be as strong or stronger than the
current system, a point that even retired Korean generals
have expressed in recent weeks during the annual "Pyoungwa"
exercise. Over time, putting the sovereignty argument aside,
(which he agreed was specious),many Koreans would prefer
that their troops fall under the command of their generals in
time of war.

SUPPORT FOR PSI
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8. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that the USG was
disappointed that Korea had decided not to come out and fully
endorse PSI. The ROKG and South Korean politicians,
including the GNP, had failed to adequately explain to the
Korean people what PSI was and what it was not. The USG
remained hopeful that Korea would consider fully supporting
PSI and thereby send a stronger message to North Korea. But
we welcomed Korea's selective participation in PSI activities
and exercises. Kang said that he and his party had expended
a lot of political capital in support of PSI, despite a lack
of enthusiasm among the Korean public.

SIX PARTY TALKS
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9. (C) When Kang expressed his concern that the U.S.
appeared to be satisfied merely with getting the DPRK back to
the negotiating table and had made a concession by agreeing
to discuss the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) case bilaterally, the
Ambassador disagreed. He emphasized that the U.S. planned to
be firm and demand concrete actions such as early
dismantlement and destruction of nuclear facilities and the
return of IAEA inspectors. The Ambassador said that the
announcement that the talks would resume was a product of
multilateral pressure, especially through the UNSCR. We had
always been ready to discuss the BDA case bilaterally within
the context of the Six Party Talks; this was not a
concession. Any resolution to BDA will need to involve the
DPRK's curtailment of its illicit activity, the Ambassador
said.
VERSHBOW