DEPARTING UNIFICATION MINISTER URGES FLEXIBILITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003975

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM KS KN
SUBJECT: DEPARTING UNIFICATION MINISTER URGES FLEXIBILITY
ON DPRK

Classified By: Amb. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on November 16,
Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok reconfirmed that the ROKG
would support the UN resolution on DPRK human rights. Noting
his awareness of USG disappointment with the ROKG's November
13 announcement on PSI, Lee told the Ambassador that Seoul
would increase its range of PSI participation. More
importantly, he asserted, the ROKG had the determination to
deter WMD proliferation to or from the DPRK. USG flexibility
was now important to make progress at the Six Party Talks,
the focus of which should be denuclearization (rather than
illicit activities or human rights). Lee explained that ROKG
policy toward North Korea derived from a desire for stability
and not from any special affinity for the DPRK. The
Ambassador emphasized that the USG welcomed greater ROKG
participation in PSI and suggested that increased ROKG
inspections of DPRK ships and cargo would be a positive
signal of ROKG vigilance. The Ambassador reinforced the
point that early, concrete DPRK steps toward denuclearization
were the key to successful Six Party Talks. He also
encouraged the ROK to be more resolute in the face of DPRK
rhetoric. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a farewell call on Unification Minister Lee
Jong-seok, who is expected to leave office November 22, the
Ambassador expressed appreciation for their working
relationship and inquired whether, in addition to steps
announced on November 13 in accordance with UNSCR 1718, there
were any more fundamental changes in ROKG strategy toward the
DPRK after the North Korean nuclear test.
.
DPRK HUMAN RIGHTS
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3. (C) Pointing to one change, Unification Minister Lee
confirmed that the ROKG had decided to vote for the UN
resolution on North Korean human rights even though the vote
might complicate inter-Korean relations. Lee stressed that
the ROKG decision was in part in response to the clear USG
interest on the issue. The Ambassador remarked that this was
welcome news. Moreover, it was the right thing to do, both
in terms of principle and to the extent that it would help
Washington's perception of ROKG actions.
.
PSI AND INSPECTION ISSUES
--------------


4. (C) Lee reaffirmed that the ROKG would increase its range
of participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). He knew that the USG sought more formal and full ROKG
participation and was disappointed in Seoul's November 13
announcement, which stopped short of an endorsement of the
Statement of Interdiction Principles. However, the ROKG
needed to manage a unique situation that included the
ever-present North-South military confrontation. Lee sought
to assure the Ambassador that the ROKG possessed the
determination to deter proliferation from or to the DPRK.
The ROKG, he noted, already had enough regulations and
procedures in place to stop potential proliferation.


5. (C) The Ambassador reiterated that the USG still hoped to
discuss PSI further with South Korean counterparts. Despite
understandable political realities on the Peninsula, the ROKG
could become a formal PSI participant while continuing to
limit its actual activities in line with its special
circumstances. It would be a positive signal if the ROKG
conducted a test inspection of a DPRK vessel in accordance
with the North-South Maritime Agreement. It appeared to some
that there was a lack of intensive inspections of cargo going
to and from North Korea via the inter-Korean transportation
corridors, perhaps due in part to limited inspection
personnel. It would be a good message if the ROKG conducted
more frequent inspections to demonstrate its heightened
vigilance.


6. (C) Lee responded that the ROKG would intensify
inspections of North Korean ships if necessary. However,
there was no possibility that DPRK ships could transit ROKG

waters transferring WMD materials to a third country. Lee
claimed that DPRK ships made port calls in the ROK and
entered ROK territorial waters to deliver goods between the
two Koreas, such as humanitarian aid. Similarly, goods being
sent overland to North Korea were being used by ROK companies
in the Kaesong Industrial Complex or the Kumgang tourism
project. The ROK was already making new efforts for customs
inspections of goods going to the DPRK. For example, the ROK
strictly controlled the export of important items with serial
numbers. Lee stressed that the ROKG would do what it had to
do to prevent proliferation.


7. (C) The Ambassador indicated that questions might remain
about North Korean goods entering South Korea. ROK
inspections would reassure people that Seoul was staying
vigilant in light of the new situation on the Peninsula,
regardless if the North was trying to ship WMD items or
counterfeit cigarettes.


8. (C) Lee replied that the ROKG would intensify its
inspections as much as possible to eliminate even the
slightest concern that the USG might have.
.
LEE: USG THE KEY TO SIX PARTY TALKS . . .
--------------


9. (C) Asked about the North's decision to return to the Six
Party Talks, Lee opined that the prospects for successful
talks in the short run were not that bright. The DPRK would
assert a tougher position now that it had conducted a nuclear
test and would demonstrate a stronger will to retain its
nuclear capabilities. The most important factor, Lee
continued, was the attitude of the United States. If the
United States offered enough incentives, it was still
possible that the DPRK would abandon its nuclear programs.
On the other hand, if the USG approached the talks from a
moral point of view, with the emphasis on good versus evil,
then it was possible that the North would pursue nuclear
weapons permanently.


10. (C) Lee claimed that some experts in the United States
had concluded that the DPRK had shown a consistent intention
to posses nuclear weapons, while others argued that the USG
since 2003 had not offered enough to induce North Korea to
abandon its nuclear programs. Some felt that the USG had
allowed the current situation to happen, he said. If the
international community now failed to demonstrate flexibility
in return for DPRK promises, we might miss the opportunity to
secure a strategic agreement and find ourselves in a
situation where we would eventually be unable to induce North
Korea to abandon its nuclear programs.


11. (C) The Ambassador countered that, while the USG viewed
the situation as urgent, the international community needed
more than North Korean promises in the wake of the nuclear
test. The North signed the September 2005 Joint Statement;
the DPRK must carry out its pledges to dismantle its nuclear
programs. The international community indeed would respond
if the North actually fulfilled its obligations. It was
insufficient to ask whether the USG had offered enough
concessions because Washington had made it clear throughout
the Six Party Talks process that we would meet our
commitments. It would be more effective if the countries
pursued a team effort. We needed a coordinated response to
the North Korean challenge.


12. (C) The Ambassador observed that one reason the DPRK
dropped its preconditions for a resumption in Six Party Talks
was UNSCR 1718. The DPRK found itself up against the
international community, not just the United States.
Moreover, China not only supported UNSCR 1718 and UNSCR 1695
but was also increasing efforts to pressure the North. We
should avoid the fallacious U.S.-versus-DPRK argument and
find ways to convince the North that it could not continue to
avoid its commitments without paying any costs.


13. (C) Lee agreed and said the ROKG was taking measures
beyond the scope of UNSCR 1718, which was an international
obligation. In his view, however, the North returned to the
Six Party talks not because of UNSCR 1718 but because it had
conducted a nuclear test and could argue from a position of
strength. An additional factor was that the USG had agreed

to discuss the resolution of the Banco Delta Asia (BDA) issue
within the framework of the Six Party Talks. Lee expressed
his own view that, had the USG and DPRK reached this
agreement one month earlier than the Beijing meeting of
October 31, the North might have returned to the talks
without having conducted a nuclear test.
.
. . . FOCUS SHOULD BE THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS . . .
-------------- ---


14. (C) Lee said that when the Six Party Talks resumed, we
should reject the North Korean insistence that it be
considered a nuclear power. Lee expressed the concern that
doing otherwise and accepting North Korea as a nuclear state
might incite hard-liners to call for even stronger measures
against the DPRK, which would derail the talks. The focus
should be on encouraging the North to take concrete actions
toward denuclearization. This would require Seoul,
Washington and Beijing to have bold and flexible measures to
offer North Korea. When a roadmap for DPRK nuclear
dismantlement was developed, then we could work on a roadmap
for international incentives for North Korea. If the USG
really saw a nuclear DPRK as a catastrophe and sought peace
and stability in the region, then the USG must make every
effort to achieve dismantlement, leaving aside issues such as
human rights and illicit activities for the time being, Lee
argued.


15. (C) The Ambassador stated that the DPRK needed to take
concrete steps to show it was actually moving toward nuclear
dismantlement. Other countries could then commit to equally
bold steps. The concern, however, was that the North would
ask for our bold steps in return for just declaratory
promises, such as a missile launch moratorium or a nuclear
test freeze, which would be insufficient, words only. We
should set a high standard for DPRK actions, as well as for
our responses. BDA, for example, would not prove an easy
issue to resolve, and the North would need to demonstrate
that it was getting out of this type of illegal behavior.
While human rights and other issues might be more fully
addressed at a different stage, perhaps in the process of
normalization talks, the point was that North Korea needed to
take early steps to meet its obligations to denuclearize.

. . . NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS HAVE STALLED
--------------


16. (C) The Ambassador stated that the DPRK had broken
promises to the international community, including South
Korea. The North, for example, had prevented progress on the
inter-Korean railways, and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
had not delivered on his 2000 pledge to pay a return visit to
South Korea for a summit. Confidence-building was a two-way
street, and he asked if there were any recent positive
gestures from North Korea on inter-Korean relations.


17. (C) Lee answered that the North indeed had recently
given signs that it would consider, for example, another
round of family reunions. In his view, however, it was not
proper to advance inter-Korean relations at this time. Seoul
first wanted to see some progress in Six Party Talks. Lee
opined that some in the USG might have the misperception that
South Koreans actually trusted the North Korean leadership.
He explained that his doctoral thesis had shown the failure
of the North Korean policy of Juche and the undemocratic
nature of the North Korean dictatorship. He and his South
Korean colleagues had experienced a war with North Korea and
were daily living with a military confrontation. A single
negative word from South Korea might provoke North Korea into
starting a shooting war. A single negative word from North
Korea might shake South Korean financial markets. Therefore,
the ROKG had to be careful in its policy toward North Korea.
Lee joked that among the Six Party member countries, he was
the only minister who offered his resignation because of the
DPRK nuclear test, so how could one say that he had much
trust in Kim Jong-il. Lee concluded by saying that sometimes
one needed to talk to the hostage-takers. Seoul wanted to
build peace on the Peninsula and resolve confrontation with
Pyongyang.


18. (C) The Ambassador said that Seoul and Washington should
not let North Korean bullying tactics have too much influence

over our policies. South Korea was stronger than North
Korea, and not only in military terms. South Korea had a
strong democracy and economic institutions and the South
Korean people had a strong character, which was the real
threat to North Korea. The South had succeeded where the
North had failed. The North was not suicidal and was not
likely to start a war in response to negative words from the
South. While being prudent, the South should be resolute in
the face of North Korean rhetoric. Seoul and Washington now
had the opportunity to bring our two approaches on North
Korea closer together.
.
COMMENT
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19. (C) Combative and ideological, Lee Jong-seok has been
the most visible face of President Roh's engagement policy.
Although his departure is an acknowledgment that the policy
he represented had failed, we have seen no evidence so far
that President Roh is about to embark on a different course.
Rather, the ROKG seems to be engaged in a holding action
only, unwilling to do much except stress stability, which in
practical terms means not doing anything that might provoke
Pyongyang's ire. Lee now returns to the Sejong Institute,
home to many engagement policy supporters, including Lim
Dong-won, former President Kim Dae-jung's right-hand man in
implementing the Sunshine Policy, and Baek Jong-chun, head of
the Sejong Institute and the likely successor to Song
Min-soon as National Security Advisor. END COMMENT.
VERSHBOW